CompactLogix 5370 EUVD-2026-37118

Consult Rockwell Automation security advisory SD1776 at https://www.rockwellautomation.com/en-us/trust-center/security-advisories/advisory.SD1776.html for official patch guidance; no specific patched firmware version was included in the available intelligence data, so patch availability and version must be confirmed with the vendor directly. As an immediate compensating control, restrict network access to TCP port 80 (and 443 if applicable) on CompactLogix 5370 controllers using perimeter firewalls or network ACLs to prevent unauthenticated hosts from reaching the diagnostics page - this directly eliminates the disclosure vector without requiring a firmware change, though it may limit remote diagnostics access. If the embedded web server is not operationally required, disable it following Rockwell Automation's product hardening guide to permanently eliminate this attack surface; note that disabling the web interface will prevent web-based monitoring and diagnostics workflows. Implementing strict OT network segmentation - placing controllers in an isolated VLAN with deny-by-default ingress rules - is the recommended long-term architectural control and limits the pool of hosts that can attempt chained CIP-based DoS attacks even if the disclosure remains present.