What is the CVSS score of EUVD-2026-41612?

EUVD-2026-41612 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.1 (Critical). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.3%.

Which versions of Gitea are affected by EUVD-2026-41612?

A critical OAuth2 scope validation bypass in the archive endpoint (versions prior to 1.26.2) allows authenticated users with limited-scope tokens to access unauthorized resources.. A patch is available.

How to fix or mitigate EUVD-2026-41612?

Within 24 hours: confirm your deployed version and review archive endpoint access logs for anomalies. Within 7 days: upgrade to version 1.26.2 or later. Within 30 days: audit token activity and accessed resources during the exposure window for evidence of unauthorized access.

Gitea EUVD-2026-41612

| CVE-2026-20706 CRITICAL

Incorrect Authorization (CWE-863)

2026-06-16 https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea

GHSA-cr4g-f395-h25h

Authentication Bypass

9.1

CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea

Severity by source

Vendor (https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea) PRIMARY

9.1 CRITICAL

AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

vuln.today AI

6.5 MEDIUM

Requires a valid low-scope personal access token, so PR:L not PR:N; endpoint only serves read-only archives, so C:H but I:N and A:N.

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea).

CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

None

Lifecycle Timeline

Analysis Updated

Jul 06, 2026 - 19:36 vuln.today

v3 (cvss_changed)

Analysis Updated

Jul 06, 2026 - 19:36 vuln.today

v2 (cvss_changed)

Re-analysis Queued

Jul 06, 2026 - 19:22 vuln.today

cvss_changed

CVSS changed

Jul 06, 2026 - 19:22 NVD

9.1 (CRITICAL)

Source Code Evidence Fetched

Jun 17, 2026 - 00:37 vuln.today

Analysis Generated

Jun 17, 2026 - 00:37 vuln.today

DescriptionCVE.org

Summary

PR #37698 added checkDownloadTokenScope to /raw/*, /media/*, and attachment download web endpoints. The /archive/* endpoint (repo.Download in routers/web/repo/repo.go:372) was not included in the fix. This endpoint accepts OAuth2 tokens via webAuth.AllowOAuth2 (registered at routers/web/web.go:1649-1652) but does not call checkDownloadTokenScope or CheckRepoScopedToken.

A personal access token with any non-repository scope (e.g., read:issue or read:misc) can download full repository archives (zip/tar.gz) of private repositories the token owner has access to.

Impact

Scope escalation: tokens scoped to non-repository categories can access full repository content through the archive download endpoint. Higher impact than endpoints fixed in #37698 because /archive/* serves the entire repository.

Steps to Reproduce

Create a personal access token with ONLY read:misc scope
Access: GET /{owner}/{private-repo}/archive/main.tar.gz
Archive is served (200 OK) instead of being rejected (403 Forbidden)

Compare with fixed endpoints:

GET /{owner}/{private-repo}/raw/branch/main/README.md correctly returns 403

Root Cause

Download function in routers/web/repo/repo.go:372 does not call checkDownloadTokenScope. The outer group middleware reqUnitCodeReader checks repository permission but not token scope.

The API equivalent (/api/v1/repos/{owner}/{repo}/archive/*) IS properly scoped via tokenRequiresScopes(AccessTokenScopeCategoryRepository). The git HTTP endpoints are scoped via CheckRepoScopedToken in httpBase.

Suggested Fix

Add checkDownloadTokenScope(ctx) to Download and InitiateDownload in routers/web/repo/repo.go. The function already exists in routers/web/repo/download.go (same package).

Discovery Method

Variant analysis of PR #37698 - reviewed all web routes with webAuth.AllowOAuth2 middleware.

AnalysisAI

{owner}/{repo}/archive/* accepts OAuth2 tokens but never validates the token's scope, unlike the equivalent API and git-HTTP paths. The issue was found via variant analysis of prior fix PR #37698, is fixed in 1.26.2, and carries a low EPSS (0.26%, 17th percentile) with no public exploit identified at time of analysis beyond the reproduction steps published in the GHSA advisory.

Technical ContextAI

Gitea is a lightweight, self-hosted Go-based Git hosting service (package pkg:go/code.gitea.io/gitea). Gitea implements fine-grained personal access token (PAT) scopes so a token can be limited to categories such as issues, notifications, or misc data without granting repository code access. The web archive route (repo.Download at routers/web/repo/repo.go:372, registered at routers/web/web.go:1649-1652) is wrapped by webAuth.AllowOAuth2 to accept PAT bearer tokens and by the reqUnitCodeReader middleware, which verifies the user's repository permission but NOT the token's declared scope. The root cause is CWE-863 (Incorrect Authorization): the download handler omits the checkDownloadTokenScope enforcement that PR #37698 added to /raw/*, /media/*, and attachment endpoints, and does not call CheckRepoScopedToken as the git HTTP paths do or tokenRequiresScopes(AccessTokenScopeCategoryRepository) as the API archive path does. The authorization decision therefore checks the account's access but skips the token-scope check, allowing scope escalation.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patch: upgrade to Gitea 1.26.2 or later, which adds checkDownloadTokenScope to the Download and InitiateDownload/RedirectDownload handlers per PR #37735 (https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/pull/37735); see the release notes at https://blog.gitea.com/release-of-1.26.2/ and the advisory GHSA-cr4g-f395-h25h. If immediate upgrade is not possible, reduce exposure by revoking or not issuing personal access tokens with non-repository scopes to users who should not read private repository code, and by placing a reverse proxy or WAF rule that blocks or requires additional auth on GET/POST /{owner}/{repo}/archive/* requests bearing bearer tokens - note this proxy control also blocks legitimate token-based archive downloads and must whitelist trusted automation. Auditing which accounts hold private-repo access and rotating existing low-scope tokens further limits residual risk until the upgrade is applied.