OpenClaw EUVD-2026-37149

Exploitation requires a valid authenticated account with operator.write access to an OpenClaw Gateway instance that is reachable over the network (AV:N). The vulnerability is specific to the Active Memory write scope component and is triggered by submitting configuration change requests that should require operator.admin authorization. Exploitation is limited by the mandatory requirement for operator.write credentials - unauthenticated users and accounts without any operator scope cannot exploit this directly. Risk is further bounded by deployments where operator.write access is tightly controlled or where the Gateway management interface is not broadly network-accessible. No user interaction is required once authenticated access is established, and no special system configuration beyond having the Gateway running is needed.

The CVSS 4.0 score of 5.3 (Medium) with vector AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:L reflects a network-accessible, low-complexity, low-privilege attack with bounded integrity and availability impact and no confidentiality exposure. The real-world risk is operationally significant for organizations running OpenClaw Gateways with multiple operator-level users: any operator.write account - typically a broader population than admin accounts - could silently alter global gateway configuration. The impact is capped (VI:L/VA:L, no scope change to subsequent systems), and this CVE is not in CISA KEV; no public exploit code has been identified. An EPSS score was not included in the source data, so exploitation probability cannot be quantified numerically. The privilege escalation path does not yield direct code execution, but unauthorized configuration changes to a gateway could enable secondary attacks such as traffic rerouting or disabling security controls. This represents a genuine remediation priority for affected deployments, particularly those where operator.write is granted broadly.

An authenticated Gateway operator with only operator.write credentials sends crafted requests targeting the Active Memory write scope API endpoint, supplying a configuration payload that normally requires operator.admin authorization. Because the scope validation logic does not enforce the privilege boundary, the system processes and applies the global configuration change without elevating the privilege check. No public exploit code is known at this time, but the low attack complexity (AC:L, AT:N) means exploitation would be straightforward for any operator-level user with API familiarity.