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Fiber Helmet Middleware EUVDEUVD-2026-42356

| CVE-2026-53624 MEDIUM
Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information (CWE-319)
2026-07-06 https://github.com/gofiber/fiber GHSA-gv83-gqw6-9j2c
4.8
CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: https://github.com/gofiber/fiber
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Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/gofiber/fiber) PRIMARY
4.8 MEDIUM
AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
vuln.today AI
4.8 MEDIUM

MITM network position required raises AC:H; attacker needs no credentials; limited confidentiality and integrity impact from traffic interception only.

3.1 AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N
4.0 AV:N/AC:H/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
SUSE
MEDIUM
qualitative

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/gofiber/fiber).

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/gofiber/fiber

Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
High
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
Low
Integrity
Low
Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

2
Analysis Generated
Jul 06, 2026 - 22:13 vuln.today
CVE Published
Jul 06, 2026 - 20:43 github-advisory
MEDIUM 4.8

DescriptionCVE.org

Summary

The helmet middleware in gofiber/fiber never sets the Strict-Transport-Security (HSTS) response header, even when HSTSMaxAge is explicitly configured, because the condition check at helmet.go:67 uses c.Protocol() - which returns the HTTP protocol version string (e.g., "HTTP/1.1", "HTTP/2.0") - instead of c.Scheme() - which returns the URL scheme ("http" or "https"). Since c.Protocol() never equals "https" in any real deployment, the HSTS header is permanently disabled, defeating the security protection.

Details

Root cause: middleware/helmet/helmet.go, line 67:

go
if c.Protocol() == "https" && cfg.HSTSMaxAge != 0 {

c.Protocol() (defined at req.go:865-867) delegates to fasthttp.Request.Header.Protocol(), which returns the HTTP protocol version:

  • "HTTP/1.1" for HTTP/1.1 connections
  • "HTTP/2.0" for HTTP/2 connections

The correct method is c.Scheme() (defined at req.go:844-862), which returns:

  • "http" for plain HTTP connections
  • "https" for TLS connections

Since "HTTP/1.1" != "https" always evaluates to true, the entire HSTS block (lines 67-76) is dead code.

Note on test coverage: The existing helmet test (helmet_test.go) passes because it uses ctx.Request.Header.SetProtocol("https") to artificially force Protocol() to return "https". However, fasthttp.Request.Header.SetProtocol() sets the HTTP version field, and real HTTP requests never have protocol "https" - they have "HTTP/1.1" or "HTTP/2.0". The test is validating the wrong thing.

PoC

Clean-checkout maintainer-runnable recipe:

  1. Save the following as middleware/helmet/poc_hsts_test.go:
go
package helmet

import (
    "crypto/tls"
    "net/http/httptest"
    "testing"

    "github.com/gofiber/fiber/v3"
)

func Test_PoC_HSTS_NeverSet(t *testing.T) {
    app := fiber.New()
    app.Use(New(Config{
        HSTSMaxAge: 31536000,
    }))
    app.Get("/", func(c fiber.Ctx) error {
        return c.SendString("ok")
    })

    // Simulate HTTPS connection
    req := httptest.NewRequest(fiber.MethodGet, "/", nil)
    req.TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{}

    resp, _ := app.Test(req)
    hsts := resp.Header.Get("Strict-Transport-Security")

    if hsts == "" {
        t.Log("BUG CONFIRMED: HSTS header not set. c.Protocol() returns 'HTTP/1.1', not 'https'")
        t.Log("Fix: change c.Protocol() == 'https' to c.Scheme() == 'https' on line 67")
    }
}
  1. Run: go test -run Test_PoC_HSTS_NeverSet -v ./middleware/helmet/

Expected vulnerable output:

=== RUN   Test_PoC_HSTS_NeverSet
    BUG CONFIRMED: HSTS header not set. c.Protocol() returns 'HTTP/1.1', not 'https'
    Fix: change c.Protocol() == 'https' to c.Scheme() == 'https' on line 67
--- PASS: Test_PoC_HSTS_NeverSet

Expected output after fix:

=== RUN   Test_PoC_HSTS_NeverSet
--- PASS: Test_PoC_HSTS_NeverSet
    (HSTS header is set: "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains")

Observed output from this environment (commit ee98695f):

=== RUN   Test_PoC_HSTS_NeverSet
    poc_hsts_test.go:39: HSTS header value: ""
    poc_hsts_test.go:42: BUG CONFIRMED: HSTS header is NOT set even over TLS
    poc_hsts_test.go:43: Root cause: helmet.go:67 uses c.Protocol() which returns HTTP version
    poc_hsts_test.go:44: c.Protocol() returns 'HTTP/1.1' not 'https'
    poc_hsts_test.go:45: Fix: use c.Scheme() == 'https' instead of c.Protocol() == 'https'
--- PASS: Test_PoC_HSTS_NeverSet

Negative/control case: With HSTSMaxAge: 0 (default), HSTS is correctly not set (this is expected behavior, not a bug).

