n8n CVE-2026-77080

Exploitation requires two concurrent prerequisites: first, a valid authenticated n8n account with permission to create or edit workflows (PR:L); second, access to a configured and usable Snowflake credential within that n8n instance, either owned by the attacker or shared via n8n's credential-sharing mechanism. The vulnerability is triggered specifically through the Snowflake node's Execute Query input field when a client-side Snowflake directive (PUT or GET) is submitted - the flaw is that n8n does not strip or sandbox these commands before passing them to the Snowflake SDK. Exploitation is not possible for unauthenticated users, for authenticated users who lack access to any Snowflake connection, or on n8n deployments that have no Snowflake integrations configured. The file operations are bounded by the OS-level permissions of the n8n server process, so a hardened deployment running n8n as a low-privilege user with restricted filesystem access limits (but does not eliminate) the impact.

The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N) with a score of 8.7 accurately reflects a network-exploitable flaw requiring only low-privileged access - specifically an authenticated n8n account and access to a configured Snowflake credential. The high VC/VI/VA impact ratings are justified: file read can expose secrets, API keys, or n8n's own credential store, while file write can corrupt configuration files or application binaries, enabling further compromise. KEV listing is absent and no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, which modestly reduces urgency relative to a worst-case scenario. However, the absence of KEV should not be read as safety - the attack conditions are low-complexity once prerequisites are met, and the technique is well within the reach of any n8n user familiar with Snowflake's PUT/GET syntax. EPSS data was not provided in the input; exploitation probability should be treated as non-trivial given the straightforward nature of the attack. The CVSS score and real-world risk are well-aligned: this is not a case of inflated scoring, and organizations running multi-tenant or shared n8n instances where Snowflake connections are broadly accessible should treat this as urgent.

An authenticated n8n user with access to a shared Snowflake credential opens or creates a workflow, adds a Snowflake node, and enters a Snowflake client-side GET command in the Execute Query field targeting a sensitive path on the n8n host - for example, retrieving n8n's environment file containing database credentials or API keys. The Snowflake SDK processes the GET command locally, transfers the file to a Snowflake stage, and the attacker retrieves it from there. No public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis, but the technique requires only knowledge of Snowflake's PUT/GET syntax and standard n8n workflow editing access.