Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Local vector because exploitation requires loading a crafted file; UI:R because a user must run the proof checker; I:H for complete session soundness compromise; no confidentiality or availability impact applies.
Primary rating from Vendor (vulncheck).
CVSS VectorVendor: vulncheck
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
The guard checker in Rocq Prover does not recheck the recursive tree representation of an inductive type parameter after that parameter has been changed by transport. A fixpoint may apply a rewrite along an equality between types to its recursive argument, which the guard checker accepts because the inductive type is preserved, while the recursive tree recorded for the parameter is altered. A second fixpoint that calls the first inherits the altered recursive tree without verification, so a call that is not structurally decreasing is accepted as terminating. The resulting non-terminating definition proves that a natural number equals its own successor and therefore False, from which any proposition follows. The demonstration uses two axioms that follow from univalence and are consistent with the calculus of inductive constructions, so the contradiction comes from the guard check rather than from the assumptions. A fix is proposed but not merged.
AnalysisAI
Rocq Prover's kernel guard checker fails to revalidate the recursive tree representation of inductive type parameters after they are altered by transport, allowing construction of provably non-terminating fixpoint definitions that the kernel accepts as structurally decreasing. Two cooperating fixpoints exploit this: the first corrupts the recursive tree via a transport rewrite, and the second inherits the corrupted tree without re-verification, enabling a structurally non-decreasing call to be accepted as terminating. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires that a Rocq proof session processes a source file containing the specific two-fixpoint pattern: the first fixpoint applies a transport rewrite along an equality between types to its recursive structural argument, and the second fixpoint calls the first, inheriting the corrupted recursive tree without re-verification by the guard checker. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VI:H, score 6.8) accurately characterizes the threat model: exploitation requires local file authoring and a user passively loading the crafted file into Rocq, with no OS-level privileges needed, and the integrity impact is high because soundness corruption is categorical. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | No vendor-released patch has been identified at time of analysis; upstream fix available (PR #22027 at https://github.com/rocq-prover/rocq/pull/22027) but released patched version not independently confirmed. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-65140
GHSA-h294-vvmw-mqg3