Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Network-delivered via OCPP but AC:H because the attacker must first occupy the trusted OCPP-server role; S:C and full C/I/A as injected commands run on the charger OS.
Primary rating from Vendor (CyberDanube).
CVSS VectorVendor: CyberDanube
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
Autel Maxi Charger Single firmware through V1.03.51 is vulnerable to OS command injection when processing OCPP GetDiagnostics requests. A malicious or compromised OCPP server can supply a crafted diagnostics URL that results in arbitrary command execution on the charging station.
AnalysisAI
OS command injection in Autel MaxiCharger Single EV charging stations (firmware through V1.03.51) lets a malicious or compromised OCPP backend server inject arbitrary operating-system commands via the diagnostics URL parameter of an OCPP GetDiagnostics request. A rogue or hijacked charge-point management server can fully compromise the charger, and publicly available exploit code exists (CyberDanube), though no active exploitation has been confirmed. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires the attacker to control the OCPP server side of the charger's connection - either by operating a malicious OCPP backend, compromising the legitimate charge-point management server, or man-in-the-middling an OCPP session that lacks TLS/mutual authentication - and then sending a GetDiagnostics request with a crafted diagnostics URL containing OS command-injection payload. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The CVSS 4.0 base score is 9.5 (AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N with high impact to both the vulnerable system and subsequent systems), reflecting network reachability, low complexity, and total compromise - but the AT:P (attack requirement present) metric is the crux: exploitation is not against an arbitrary anonymous attacker but requires the adversary to occupy the position of the charger's OCPP server, either by operating a malicious backend, compromising the legitimate one, or performing a man-in-the-middle on an unauthenticated/weakly-authenticated OCPP session. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker who stands up a rogue OCPP server, compromises the legitimate charge-point management platform, or intercepts an unauthenticated OCPP session sends a GetDiagnostics request whose diagnostics URL embeds shell metacharacters and an attacker command. The charger parses the request and executes the injected command on its OS, giving the attacker code execution on the charging station; a public POC from CyberDanube demonstrates the technique, and the low attack complexity means it can be triggered with a single crafted message once server position is achieved. |
| Remediation | No vendor-released patched firmware version is identified at time of analysis, so operators should treat mitigation as primary: update to any Autel-provided firmware newer than V1.03.51 as soon as the vendor publishes one and monitor the CyberDanube advisory (https://cyberdanube.com/security-research/multiple-vulnerabilities-in-autel-maxi-charger/) and Autel channels for a release. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours, immediately inventory all Autel MaxiCharger Single stations and confirm firmware versions to identify affected units (v1.03.51 and earlier), while documenting OCPP backend server configurations and network connectivity. …
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-46640
GHSA-pfm9-xrwg-mf3r