hulumi drift EUVD-2026-68446

Exploitation requires that the target run @hulumi/drift before 1.3.2 AND that its orphan reconciler be configured/deployed such that it ingests execute plans originating from outside the trust boundary - the vulnerable behavior is acceptance of externally supplied execute plans without provenance validation. Per the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N), no authentication or user interaction is needed once that ingestion path is reachable over the network. The primary limiting factor is deployment topology: if the reconciler only consumes internally generated plans or its plan-ingestion path is not externally reachable, an attacker cannot supply a malicious plan; conversely, any deployment exposing that path is exploitable by a remote unauthenticated attacker.

The signals are largely consistent toward high priority: the vendor-supplied CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H) describes remote, unauthenticated, low-complexity exploitation with high confidentiality, integrity, and availability impact on the vulnerable system, yielding a 9.3 Critical score. Tempering that, there is no EPSS score provided, no public proof-of-concept identified, and no CISA KEV listing, so exploitation remains theoretical rather than observed at this time. The dominant real-world limiter is exposure: the danger only materializes where the reconciler actually accepts externally reachable execute-plan input, so an operator whose deployment does not expose that ingestion path faces materially lower practical risk than the raw score implies. Given the trivial exploitation profile against exposed instances and the availability of a clean fix, any team running an affected version should treat patching as urgent while verifying whether their reconciler ingestion path is externally reachable.

An attacker crafts a malicious execute plan and submits it to a system running @hulumi/drift before 1.3.2 whose orphan reconciler accepts externally supplied plans. Because the plan's provenance is not validated, the reconciler treats it as trusted and carries out attacker-chosen reconciliation operations, bypassing the intended security checks. No authentication or user interaction is required per the CVSS vector, and no public POC is currently known.