Severity by source
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Primary rating from Vendor (Linux) · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorVendor: Linux
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
5DescriptionCVE.org
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: cs40l50-vibra - validate custom data from user space
cs40l50_add() copies the custom data of an FF_PERIODIC/FF_CUSTOM effect straight from the ff_effect the user passed to EVIOCSFF, without requiring it to hold anything:
work_data.custom_data = memdup_array_user(periodic->custom_data, periodic->custom_len, sizeof(s16)); work_data.custom_len = periodic->custom_len;
The driver then reads two words out of that buffer: custom_data[0] as the waveform bank in cs40l50_effect_bank_set(), and custom_data[1] as the index within the bank in cs40l50_effect_index_set(). Neither read is covered by a length check, and custom_len is fully user controlled:
- custom_len == 0 makes memdup_array_user() call memdup_user() with a
length of zero, which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR rather than an error, so custom_data[0] dereferences it.
- custom_len == 1 allocates two bytes. A bank of ROM or RAM keeps
effect->type out of the OWT case, and custom_data[1] is then read one word past the allocation.
The bank value itself is also mishandled. It is masked with CS40L50_CUSTOM_DATA_MASK (0xffff) but stored in an s16, so a custom_data[0] of 0x8000 or above wraps to a negative value that passes the "bank_type >= CS40L50_WVFRM_BANK_NUM" test. cs40l50_effect_index_set() indexes vib->dsp.banks[] with it before the switch statement's default case gets a chance to reject it:
base_index = vib->dsp.banks[effect->type].base_index; max_index = vib->dsp.banks[effect->type].max_index;
Require the two words the driver reads to be present, and hold the masked bank in a u32 so the existing upper-bound test covers the whole range. The da7280 haptic driver already range checks custom_len this way.
AnalysisAI
Out-of-bounds memory access in the Linux kernel's cs40l50-vibra haptic driver allows a local low-privileged user to read or write beyond allocated kernel buffers by submitting a crafted force-feedback effect via EVIOCSFF ioctl. The driver's cs40l50_add() function fails to validate user-supplied custom_len before dereferencing custom_data[0] and custom_data[1], and an integer sign-wrap in bank type handling permits negative array indexing into vib->dsp.banks[]. …
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Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours, inventory systems running Linux kernels with cs40l50-vibra driver support and identify those handling sensitive data or operating in high-trust environments; within 7 days, obtain the vendor-released patch from your Linux distribution (Ubuntu, RHEL, Debian, or others) and validate it in non-production environments to ensure haptic functionality remains operational; within 30 days, deploy the patched kernel across all affected systems following your standard change management procedures and complete post-deployment validation.
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-66490
GHSA-6c2r-6hqv-3xph