What is the CVSS score of EUVD-2026-62556?

EUVD-2026-62556 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.1 (Critical). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.6%.

Which versions of Wazuh are affected by EUVD-2026-62556?

Critical vulnerabilities in Wazuh versions 4.0.0-4.14.5 and 5.0.0-beta1/beta2 allow attackers with cluster-level network access to forge administrator credentials and gain full control of your…. A patch is available.

Is there a public PoC exploit available for EUVD-2026-62556?

Yes, a public proof-of-concept exploit is available for EUVD-2026-62556. Prioritise patching immediately. EPSS: 0.6%.

How to fix or mitigate EUVD-2026-62556?

Within 24 hours, conduct a comprehensive inventory of all Wazuh deployments to identify instances running versions 4.0.0-4.14.5 or 5.0.0-beta1/beta2. Within 7 days, apply vendor patches immediately to production and non-production systems: upgrade 4.x instances to Wazuh 4.14.6 and 5.x instances to 5.0.0-beta3, ensuring cluster nodes are updated in coordination to maintain availability. Within 30 days, complete patching of all remaining instances, audit administrative account activity and API token creation logs during the vulnerability exposure window, and reset credentials for all administrative users as a precautionary measure.

Wazuh EUVD-2026-62556

| CVE-2026-48162 CRITICAL

External Control of File Name or Path (CWE-73)

2026-08-19 GitHub_M

Information Disclosure Wazuh

9.1

CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: GitHub_M

Severity by source

Vendor (GitHub_M) PRIMARY

9.1 CRITICAL

AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

vuln.today AI

9.1 CRITICAL

Attacker must hold the shared cluster key (PR:H) but acts over the network with low complexity; arbitrary file read yields the API key, escaping the DAPI component to compromise the security authority (S:C), giving full C/I/A via forged admin tokens.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H

Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M).

CVSS VectorVendor: GitHub_M

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

High

User Interaction

None

Scope

Changed

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

High

Lifecycle Timeline

Source Code Evidence Fetched

Aug 19, 2026 - 17:12 vuln.today

Analysis Generated

Aug 19, 2026 - 17:12 vuln.today

Patch available

Aug 19, 2026 - 17:02 EUVD

CVE Published

Aug 19, 2026 - 16:13 cve.org

CRITICAL 9.1

DescriptionCVE.org

Wazuh is a free and open source platform used for threat prevention, detection, and response. From 4.0.0 until 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta3, DistributedAPI.send_tmp_file() in framework/wazuh/core/cluster/dapi/dapi.py joins an attacker-controlled tmp_file value to WAZUH_PATH without canonicalization or confinement. A cluster peer holding the shared Fernet key can use traversal or an absolute path to make the master return any readable file over the cluster channel. Reading /var/ossec/api/configuration/security/private_key.pem allows the peer to forge administrator REST API tokens offline and then exercise administrative privileges without creating an account. This issue is fixed in versions 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta3.

AnalysisAI

Arbitrary file read in Wazuh cluster deployments (4.0.0 through 4.14.5, and 5.0.0-beta1/beta2) lets a peer node that already holds the shared cluster Fernet key coerce the master into returning any file it can read over the encrypted cluster channel. By retrieving /var/ossec/api/configuration/security/private_key.pem, that peer can forge administrator REST API tokens offline and exercise full administrative privileges without ever creating an account. No public exploit identified at time of analysis; the underlying fix is confirmed in the vendor advisory and shipped in 4.14.6 and 5.0.0-beta3.

Technical ContextAI

Wazuh is an open-source XDR/SIEM whose multi-node clusters distribute API operations via a DistributedAPI (DAPI) mechanism, with worker and master nodes authenticating each other using a shared symmetric Fernet key. The flaw is a classic CWE-73 (External Control of File Name or Path): DistributedAPI.send_tmp_file() in framework/wazuh/core/cluster/dapi/dapi.py built the source path as os.path.join(common.WAZUH_PATH, self.f_kwargs['tmp_file']) with no canonicalization or directory confinement. Because os.path.join discards the base when the second argument is absolute - and does not collapse '../' sequences - a caller supplying an absolute path (e.g. /etc/passwd) or a traversal string (e.g. ../api/configuration/security/private_key.pem) makes the master read and stream back an out-of-scope file. The patched code resolves the joined path with os.path.realpath() and rejects anything not confined under common.OSSEC_TMP_PATH. Affected component per CPE is cpe:2.3:a:wazuh:wazuh, specifically clustered installations where DAPI file transfer is reachable.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patch: upgrade to Wazuh 4.14.6 (https://github.com/wazuh/wazuh/releases/tag/v4.14.6) on the 4.x line, or to 5.0.0-beta3 (https://github.com/wazuh/wazuh/releases/tag/v5.0.0-beta3) if running the 5.0 pre-release; the fix (PR https://github.com/wazuh/wazuh/pull/36246, commit de1eeedbe336744934be4e20d87d84a76e438cee) adds realpath resolution and confinement of tmp_file to the OSSEC tmp directory. Because the vulnerability can already have exposed the API private key, after patching you should rotate /var/ossec/api/configuration/security/private_key.pem (invalidating any forged tokens) and rotate the shared cluster Fernet key, then review authentication_pool/API logs for anomalous admin token use. Where immediate patching is not possible, reduce exposure by strictly firewalling the cluster port (default 1516/tcp) so only trusted node IPs can speak on the cluster channel and by treating every cluster node as a crown-jewel host, since any node holding the shared key can trigger the read - note this network control does not protect against an already-compromised legitimate node, so it is a stopgap, not a substitute for the upgrade.