Chatwoot EUVD-2026-48360

Exploitation requires network access to the Chatwoot HTTP application and specifically to the ActiveStorage direct-uploads controller endpoint; per the CVSS vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N) there is no authentication, no user interaction, and no special attack requirement, so a default internet-exposed Chatwoot instance older than 4.16.0 is directly exploitable. What limits exploitation: the instance must be reachable by the attacker (internet-facing or attacker-adjacent network), and impact is bounded to creating/writing arbitrary storage blobs across tenants (integrity and limited availability) rather than reading existing data or achieving code execution. No special product feature toggle or non-default configuration is called out in the description as a prerequisite.

The signals are largely consistent and point to a genuine priority. The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N) describes network-reachable, low-complexity, unauthenticated exploitation with no user interaction - trivially automatable. Impact is scoped to integrity (VI:H, arbitrary data written to the storage backend) plus limited availability (VA:L, potential storage exhaustion), with no confidentiality impact (VC:N) and no subsequent-system impact, which is why the base score is 8.8 rather than a full 9.x. Exploit maturity is elevated: publicly available exploit code exists and the issue was disclosed by a credible research org (VulnCheck), so weaponization by opportunistic actors is realistic. No EPSS score was provided in the input, and the CVE is not listed in CISA KEV, so there is no confirmation of active in-the-wild exploitation yet. Net: high real-world risk for internet-exposed Chatwoot instances given unauthenticated network access and public POC, tempered only by the write-oriented (not direct RCE or data-theft) impact profile.

A remote attacker with no credentials sends crafted requests to an internet-exposed Chatwoot instance's ActiveStorage direct-uploads controller, specifying an arbitrary account and conversation ID, and receives signed PUT URLs. Using the public POC, they write arbitrary attacker-controlled blobs into another tenant's storage - polluting attachments, planting malicious files, or exhausting storage - all without authenticating or interacting with any user.