Dolibarr ERP CRM CVE-2026-7689

The Online Signature Module must be installed and enabled in the Dolibarr deployment. The attacker must target an instance using dol_verifyHash for signature validation and must craft a signature payload that exploits the specific weakness in the verification algorithm. The high attack complexity (AC:H) indicates that the exploit requires either: knowledge of the internal hash comparison logic, ability to reverse-engineer the signature scheme, or possession of a valid signing key. No authentication is required, and the attack is not dependent on user interaction or specific server configuration beyond having the module active. Exploitation is limited to scenarios where signed documents are critical to business processes; if signature verification is purely informational or is validated by additional downstream controls, real-world impact diminishes.

CVSS 3.7 with AC:H (high attack complexity) indicates low severity with a significant technical barrier to exploitation. EPSS exploitation probability is not provided, limiting quantitative risk scoring. The publicly available exploit code elevates concern beyond the raw CVSS score, but the high complexity requirement and lack of confirmed active exploitation (not in CISA KEV) suggest this remains a targeted vulnerability rather than a widespread threat. The integrity impact (I:L) is limited, and the E:P rating (exploit/proof-of-concept exists) is already factored into CVSS. The RC:R (reasonable confidence) indicates the vulnerability is reproducible but not universally present. For most Dolibarr users, the realistic risk depends on whether the Online Signature Module is deployed and relied upon for critical transaction validation; organizations not using this feature face minimal exposure. The vendor's non-response to early disclosure is a governance concern but does not change technical exploitability. Organizations should prioritize patching only if actively using digital signature verification; others can defer based on other remediation priorities.

An attacker crafts a malicious request to the Online Signature Module containing a forged or manipulated signature that should fail verification under proper cryptographic standards. Due to the weak dol_verifyHash implementation, the forged signature is accepted as valid, allowing the attacker to submit fraudulent transaction documents (invoices, contracts, etc.) that appear legitimately signed. This could enable invoice tampering, unauthorized contract modifications, or transaction forgery depending on how the signed data is used downstream in the Dolibarr workflow.