rotki EUVD-2026-109385

Exploitation requires that the target use rotki's premium cloud backup/sync feature AND that the attacker first obtain the uploaded backup blob (e.g., via sync-server or cloud-storage compromise or interception) - this possession requirement is the AT:P attack requirement in the CVSS 4.0 vector. Given the blob, decryption is an offline, unauthenticated, GPU-parallel password-guessing attack against a single unsalted SHA-256 of the user password, with no user interaction. The principal limiting factors are: the attacker must already hold the backup, only premium-sync users are affected, and recovery difficulty scales with the victim's password entropy - a high-entropy password materially raises the offline cracking cost even though the KDF itself provides no hardening. The complete fix is upgrading to rotki 1.44.2 on every syncing device; the sources state no partial mitigation.

The CVSS 4.0 base score of 8.2 (CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H) reflects a high-confidentiality-impact flaw: an unsalted single-iteration SHA-256 key derivation (CWE-916) that makes premium cloud backups trivially brute-forceable offline. The AT:P metric is the decisive qualifier - exploitation carries an attack requirement (the adversary must first obtain the uploaded backup blob), so this is not spray-and-pray remote compromise but a secondary-access attack gated on possession of the encrypted backup. No EPSS score was supplied and the CVE is not on CISA KEV, so there is no evidence of widespread or active exploitation; exploitation status is 'no public exploit identified at time of analysis.' The vuln.today decision label is 'this_week,' which aligns with a patched, high-impact flaw that is serious for affected users but not an emergency given the AT:P gating and absence of KEV/active-exploitation signals. The dominant risk is realized when backups leak (sync-server compromise, cloud-storage misconfiguration, interception): once a blob is obtained, GPU-parallel password guessing can recover the password and decrypt exchange API keys, secrets, wallet addresses, and full transaction history. EPSS data is MISSING, so probability-of-exploitation cannot be quantified from the input.

An attacker who gains access to rotki's premium sync storage or intercepts an uploaded backup blob takes the encrypted database offline. Because the encryption key is a single unsalted SHA-256 hash of the user's password, the attacker runs GPU-accelerated offline password guessing against the blob; a weak or moderate password falls quickly, after which the database decrypts to reveal exchange API keys, secrets, wallet addresses, and transaction history. No public exploit code is identified, but the technique requires only standard offline password-cracking tooling.