Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
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AccessObtain local account on BoKS Master
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DeliveryMonitor predictable files under BOKS_tmp
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ExploitAdmin runs bccgethostcert (UI:R)
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ExecutionRead exposed CA secret/host private key
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ImpactForge trusted certificates, impersonate hosts
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A01:2025 - Broken Access Control
ASVS 5.0
V5 - File Handling Secure temp file creation
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| Exploitation Conditions | Requires a local, authenticated low-privileged account on the BoKS Master host specifically (not a managed client), with read access to files under the BOKS_tmp directory. Exploitation further depends on the bccgethostcert utility being executed by a privileged user - the attacker either wins a timing window while it runs or reads CA secret material left behind after a successful certificate creation. Limiting factors: local-only attack vector (no remote/network path), the need for the utility to actually be invoked (UI:R), and the restricted population of users who have accounts on the Master. The root cause is the utility failing to set a restrictive umask before creating predictably-named temporary files. |
| Impact | This is a genuine but access-gated local vulnerability, not an internet-facing emergency. The CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N, 7.9) correctly captures that exploitation is LOCAL (AV:L) and requires an existing low-privileged account (PR:L) on the BoKS Master host specifically, plus user interaction (UI:R) - an administrator must run the bccgethostcert utility, or have run it leaving material behind. The high base score is driven by the scope change (S:C) and C:H/I:H, which are justified: the leaked artifact is CA secret or host private-key material, whose compromise lets an attacker forge trusted certificates and impersonate hosts across the PAM trust domain - hence the integrity impact and scope change beyond the single host. No EPSS score, no CISA KEV listing, and no public POC were provided, so there is no public-exploitation signal; combined with the local-only vector and the niche deployment footprint, this is a moderate-priority patch-when-able item for environments running BoKS, not a drop-everything issue. One caveat: the description frames the clearest attack (reading leftover material after cert creation) as not needing a live race, which supports AC:L, but the 'while the utility runs' variant is a classic TOCTOU race that in practice is harder to win - the AC:L rating is slightly generous for that path. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | A local user with a shell account on the BoKS Master monitors the BOKS_tmp directory. When an administrator runs bccgethostcert to create or renew a certificate, the utility writes predictable temporary files with a permissive umask; the attacker reads the CA secret or host private-key material from those files during the operation, or recovers CA secret material left behind afterward. No public exploit code was identified, and exploitation requires an existing local account and that the utility be run. |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Oct 01, 2026
Fortra BoKS Manager's bccgethostcert utility writes predictably named temporary files under the BOKS_tmp directory without first setting a restrictive umask, so a local, authenticated low-privileged user on a BoKS Master host can capture CA secret or host private-key material - either by reading the files during the window in which a privileged operator runs the utility, or by recovering CA secret material left behind after a successful certificate creation. The issue is scored 7.9 (CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N, CWE-377), and its confidentiality and integrity impact is high precisely because the leaked material is CA-level keying material rather than ordinary application data. Exploitation is access-gated rather than remote: it requires a Master-local account, read access to files under BOKS_tmp, and the utility actually being invoked by a privileged user. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, and KEV/EPSS signals were not provided in the source data.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch was identified in the supplied data, so the primary action is to consult Fortra's advisory FI-2026-014 (https://www.fortra.com/security/advisories/product-security/fi-2026-014) for the current fixed release and upgrade guidance rather than assuming a version number; treat patch status as unconfirmed until the vendor states otherwise. Until a fix is applied, the most effective compensating control is to tighten filesystem access on the BOKS_tmp directory so that only the privileged account that runs bccgethostcert can read it - for example by applying restrictive directory ownership and mode (0700/0600 equivalents) and ACLs, and by placing BOKS_tmp on a dedicated filesystem so the permissions can be enforced without disturbing other BoKS state. The trade-off is that other BoKS utilities or automation that expect group- or world-readable temporary files under that path may fail, so changes should be staged and tested. A second control is to wrap or invoke bccgethostcert with an explicit restrictive umask (for example umask 077) and to ensure temporary artifacts are removed immediately after a successful certificate creation, since the vulnerability description notes that CA secret material can be left behind - the caveat being that a hard umask may break utilities that depend on the inherited permissive setting. Where the utility cannot be constrained, restrict who may run it and audit invocations, though this only narrows the timing window and does not eliminate the predictable-name weakness. Finally, because the exposed material is CA secret or host private-key data, any environment where BOKS_tmp was broadly readable should treat those keys as potentially compromised and plan certificate and key rotation - an operation that is disruptive to the trust chain and must be scheduled and coordinated, but is the only way to fully remediate a disclosure of this type once it has occurred.
