Wagtail CMS EUVD-2026-41147

Exploitation requires a valid, authenticated Wagtail admin account - the vulnerability is explicitly not accessible to ordinary site visitors without admin access. The specific trigger is interacting with the Documents or Images chooser 'chosen' endpoint within the Wagtail admin interface, which is a standard UI workflow for content editors. The disclosed information is limited to filenames, display names, and URLs of assets in restricted collections; actual file content retrieval depends on downstream storage access controls (e.g., whether the storage backend serves files without authentication). The key limiting factor is the PR:L authentication requirement: an attacker must already possess admin credentials, constraining realistic exposure to insider threats or compromised admin accounts. Organizations not using collection-level permission restrictions in Wagtail have no meaningful incremental exposure from this flaw.

The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N, score 4.3) accurately characterizes this as a low-to-medium severity issue: it is network-reachable with no attack complexity, but requires authenticated admin access (PR:L), and the confidentiality impact is limited to asset metadata rather than file content. No EPSS data was included in the provided intelligence. No CISA KEV listing and no POC or exploit code are available from the provided sources. Real-world risk is tightly bounded: organizations that do not use Wagtail's collection-level permission system to segregate access face negligible incremental exposure, as admin users already share a trust boundary. The vulnerability is meaningful only where collection permissions are actively used to restrict sensitive document or image access from certain admin roles - for example, multi-tenant editorial environments or organizations separating HR documents from general content editors. This is a genuine but moderate priority: patch on the next maintenance cycle rather than emergency response.

An authenticated Wagtail admin editor who has been restricted from a sensitive 'HR Documents' collection opens the Documents chooser widget while editing a page. By querying the 'chosen' endpoint - a normal part of the chooser UI flow - they receive a listing of filenames, display names, and direct URLs for documents in the restricted collection. The attacker can then access those URLs directly to retrieve the underlying files if storage permissions permit. No exploit code is required; the attack is achievable through normal admin UI interaction.