Vault Secrets Operator EUVD-2026-58400

Exploitation requires a multi-tenant Kubernetes cluster running Vault Secrets Operator 1.3.0-1.4.1 where the attacker holds limited Kubernetes RBAC sufficient to create or modify the AppRole authentication configuration (specifically the SecretIDPath field) processed by the operator. The concrete prerequisite named in the description is the AppRole authentication configuration's SecretIDPath, which the attacker abuses to reference arbitrary files on the operator pod and to specify a tenant-controlled destination endpoint for exfiltration. Limiting factors: the attacker must already be an authenticated in-cluster tenant (PR:L, not anonymous), the deployment must actually use AppRole auth via a file path and grant tenants influence over that configuration, and single-tenant or strictly RBAC-locked clusters where tenants cannot touch VSO custom resources are not practically exploitable. No user interaction is required (UI:N).

The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N, 9.6 Critical) indicates a network-reachable, low-complexity attack requiring only limited privileges and no user interaction, with a scope change reflecting that one tenant's action compromises other tenants' or the operator's credentials. The PR:L is consistent with the description's 'tenant with limited Kubernetes RBAC permissions,' so this is genuinely low-barrier for anyone already inside a multi-tenant cluster. No EPSS score, KEV listing, or POC is present in the provided data, so there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and no evidence of active exploitation - the criticality is driven by structural impact, not observed attacks. The main uncertainty: exploitation presupposes a multi-tenant cluster where untrusted tenants can influence VSO AppRole configuration; single-tenant or tightly-RBAC'd deployments face materially lower real-world risk than the raw 9.6 suggests. Availability impact is None, so this is a confidentiality/integrity (credential theft and lateral escalation) issue rather than a denial-of-service concern.

A tenant holding only limited Kubernetes RBAC in a shared cluster creates or edits a VSO AppRole authentication resource, setting the SecretIDPath to traverse to a sensitive file (for example another tenant's token or a service-account credential) on the operator pod, and directs authentication toward a tenant-controlled endpoint. When the operator processes the configuration it reads the targeted file and transmits its contents to the attacker's endpoint, handing over credentials that enable privilege escalation across the cluster. No public POC is identified at time of analysis, but the low attack complexity (AC:L) and absence of user interaction make weaponization straightforward for an insider.