Affected VersionsENISA
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in euvd
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
The root cause is CWE-377, insecure temporary file: bccgethostcert, a Fortra BoKS Manager utility used on the BoKS Master to obtain host certificates from the platform CA, creates its working files with predictable names and inherits the calling process's default umask instead of explicitly forcing a restrictive mode (such as 0600 with a 077 umask) or using an exclusively created, unguessable file. Because the filename is predictable and the permissions are permissive, a local user who can read files under the BOKS_tmp path can either pre-empt or snoop the file contents. The CVSS vector confirms this profile: the attack is local (AV:L) and low-complexity (AC:L), requires a low-privileged account (PR:L), and needs user interaction (UI:R) in the form of a privileged operator actually invoking bccgethostcert. The scope change (S:C) is the critical differentiator - the compromised material is CA secret and host private-key data, so the impact escapes the vulnerable component itself and undermines the trust anchor for the whole BoKS certificate hierarchy, giving full confidentiality and integrity loss (C:H/I:H) with no direct availability impact (A:N). The CPE entry cpe:2.3:a:fortra:boks_manager:*:*:*:*:*:*:* uses a wildcard version, indicating that no version boundary was published in the supplied data; the vulnerable component is specifically the bccgethostcert utility on the BoKS Master role, not the code running on managed client hosts. The residual risk is bounded by three factors: there is no network-reachable path, the utility must be executed by a privileged user, and the population of accounts existing on the Master is normally small and tightly administered.
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Severity by source
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:N
Local user on BoKS Master (AV:L/PR:L) reads predictable temp files, needing the utility to run (UI:R); leaked CA/private-key material compromises the wider trust domain (S:C) giving C:H and forgery-enabled I:H, no availability impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (Fortra).
CVSS VectorVendor: Fortra
DescriptionCVE.org
Fortra BoKS Manager contains an insecure temporary file vulnerability in bccgethostcert. The utility creates predictable temporary files without first setting a restrictive umask. A local user on the BoKS Master who can read files under BOKS_tmp may be able to obtain CA secret or host private-key material while the utility runs, or obtain CA secret material left behind after successful certificate creation.
Executive ViewAI
Fortra BoKS Manager customers running affected Master hosts face a high-severity, local-only exposure in the bccgethostcert utility that can leak certificate authority secrets or host private keys to an authenticated low-privileged user when a privileged operator invokes the tool. Because the exposed material is CA-level keying material, successful exploitation could undermine trust in certificates issued by that authority and force costly reissuance or revocation across certificate-dependent operations. Leadership should care because this affects high-trust BoKS Master infrastructure, requires no public exploit identified at time of analysis, and has no vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis.
Interim mitigations only: restrict local and privileged access on BoKS Master hosts; enforce restrictive umask such as 077 for all invocations of bccgethostcert via wrapper or operational procedure; harden and audit BOKS_tmp permissions and contents; monitor for unauthorized reads or leftover CA and host key material; rotate CA and host private keys if exposure is suspected. No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Information disclosure occurs when an application unintentionally exposes sensitive data that aids attackers in reconnaissance or directly compromises security.
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