GHSA-m82c-83jf-3j4v
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
AC:H and PR:L because the attacker needs their own recovery-enabled account plus the victim's password and a non-numeric key scheme; account takeover yields C:H/I:H, no availability impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (CNA).
CVSS VectorVendor
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
5Description PRE-NVD
AnalysisAI
Two-factor authentication bypass in the Perl module Punk::Plugin::TOTP before 0.05 lets an attacker who already knows a victim's password clear the victim's TOTP challenge using a recovery code issued to the attacker's own account. The flaw stems from the recovery-code helper looking up codes by digest across all users and then binding ownership through a numeric comparison of user identifiers, which fails whenever accounts are keyed by username, email, or UUID. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires three concrete prerequisites, all named in the description: (1) the attacker already knows the victim's account password, since the recovery code is only accepted after primary TOTP verification fails at the challenge route; (2) the attacker possesses a valid recovery code issued to an account they control; and (3) the target application keys its user models on a NON-numeric identifier - a username, email address, or UUID - because the bypass depends on Perl integer coercion collapsing such identifiers to zero so two of them compare equal. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The published CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N, C:H/I:H/A:H = 9.8) treats this as trivially exploitable and unauthenticated, but the description contradicts that: the attacker must already know the victim's password (first factor) AND hold a valid recovery code of their own (implying an attacker-controlled account), AND the target application must key user models on a non-numeric identifier. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker who has phished or reused a victim's password reaches the TOTP challenge, fails standard TOTP verification, then submits a recovery code from their own registered account. Because both accounts are keyed on non-numeric identifiers that coerce to zero, the ownership check passes and the attacker completes the victim's second factor, achieving full account takeover. … |
| Remediation | Upgrade to Punk::Plugin::TOTP 0.05 or later - Vendor-released patch: 0.05 (see the Changes file at https://metacpan.org/release/LNATION/Punk-TOTP-0.05/source/Changes and the oss-security advisory at https://seclists.org/oss-sec/2026/q3/574 / http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/08/25/6). … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours: identify all systems using Punk::Plugin::TOTP and determine their current versions. …
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Same weakness CWE-305 – Authentication Bypass by Primary Weakness
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-66119