OpenClaw EUVD-2026-28182

Exploitation requires the adversary to possess a previously valid OpenClaw gateway bearer token obtained before SecretRef rotation. The vulnerability is exploitable specifically when administrators perform runtime secret rotation via secrets.reload or config hot-reload without immediately restarting gateway processes. Attack surface is limited to deployments using bearer token authentication backed by SecretRef configuration; static token configurations or alternative authentication schemes are not vulnerable. The window of opportunity extends from the moment of SecretRef rotation until gateway process restart, which in long-running container or VM deployments may span hours or days. Network reachability to gateway HTTP endpoints (AV:N) is required, but no additional privileges (PR:N) or user interaction (UI:N) are needed once the token is possessed. The CVSS vector AC:H (high complexity) reflects the coordination required between token possession and the rotation timing window, not technical difficulty of exploitation itself.

Real-world risk is HIGH but nuanced. CVSS 9.2 (AV:N/AC:H/PR:N) indicates network-accessible attack without authentication but with high complexity and specific timing conditions. The attack requires the adversary to possess a previously valid bearer token AND exploit the window between SecretRef rotation and gateway process restart - a narrow but exploitable condition in continuous-operation environments. No EPSS score provided, but the authentication bypass tag and CISA KEV absence suggest this is not yet widely exploited in the wild. The vulnerability is particularly dangerous in microservices architectures where operators rotate secrets in response to suspected compromise; they may believe rotated tokens are invalidated when the gateway silently continues accepting them. SSVC considerations: exploitation requires prior token possession (not automatable from zero knowledge), technical impact is total gateway compromise (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H), and the fix is a straightforward code change with vendor patch available. Priority depends heavily on deployment model - critical for multi-tenant SaaS gateways with frequent secret rotation, moderate for single-tenant deployments with infrequent rotation cycles.

An attacker who previously obtained a valid OpenClaw gateway bearer token (through phishing, insider access, or prior compromise) monitors the target organization's security practices. When defenders detect suspicious activity and rotate the SecretRef to invalidate all tokens, the attacker continues using the old token to access gateway HTTP endpoints. The gateway accepts the rotated-out token because its authentication validator still references the startup-time credential snapshot. The attacker maintains unauthorized access to /v1/* API routes, invokes tools via /tools/invoke, and establishes canvas WebSocket connections until administrators discover the ongoing breach and manually restart gateway processes. High attack complexity (AC:H) reflects the requirement for precise timing between rotation event and process restart.