Trigger.dev EUVD-2026-58482

Exploitation requires three concurrent conditions: (1) the attacker possesses a valid project API key for any project on the target instance - the attacker must be a registered project member or hold a leaked/stolen key; (2) the Trigger.dev instance is self-hosted and configured for multiple organizations - single-organization deployments and the Trigger.dev managed cloud are not subject to cross-tenant data exposure; (3) the attacker has knowledge of or can enumerate the target organization's projectRef identifier and environment slug to construct a valid traversal path. Exploitation is bounded by the PR:L authentication requirement (no unauthenticated access), the multi-org self-hosted deployment topology, and the need to know valid cross-tenant identifiers. Admin access is not required - any project-scoped API key suffices.

The CVSS 3.1 vector AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N scores 8.1. Attack complexity is Low because no race conditions or advanced knowledge are required beyond a valid project API key and awareness of the object-store key naming scheme. PR:L reflects the mandatory project API key - the vulnerability is not unauthenticated. High confidentiality and integrity impacts reflect the ability to read and overwrite cross-tenant task data. EPSS data is absent from the provided intelligence and cannot be assessed. No CISA KEV listing exists, and no public exploit or POC has been identified - exploitation status is unconfirmed in the wild. A significant real-world risk boundary: the cross-tenant impact applies only to multi-organization self-hosted deployments; single-organization self-hosted instances and the Trigger.dev managed cloud service are not exposed to cross-tenant data leakage, which meaningfully narrows the affected population compared to what the raw CVSS score implies. Organizations running self-hosted multi-tenant instances should treat this as a genuine high-priority finding.

An attacker holding a valid project API key for Organization A on a multi-organization self-hosted Trigger.dev instance (versions 4.4.2-4.4.x) sends a presign GET or POST request to /api/v1/packets/../../<orgB-projectRef>/<orgB-env>/sensitive-output, where the .. segments navigate out of Organization A's object-store prefix into Organization B's namespace. The server returns a presigned URL granting direct read or write access to Organization B's offloaded task payload in the underlying object store. No public POC has been identified, but the fix diff in PR #3830 makes the traversal mechanism transparent to any reader.