What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-12112?

CVE-2026-12112 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 7.8 (High). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.1%.

Which versions of Foreman MCP Server are affected by CVE-2026-12112?

Red Hat Satellite 6's foreman-mcp-server component contains a session hijacking vulnerability that allows local attackers with log read access to assume administrative sessions without…. A patch is available.

How to fix or mitigate CVE-2026-12112?

Within 24 hours: Inventory all Red Hat Satellite 6 deployments and immediately restrict read access to application logs to the narrowest group required. Within 7 days: Deploy network segmentation to limit lateral movement from compromised Satellite instances and enable detailed session activity monitoring. Within 30 days: Evaluate migration timeline to Red Hat Satellite 6.14+ or newer versions if available with remediation; contact Red Hat support to confirm patch timeline and interim security hardening options.

Foreman MCP Server CVE-2026-12112

EUVD-2026-38599 HIGH

Improper Authentication (CWE-287)

2026-06-23 redhat

GHSA-6v32-2jc8-w595

Authentication Bypass Privilege Escalation RCE Red Hat Satellite 6 Red Hat

7.8

CVSS 3.1 · Vendor: redhat

Severity by source

Vendor (redhat) PRIMARY

7.8 HIGH

AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

vuln.today AI

7.8 HIGH

Exploitation needs local/log access (AV:L) and a low-priv account that can read MCP logs (PR:L); replayed admin session yields full C/I/A on Satellite.

3.1 AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H

4.0 AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Red Hat

7.8 HIGH

qualitative

Primary rating from Vendor (redhat).

CVSS VectorVendor: redhat

Attack Vector

Local

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

Low

User Interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

High

Lifecycle Timeline

Analysis Generated

Jun 23, 2026 - 20:51 vuln.today

DescriptionCVE.org

A flaw was found in the foreman-mcp-server. A session management vulnerability in the MCP Server allows unauthenticated attackers to hijack active administrative sessions due to an improper cache of authenticated client connections, by trusting a non-secret session ID without re-validating authentication tokens and by logging all newly created session IDs to standard logs. This issue can result in privilege escalation and infrastructure-wide code execution.

AnalysisAI

Session hijacking in the foreman-mcp-server component (shipped with Red Hat Satellite 6) allows local attackers to take over active administrative sessions by reusing leaked session IDs that the server caches without re-validating authentication tokens. Because session IDs are written to standard logs, any user with log read access can replay them to gain administrative control and pivot to infrastructure-wide code execution. No public exploit identified at time of analysis and the issue is not listed in CISA KEV.

Technical ContextAI

The foreman-mcp-server is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server integration for Foreman/Red Hat Satellite 6, which manages provisioning, configuration, and patching across enterprise infrastructure. The root cause is CWE-287 (Improper Authentication): the server caches authenticated client connections keyed by a session ID and treats subsequent requests bearing that ID as trusted without re-verifying the bearer's authentication token. Compounding the design flaw, newly created session IDs are emitted to standard log streams, turning a non-secret identifier into an effective credential for anyone with log visibility.

RemediationAI

Apply the Red Hat-provided update for foreman-mcp-server / Red Hat Satellite 6 as referenced at https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-12112 and tracked in https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2488031; exact patched package versions are not independently confirmed from the supplied data, so verify via the errata before deploying. Until patched, restrict read access to MCP server log files and the systemd journal to root only (chmod 600 on log paths, journald 'SystemMaxUse' and ACLs), rotate and purge any historical logs that may contain leaked session IDs, and force-expire all active MCP sessions to invalidate cached connections - note that tightening journal ACLs may break log-shipping agents that run as non-root. As a defense-in-depth measure, segment the Satellite host so only trusted operators have shell or log-collection access, and audit SIEM pipelines to ensure ingested session IDs are not retrievable by analysts.