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Rs Soroban Sdk CVE-2026-26267

HIGH
Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation (CWE-670)
2026-02-19 security-advisories@github.com GHSA-4chv-4c6w-w254
7.5
CVSS 3.1 · GitHub Advisory
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Severity by source

GitHub Advisory PRIMARY
7.5 HIGH
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N

Primary rating from GitHub Advisory · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
None
Integrity
High
Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

4
Analysis Generated
Mar 12, 2026 - 22:03 vuln.today
PoC Detected
Feb 20, 2026 - 19:49 vuln.today
Public exploit code
Patch released
Feb 20, 2026 - 19:49 nvd
Patch available
CVE Published
Feb 19, 2026 - 20:25 nvd
HIGH 7.5

DescriptionGitHub Advisory

soroban-sdk is a Rust SDK for Soroban contracts. Prior to versions 22.0.10, 23.5.2, and 25.1.1, the #[contractimpl] macro contains a bug in how it wires up function calls. #[contractimpl] generates code that uses MyContract::value() style calls even when it's processing the trait version. This means if an inherent function is also defined with the same name, the inherent function gets called instead of the trait function. This means the Wasm-exported entry point silently calls the wrong function when two conditions are met simultaneously: First, an impl Trait for MyContract block is defined with one or more functions, with #[contractimpl] applied. Second, an impl MyContract block is defined with one or more identically named functions, without #[contractimpl] applied. If the trait version contains important security checks, such as verifying the caller is authorized, that the inherent version does not, those checks are bypassed. Anyone interacting with the contract through its public interface will call the wrong function. The problem is patched in soroban-sdk-macros versions 22.0.10, 23.5.2, and 25.1.1. The fix changes the generated call from <Type>::func() to <Type as Trait>::func() when processing trait implementations, ensuring Rust resolves to the trait associated function regardless of whether an inherent function with the same name exists. Users should upgrade to soroban-sdk-macros 22.0.10, 23.5.2, or 25.1.1 and recompile their contracts. If upgrading is not immediately possible, contract developers can avoid the issue by ensuring that no inherent associated function on the contract type shares a name with any function in the trait implementation. Renaming or removing the conflicting inherent function eliminates the ambiguity and causes the macro-generated code to correctly resolve to the trait function.

AnalysisAI

Function name collision in Rs Soroban SDK versions prior to 22.0.10, 23.5.2, and 25.1.1 causes the #[contractimpl] macro to invoke incorrect functions when both trait and inherent implementations share identical function names, allowing attackers to exploit logic flaws through public exploit code. Smart contract developers using affected versions risk silent execution of unintended code paths that could compromise contract integrity and security guarantees. …

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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata

Access
Deploy Soroban contract with duplicate function names
Exploit
Macro generates incorrect function wiring
Execution
Trait function call resolves to inherent function
Impact
Unintended contract logic executes

Vulnerability AssessmentAI

Exploitation Soroban contract must define both a trait implementation block (`impl Trait for MyContract`) and an inherent function with identical names in soroban-sdk versions prior to 22.0.10, 23.5.2, or 25.1.1. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment.
Risk Assessment CVSS 7.5 (HIGH). … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in.
Exploit Scenario An attacker could exploit this vulnerability to compromise the affected system.
Remediation A vendor patch is available — apply it immediately. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report.

Recommended ActionAI

Within 24 hours: Inventory all applications and smart contracts using soroban-sdk and identify affected versions. …

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Threat intelligence, references, and detailed analysis are available after sign-in.

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CVE-2026-26267 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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