NextAuth.js CVE-2026-73420
CRITICALSeverity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Remote unauthenticated with no user interaction (AV:N/PR:N/UI:N), but AC:H because success depends on a downstream mailer applying Unicode normalization; account takeover gives C:H/I:H, no availability impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (github).
CVSS VectorVendor: github
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Lifecycle Timeline
3Blast Radius
ecosystem impact- 1 npm packages depend on @auth/core (1 direct, 0 indirect)
- 7 npm packages depend on next-auth (6 direct, 1 indirect)
Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 0.1.0 and other introduced versions.
DescriptionCVE.org
NextAuth.js provides authentication for Next.js. Prior to @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32, the defaultNormalizer used by the email and magic-link sign-in flow validates an address before applying Unicode normalization. An address can contain a Unicode character such as U+FF20 FULLWIDTH COMMERCIAL AT that is not ASCII at-sign but canonicalizes to an ASCII at-sign under NFKC or NFKD normalization. The address passes the normalizer's single-at-sign check, but a downstream sendVerificationRequest mail library or delivery service that normalizes the address can then see two at-sign separators and deliver the passwordless sign-in link to an attacker-controlled recipient. Applications are affected when the email provider uses the built-in normalizer rather than a custom normalizeIdentifier and the downstream sender applies Unicode normalization. An attacker who knows a victim's email address can request the misrouted magic link and sign in as the victim without victim interaction. This issue is fixed in @auth/core 0.41.3 and next-auth 4.24.15 and 5.0.0-beta.32.
AnalysisAI
Account takeover in NextAuth.js / Auth.js email (magic-link) sign-in lets a remote unauthenticated attacker who knows a victim's address hijack the passwordless login. The built-in defaultNormalizer checks for a single ASCII '@' before applying Unicode NFKC normalization, so a homoglyph such as U+FF20 (FULLWIDTH COMMERCIAL AT) passes validation but canonicalizes to a second '@' in a downstream SMTPUTF8/internationalized mailer, misrouting the sign-in link to an attacker mailbox. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires that the target application enables the NextAuth.js email/magic-link (passwordless) provider AND relies on the built-in defaultNormalizer (no custom normalizeIdentifier) AND uses a sendVerificationRequest mail library or delivery service that applies Unicode NFKC/NFKD normalization to recipient addresses (typical of SMTPUTF8/internationalized-email senders). … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | This is a genuine high-priority issue for affected deployments rather than an inflated high-CVSS score: the CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N, VC:H/VI:H) reflects remote, unauthenticated, zero-interaction account takeover, tempered by AT:P - an Attack Requirement - because exploitation depends on the downstream sender applying Unicode normalization. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker who knows victim@victim.company.com submits 'attacker@evil.com@victim.company.com' (using the fullwidth U+FF20 homoglyph) to the magic-link sign-in endpoint; the normalizer sees one ASCII '@' and accepts it, but the SMTPUTF8-capable mailer normalizes the string and delivers the passwordless link to attacker@evil.com. The attacker clicks the link and is authenticated as the victim with no victim interaction. … |
| Remediation | Vendor-released patch: upgrade @auth/core to 0.41.3, next-auth (v4) to 4.24.15, or next-auth (v5) to 5.0.0-beta.32, per release notes at https://github.com/nextauthjs/next-auth/releases/tag/@auth/core@0.41.3, .../next-auth@4.24.15 and .../next-auth@5.0.0-beta.32; the fix (commits 19d2feb24359fa8c79418907fc68d9ec8152ca94 and a63eee12a1a20cb35209e44195b097868517b9a0) normalizes before validation and needs no application code changes. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours, identify all services using NextAuth.js or Auth.js email authentication and determine current version numbers. …
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-7rqj-j65f-68wh