ClawHub EUVD-2026-87695

Primary vector needs no special conditions: a remote unauthenticated caller can drain the single shared default quota bucket used for all direct anonymous HTTP API requests against a default ClawHub deployment, degrading availability for unrelated anonymous visitors. The secondary identity-selection/rate-limit-evasion vector is gated on the non-default TRUST_FORWARDED_IPS option being enabled while NO authenticated edge/proxy sits in front, allowing forged forwarded-IP headers (e.g. X-Forwarded-For, CF-Connecting-IP) to choose quota identities. Limiting factors: impact is confined to availability/service degradation (no data read or write), the header-spoofing path requires that specific misconfiguration, and the affected component is the ClawHub backend only - the npm CLI and OpenClaw runtime are explicitly not affected.

All signals point to a low-to-moderate, availability-only issue rather than a top-tier priority. The vendor CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N, 6.9 Medium) is internally consistent with the description: network-reachable, low-complexity, no privileges or user interaction, and impact confined to a low availability hit (VA:L) with zero confidentiality or integrity impact - matching a quota-exhaustion/rate-limit-bypass (CWE-770) that degrades service rather than exposing or altering data. The 6.9 figure is somewhat generous for a shared-quota drain that only 'denies or degrades' API access; my independent scoring lands around 5.3 (A:L only). There is no EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public exploit code identified at time of analysis, so this is not confirmed as actively exploited - the practical risk is opportunistic nuisance-level DoS against a niche service, not widespread automated exploitation. Note a nuance the raw score obscures: the primary vector (draining the single shared anonymous quota) works against default configurations and requires no auth, while the second vector (forged X-Forwarded-For/CF-Connecting-IP headers to pick quota identities and evade limits) is gated on the non-default TRUST_FORWARDED_IPS option being enabled without an authenticating edge/proxy. Defenders should treat this as a hardening/availability fix, not an emergency.

A remote, unauthenticated attacker sends a burst of direct anonymous requests to ClawHub's HTTP API; because every anonymous caller shares one default quota bucket, the attacker exhausts that allowance and legitimate anonymous visitors are throttled or blocked. Where TRUST_FORWARDED_IPS is enabled without a trusted proxy, the attacker instead forges forwarded-IP headers to rotate quota identities and evade rate limiting entirely. No public exploit code is known, but the attack requires only ordinary HTTP requests (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N).