EUVD-2026-38603
GHSA-7rcj-2493-83x3
Severity by source
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Reading container logs or SIEM data requires at least low local privilege (PR:L); no integrity or availability impact applies to this passive credential exposure flaw.
Primary rating from Vendor (redhat).
CVSS VectorVendor: redhat
Lifecycle Timeline
1DescriptionCVE.org
A flaw was found in foreman-mcp-server. This component utilizes two distinct logging mechanisms that can expose sensitive session and authentication data. One mechanism logs session identifiers, which are treated as authentication credentials, at an informational level. The other, when debug logging is enabled, incompletely sanitizes HTTP request headers, leading to the cleartext logging of sensitive information such as authorization tokens and API keys. This vulnerability can result in a confidentiality breach, as sensitive authentication data is persisted in plain text within container logs, increasing the risk if logs are forwarded to a centralized platform.
AnalysisAI
Cleartext credential persistence in foreman-mcp-server, a component of Red Hat Satellite 6, exposes session identifiers and authentication tokens through two independent logging paths. The INFO-level logger unconditionally records session identifiers (which function as authentication credentials) in plaintext, while a separate debug-mode logger incompletely sanitizes HTTP request headers, allowing Authorization tokens and API keys to persist in container logs. Any environment forwarding container logs to a centralized SIEM or log aggregation platform materially expands the attack surface beyond local disk access. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and the CVE does not appear in CISA KEV.
Technical ContextAI
foreman-mcp-server is the Model Context Protocol server component embedded within Red Hat Satellite 6, Red Hat's enterprise IT automation and lifecycle management platform (CPE: cpe:2.3:a:red_hat:red_hat_satellite_6:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*). The root cause is CWE-532 (Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File), a class of vulnerability where secrets are written to persistent log storage either by design (debug instrumentation) or by inadequate secret classification during development. Two distinct code paths are implicated: a general-purpose logger that treats session identifiers as loggable metadata rather than as secrets, emitting them at INFO level on every relevant operation; and a debug-mode HTTP header logger that applies regex or keyword-based sanitization that is incomplete, allowing Authorization, Bearer, and API key header values to pass through unmasked. Container-native deployments of Satellite 6 compound the risk because container stdout/stderr is routinely forwarded to centralized logging stacks such as Splunk, Elasticsearch, or OpenShift's built-in log aggregation, broadening the credential exposure surface well beyond the originating host.
RemediationAI
Apply the patch for foreman-mcp-server as released by Red Hat for Satellite 6, tracked at https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-9073 and https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2480151. No specific fixed version number was derivable from the available dataset - consult the Red Hat advisory directly for the exact patched package version. As compensating controls prior to patching: (1) Disable debug logging in all production Satellite 6 instances immediately, eliminating the HTTP header sanitization bypass path - note that INFO-level session ID logging remains active regardless of this change. (2) Restrict read access to container logs and log aggregation namespaces to the minimum required operator set, using RBAC controls (OpenShift ClusterRole/Role bindings if applicable) to limit log viewer permissions. (3) If logs are forwarded to a SIEM or central logging platform, configure field-level masking at the log shipper (e.g., Fluent Bit, Logstash) to redact Authorization, Cookie, and X-Auth-Token header values before ingestion - this limits retroactive credential harvesting from log archives. (4) Rotate all API keys, session tokens, and authorization tokens that may have been logged in any environment where debug mode was previously active or where log access controls are weak.
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