EUVD-2026-36290Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
PR-author can trigger it over the network with no auth or UI, but must craft a run that satisfies the main-branch gate (AC:H); deploy job's privileges compromise the production site (S:C, C/I/A:H).
Primary rating from Vendor (GitHub_M).
CVSS VectorVendor: GitHub_M
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
In Duck Site before version 1.0.1, the repository has a deploy workflow that runs after the build workflow completes. The build workflow runs on pull requests, while the deploy workflow runs with package-write permissions and deployment secrets. If an attacker can make a pull request build satisfy the deploy workflow’s main branch condition, the deploy job checks out the triggering workflow commit, builds it into a Docker image, pushes it as latest, and triggers Dokploy deployment. This can allow attacker-controlled pull request code to become the deployed production site image without being merged. This issue has been patched in version 1.0.1.
Articles & Coverage 1
AnalysisAI
Production deployment compromise in Duck Site before 1.0.1 allows remote attackers to push attacker-controlled code as the live production Docker image without code review or merge approval. The flaw stems from a GitHub Actions deploy workflow that can be tricked into treating an unmerged pull request build as a main-branch deployment, then checking out the PR commit, building it, pushing it as the latest Docker tag, and triggering a Dokploy deployment. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and CVE is not listed in CISA KEV.
Technical ContextAI
Duck Site is a containerized site application built and shipped through a two-stage GitHub Actions pipeline: a build workflow that runs on pull_request events and a deploy workflow that runs on workflow_run completion with elevated permissions (packages: write) and access to deployment secrets. The deploy workflow is gated by a 'main branch' condition that is supposed to limit it to post-merge runs, but the condition can be satisfied by a pull-request-originated workflow run. CWE-829 (Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere) applies here because the privileged deploy job ends up sourcing build artifacts and code (actions/checkout of the triggering workflow's commit) from an untrusted PR context while operating with trusted-context privileges, a well-known pwn_request / workflow_run anti-pattern in GitHub Actions. Affected CPE is cpe:2.3:a:duck-organization:duck-site, and the fix is delivered via GHSA-qj93-7xrg-rvhw.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade to Duck Site 1.0.1, which corrects the deploy workflow's gating so that pull-request-originated workflow_run events can no longer satisfy the main-branch deployment condition; the fix is described in the GitHub Security Advisory at https://github.com/duck-organization/duck-site/security/advisories/GHSA-qj93-7xrg-rvhw. For operators who cannot immediately upgrade, the highest-leverage workarounds are to require GitHub Actions approval for pull requests from first-time/external contributors (Settings → Actions → 'Require approval for all outside collaborators'), remove the workflow_run trigger from the deploy workflow and instead trigger deploys only on push to main (trade-off: loses any intentional cross-workflow chaining), or scope the deploy job with an explicit if: github.event.workflow_run.head_branch 'main' && github.event.workflow_run.event 'push' check so PR-originated runs are filtered out (trade-off: requires careful auditing of every branch protection rule). As a defense-in-depth measure, rotate any GHCR tokens and Dokploy deployment secrets that may have been exposed to a malicious PR run while the workflow was vulnerable.
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