Amazon Redshift JDBC Driver EUVD-2026-28814

Exploitation requires that the attacker can influence or control JDBC connection URL parameters passed to the Amazon Redshift JDBC Driver by the target application. This typically occurs in scenarios where applications dynamically construct connection URLs from user input, external configuration files, environment variables, or API parameters rather than using hardcoded connection strings. Additionally, successful remote code execution depends on the presence of exploitable classes (Java deserialization gadgets) on the application's classpath, such as libraries from Apache Commons Collections, Spring Framework, or similar components commonly used in Java enterprise applications. Limiting exploitation: requires high attack complexity (AC:H) and specific attack prerequisites (AT:P) per CVSS vector, meaning most standard deployments with static configuration are not exploitable. Vulnerability primarily affects multi-tenant systems, database management interfaces, ETL tools, or applications with user-configurable data source connections.

Despite Critical CVSS 9.2 rating, real-world exploitation complexity is high (AC:H, AT:P). The CVSS vector indicates network-based attack (AV:N) requiring no authentication (PR:N) or user interaction (UI:N), but attack complexity is HIGH and attack prerequisites are PRESENT. Exploitation requires: (1) attacker ability to control or influence JDBC connection URL parameters used by the application, (2) presence of exploitable classes on the application's classpath (not guaranteed), and (3) application behavior that passes attacker-influenced URLs to the driver. In typical enterprise deployments, connection URLs are hardcoded or administrator-controlled, limiting attack surface to scenarios where applications accept external input for database connections (configuration interfaces, multi-tenant systems, dynamic connection routing). AWS released official patch v2.2.2 with security advisory and GitHub release. No EPSS score, KEV status, or public POC data provided in input, suggesting limited observed exploitation at time of disclosure. This appears to be a proactive vendor disclosure rather than response to active exploitation. Priority should focus on applications that dynamically construct JDBC URLs from user input or external configuration sources.

An attacker identifies a web application that allows users to configure custom database connections or accepts connection parameters through an API. The attacker crafts a malicious JDBC URL containing parameters that reference exploit gadget classes (such as those in Apache Commons Collections or Spring Framework libraries commonly present on Java application classpaths). When the application passes this URL to the vulnerable Redshift JDBC driver, the driver loads and instantiates the referenced classes, triggering a deserialization chain that executes arbitrary code in the application's security context, allowing the attacker to compromise the server, access sensitive data, or pivot to backend systems.