Cleanup: Remove poc_hsts_test.go after verification.

Impact

The HSTS header is never applied in production, leaving all users vulnerable to:

  • SSL stripping attacks: An active network attacker can downgrade HTTPS connections to HTTP, intercepting traffic between the client and server.
  • Protocol downgrade: Without HSTS, browsers will silently accept HTTP connections to the site, even if the site supports HTTPS.
  • Cookie theft over HTTP: Session cookies without the Secure flag will be sent over HTTP if the user is tricked into an HTTP connection.

This affects any application that:

  1. Uses the helmet middleware
  2. Configures HSTSMaxAge > 0 expecting HSTS protection
  3. Serves traffic over HTTPS

The vulnerability requires an active MITM attacker on the network path, which is realistic in public Wi-Fi, corporate networks, and ISP-level scenarios.

Suggested remediation

In middleware/helmet/helmet.go, line 67, replace c.Protocol() with c.Scheme():

go
// Before (broken):
if c.Protocol() == "https" && cfg.HSTSMaxAge != 0 {

// After (fixed):
if c.Scheme() == "https" && cfg.HSTSMaxAge != 0 {

Additionally, update the existing test to use a realistic TLS simulation instead of SetProtocol("https"):

go
// Before (artificial - sets HTTP version to "https" which never happens in practice):
ctx.Request.Header.SetProtocol("https")

// After (realistic - simulates TLS connection):
ctx.RequestCtx().Request.Header.SetProtocol("HTTP/1.1")
ctx.RequestCtx().TLS = &tls.ConnectionState{}

Regression test: Add a test case that verifies HSTS is set when req.TLS is non-nil and HSTSMaxAge > 0, without using SetProtocol.

AnalysisAI

HSTS header delivery is permanently broken in gofiber/fiber's helmet middleware due to a logic error that compares the HTTP protocol version string ('HTTP/1.1', 'HTTP/2.0') against the literal string 'https' - a comparison that is always false in any real deployment, making the entire HSTS conditional block dead code. Applications using Fiber that configure HSTSMaxAge expecting HSTS protection receive none, silently eliminating a security control that operators believe is active. A maintainer-runnable POC confirming the bug has been published with the advisory; no CISA KEV listing exists, but any application relying on helmet for HSTS protection has had that protection stripped since the erroneous code was introduced.

Technical ContextAI

The Fiber web framework (pkg:go/github.com_gofiber_fiber) provides a helmet middleware that sets security-related HTTP response headers, including Strict-Transport-Security. The root cause maps to CWE-319 (Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information) and is an API confusion bug: helmet.go:67 calls c.Protocol(), which delegates to fasthttp's Header.Protocol() and returns the HTTP version string ('HTTP/1.1' or 'HTTP/2.0'), rather than c.Scheme(), which inspects the TLS connection state and correctly returns 'http' or 'https'. The conditional c.Protocol() == 'https' is unconditionally false in production, rendering the entire HSTS emission block unreachable. The flaw was masked by the existing unit test, which forged the protocol header to the literal string 'https' via SetProtocol('https') - a state that never occurs in real HTTP requests - causing the test to pass while validating the wrong code path. The bug is confirmed at commit ee98695f.

RemediationAI

The definitive fix is a one-line change in middleware/helmet/helmet.go at line 67: replace c.Protocol() with c.Scheme() so the condition reads if c.Scheme() == 'https' && cfg.HSTSMaxAge != 0. No released patched version number is confirmed in the provided advisory data; monitor the GitHub advisory at https://github.com/gofiber/fiber/security/advisories/GHSA-gv83-gqw6-9j2c for a tagged release and update the go.mod dependency accordingly once available. As an immediate compensating control with no meaningful side effects, configure the upstream reverse proxy or load balancer (nginx, Caddy, AWS ALB, Cloudflare) to inject the Strict-Transport-Security header directly, bypassing the broken middleware entirely. A concrete nginx directive would be: add_header Strict-Transport-Security 'max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains' always. Alternatively, setting HSTSMaxAge: 0 in the helmet config and delegating HSTS to infrastructure fully removes the false sense of security while the patch is awaited.

Vendor StatusVendor

SUSE

Severity: Moderate
Product Status
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 16.1 Affected
SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.1 Affected

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EUVD-2026-42356 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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