Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Adjacent vector (AV:A) per CVSS 4.0 source; PR:N confirmed; A:H because the entire kuma-cp process crashes, not merely degraded.
Primary rating from Vendor (Kong).
CVSS VectorVendor: Kong
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
The dataplane token validator in kuma-cp performs an unchecked Go type assertion on the JWT kid header. A token whose kid is a JSON number decodes as a float64 and triggers a runtime panic before any signature, claims, or authorization check runs.
The panic terminates the entire kuma-cp process, HTTP API, the health and readiness endpoints, and xDS. Unauthenticated access to the dataplane gRPC server can trigger the crash with a malformed token
A single request is a transient interruption; sustaining an outage requires repeated requests.
AnalysisAI
Denial-of-service in Kong Mesh's kuma-cp control plane allows unauthenticated network-adjacent attackers to crash the entire control plane process by submitting a JWT token whose kid header is a JSON number instead of a string. Because the Go runtime panics on the unchecked type assertion before any signature, claims, or authorization logic executes, the crash takes down kuma-cp's HTTP API, health and readiness endpoints, and xDS simultaneously. No public exploit has been identified at time of analysis, but the attack is trivially reproducible from the PR diff; sustained availability loss requires repeated requests since the process will restart.
Technical ContextAI
The affected component is the dataplane token validator in kuma-cp (the control plane of Kuma, the open-source service mesh underlying Kong Mesh, CPE cpe:2.3:a:kong_inc.:kong_mesh:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*). JWT headers are decoded by Go's JSON unmarshaler into a map[string]interface{}; numeric values in that map arrive as float64, not string. The validator called kid.(string) - a bare, unchecked Go type assertion - without first verifying the runtime type. This is CWE-248 (Unchecked Exception): the assertion panics at runtime when the type does not match, and because the panic propagates up the gRPC call stack without a recovery interceptor, it terminates the entire kuma-cp process. The fix, visible in the PR diff, replaces the bare assertion with a two-value checked form (keyID, ok := kid.(string)) and adds gRPC unary and streaming recovery interceptors in pkg/dp-server/server/recovery.go as a defense-in-depth measure.
RemediationAI
Upstream fixes are available across multiple backport PRs: https://github.com/kumahq/kuma/pull/17465, /17466, /17467, /17468, /17469, /17470, /17471, and /17472; the exact patched release version is not independently confirmed from the provided data, so operators should consult https://developer.konghq.com/mesh/changelog/ to identify the first tagged release incorporating these changes and upgrade to it. As a compensating control prior to patching, restrict network access to the kuma-cp dataplane gRPC port (typically 5678) to trusted dataplanes only via network policy or firewall rules - this directly removes the unauthenticated adjacent-network attack surface at the cost of blocking legitimate dataplane registrations from untrusted segments. The advisory is at https://github.com/kumahq/kuma/security/advisories/GHSA-5mxq-7xq4-3vx8.
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Same weakness CWE-248 – Uncaught Exception
View allSame technique Denial Of Service
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-57421
GHSA-7gh2-244h-962w