Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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ReconGain local or log-read access on Satellite host
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DeliveryTail MCP server standard logs
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ExploitCapture freshly emitted admin session ID
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InstallReplay session ID to MCP endpoint
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C2Server trusts cached connection without token check
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ExecuteIssue remote execution jobs as admin
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ImpactInfrastructure-wide code execution across managed hosts
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A07:2025 - Authentication Failures
ASVS 5.0
V6 - Authentication Authentication mechanism validation
MITRE ATT&CK
2 techniques across 2 tactics: Defense Evasion, Initial Access The technique list with ATT&CK links and the kill-chain view is part of the Basic plan and up. |
| Exploitation Conditions | Requires local access to the Red Hat Satellite host running foreman-mcp-server, or equivalent read access to any log destination (journald, syslog file, SIEM index) where the MCP server writes newly created session IDs; an administrative session must be active or be created during the observation window so a valid session ID can be harvested and replayed before its natural expiry. No user interaction is needed on the victim side. Exploitation is limited to environments where the MCP server is enabled and where logs are readable by non-root accounts - pure remote attackers without any local or log-pipeline foothold cannot trigger this directly. |
| Impact | The CVSS 3.1 vector AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H scores 7.8 and reflects a local, low-complexity, low-privilege path to full CIA impact - consistent with an attacker who can read MCP server logs on the Satellite host (e.g., an unprivileged local user, log-aggregation account, or operator with journal access) and replay an admin session ID. The description's claim of 'unauthenticated' hijacking applies to the MCP protocol layer (no token re-validation), not the host: actually obtaining a session ID requires local log access, which is why PR:L and AV:L are appropriate. No EPSS, KEV, or POC data is provided, so real-world exploitation pressure appears low today, but the blast radius is severe because Satellite 6 controls fleet-wide provisioning and remote execution - successful hijack effectively yields infrastructure-wide RCE. Prioritize patching on any Satellite deployment where log files are readable by non-admins or shipped to shared SIEM pipelines. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | A low-privileged local user on the Satellite host (or an account with read access to log aggregation downstream of the MCP server) tails the standard logs, captures a freshly issued admin session ID, and replays it against the MCP endpoint. Because the server trusts the cached connection without re-validating the auth token, the attacker assumes the administrator's identity and uses Satellite's remote execution features to push commands to every managed host in the fleet. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Jun 23, 2026
Session hijacking in the foreman-mcp-server component (shipped with Red Hat Satellite 6) allows local attackers to take over active administrative sessions by reusing leaked session IDs that the server caches without re-validating authentication tokens. Because session IDs are written to standard logs, any user with log read access can replay them to gain administrative control and pivot to infrastructure-wide code execution. No public exploit identified at time of analysis and the issue is not listed in CISA KEV.
RemediationAI
Apply the Red Hat-provided update for foreman-mcp-server / Red Hat Satellite 6 as referenced at https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-12112 and tracked in https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2488031; exact patched package versions are not independently confirmed from the supplied data, so verify via the errata before deploying. Until patched, restrict read access to MCP server log files and the systemd journal to root only (chmod 600 on log paths, journald 'SystemMaxUse' and ACLs), rotate and purge any historical logs that may contain leaked session IDs, and force-expire all active MCP sessions to invalidate cached connections - note that tightening journal ACLs may break log-shipping agents that run as non-root. As a defense-in-depth measure, segment the Satellite host so only trusted operators have shell or log-collection access, and audit SIEM pipelines to ensure ingested session IDs are not retrievable by analysts.
Affects your stack
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Technical ContextAI · show details
The foreman-mcp-server is a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server integration for Foreman/Red Hat Satellite 6, which manages provisioning, configuration, and patching across enterprise infrastructure. The root cause is CWE-287 (Improper Authentication): the server caches authenticated client connections keyed by a session ID and treats subsequent requests bearing that ID as trusted without re-verifying the bearer's authentication token. Compounding the design flaw, newly created session IDs are emitted to standard log streams, turning a non-secret identifier into an effective credential for anyone with log visibility.
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Severity by source
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Exploitation needs local/log access (AV:L) and a low-priv account that can read MCP logs (PR:L); replayed admin session yields full C/I/A on Satellite.
Primary rating from Vendor (redhat).
CVSS VectorVendor: redhat
DescriptionCVE.org
A flaw was found in the foreman-mcp-server. A session management vulnerability in the MCP Server allows unauthenticated attackers to hijack active administrative sessions due to an improper cache of authenticated client connections, by trusting a non-secret session ID without re-validating authentication tokens and by logging all newly created session IDs to standard logs. This issue can result in privilege escalation and infrastructure-wide code execution.
Executive ViewAI
Red Hat Satellite 6's foreman-mcp-server component contains a session hijacking vulnerability that allows local attackers with log read access to assume administrative sessions without re-authentication, directly enabling infrastructure-wide code execution. This affects any organization running Satellite 6 where system administrators or other log-accessing users could become attack vectors.
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis. Interim mitigations: (1) Restrict log file read permissions to administrators only-remove group/world read access; (2) Implement mandatory log rotation with deletion of old session identifiers; (3) Enable session validation on each request rather than caching; (4) Deploy endpoint detection and response (EDR) monitoring for session reuse patterns on Satellite infrastructure; (5) Isolate Satellite from production systems with network segmentation until patch is available.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Authentication bypass attacks exploit flaws in the verification mechanisms that control access to systems and applications.
Privilege escalation occurs when an attacker leverages flaws in access control mechanisms to gain permissions beyond what they were originally granted.
Remote Code Execution represents the critical moment when an attacker successfully runs arbitrary code on a target system without physical access.
Affected Products (CPE)CVE.org
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EUVD-2026-38599
GHSA-6v32-2jc8-w595
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
VulDB
Exploit-DB