Apache Camel CVE-2026-85251

Requires a camel-http endpoint configured with credentials - an OAuth2 bearer token (registered via OAuth2ClientConfigurer with addRequestInterceptorFirst) or basic/digest credentials (registered against an AuthScope matching any host) - AND followRedirects=true on that endpoint. The attacker must be, control, or be able to influence the responses of the remote server the route targets, so that it can return a redirect (Location header) to an attacker-chosen host. Limiting factors: followRedirects is not enabled by default, credentials must actually be configured on the endpoint, and the attacker must sit in the response path (be the endpoint, compromise it, or MITM it) - a route pointing only at a fully trusted, attacker-uninfluenceable server is not exploitable. Mitigation without upgrade is setting followRedirects=false on credentialed endpoints.

The reported CVSS of 7.5 (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N) captures a serious confidentiality impact - theft of OAuth2 bearer tokens or configured basic/digest credentials - but AC:L overstates the ease of exploitation when read against the description. Real exploitation is conditional: the affected camel-http endpoint must be configured with credentials AND with followRedirects=true, and the attacker must control or be able to influence the responses of the remote server the Camel route connects to (so it can answer with a redirect to an attacker-chosen host). I therefore assess AC:H rather than AC:L. No EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public exploit code were provided, so there is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and no evidence of active exploitation. Net: this is a genuine credential-leak flaw worth prioritizing for Camel deployments that both carry credentials and follow redirects, but it is not an internet-wide unauthenticated pre-auth RCE - the required credential configuration, non-default followRedirects=true, and attacker position in the response path meaningfully narrow the exploitable population.

A Camel route is configured to call a remote HTTP(S) endpoint using an OAuth2 bearer token or basic/digest credentials with followRedirects=true. The remote server (either malicious, compromised, or manipulable by an on-path attacker) answers with an HTTP 3xx redirect whose Location header points to a host the attacker controls; because the auth interceptor re-runs on every redirect hop and credentials were scoped to any host, Camel re-attaches the Authorization: Bearer token or the configured credentials to the attacker's host, handing them over. No public exploit code was provided, but the mechanism is fully documented in the vendor advisory and patch PRs.