Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Scope change (S:C) because the vulnerable inspector differs from the impacted AWS resources; PR:N as crafting the policy needs no library credentials, though exploitation depends on the policy being accepted; worst-case role assumption yields high C/I/A.
Primary rating from Vendor (VulnCheck).
CVSS VectorVendor: VulnCheck
Lifecycle Timeline
4DescriptionCVE.org
@hulumi/policies versions before 1.3.2 fail to properly validate set-qualified AWS IAM condition operators in GitHub OIDC trust policies. Attackers can use ForAnyValue:StringLike operators to hide wildcard GitHub Actions OIDC subject conditions from security guardrails.
AnalysisAI
Security-guardrail bypass in the @hulumi/policies npm library (versions before 1.3.2) allows dangerous AWS IAM configurations to pass automated policy inspection. The G_OIDC_1 trust-policy inspector only matched exact StringLike/StringEquals condition operators, so set-qualified operators like ForAnyValue:StringLike could smuggle wildcard GitHub Actions OIDC 'sub' conditions past the mandatory check, letting an overly permissive AWS role assumption go undetected. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires that @hulumi/policies (version < 1.3.2) is actually used to inspect AWS IAM GitHub OIDC trust policies, and that an attacker can introduce or influence a trust policy that expresses the GitHub Actions OIDC 'sub' condition using a set-qualified operator such as ForAnyValue:StringLike (or ForAllValues:) with a wildcard value. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The signals are mixed and should be read carefully. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | Vendor-released patch: upgrade @hulumi/policies to 1.3.2 or later, in which the AWS trust-policy inspector now evaluates set-qualified string operators (ForAnyValue:/ForAllValues:) and rejects unsafe GitHub OIDC 'sub' conditions; pin or bump the dependency in package.json/lockfiles and re-run policy checks across existing IaC. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
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Evidence-validation bypass in @hulumi/policies (npm) before 1.3.2 lets actors in a deployment pipeline suppress Cloudfla
Privilege escalation in the @hulumi/policies npm package before 1.3.2 lets attackers bypass the administrator-policy gua
Policy evaluation bypass in @hulumi/policies before 1.3.2 permits unauthenticated remote attackers to submit forged Secu
Same weakness CWE-284 – Improper Access Control
View allSame technique Authentication Bypass
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-68444
GHSA-24pm-8839-wg8f