Severity by source
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:L/A:N
Network-reachable SMTP traffic (AV:N) but requires an active man-in-the-middle position and STARTTLS tampering (AC:H); no auth needed (PR:N); credential/content disclosure drives C:H with minor I:L and no availability impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (redhat).
CVSS VectorVendor: redhat
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
A flaw was found in the SMTP email configuration handling of the keycloak-services component. When the STARTTLS option is enabled, Keycloak fails to strictly enforce an encrypted connection, allowing it to fall back to unencrypted communication if the encryption request is tampered with. An attacker who can intercept network traffic can exploit this to capture sensitive email credentials and message content in plain text.
AnalysisAI
Keycloak's SMTP email configuration can silently fall back to unencrypted communication when STARTTLS is enabled, allowing an attacker who can intercept and tamper with traffic between the Keycloak server and its mail relay to capture SMTP credentials and email message content in cleartext. Affected deployments include Red Hat Build of Keycloak and Red Hat Single Sign-On 7 (CVSS 6.5, AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N), but exploitation is conditional: it requires a man-in-the-middle position on the SMTP path and an instance configured for opportunistic STARTTLS rather than implicit TLS. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires that Keycloak's SMTP email configuration has the STARTTLS option enabled (opportunistic TLS) rather than enforced implicit TLS, and that the attacker can actively intercept and modify traffic on the network path between the Keycloak server and its SMTP mail server. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | This is a genuine but conditional confidentiality issue rather than a drop-everything priority. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | No vendor-released patch or fixed version is identified in the available data at time of analysis; monitor https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-107121 and https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2547296 for Red Hat errata covering Red Hat Build of Keycloak and Red Hat Single Sign-On 7. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-94213
GHSA-4276-jw29-xwhr