Argo CD CVE-2026-62185

Exploitation requires that Argo CD was deployed with the argo-helm chart before version 10.0.0 AND that the cluster has no independent network segmentation (a CNI-enforced NetworkPolicy or service mesh) compensating for the chart's missing default policy. The attacker must already control a pod on the same cluster (CVSS PR:L, AV:A adjacent/in-cluster network) - this is not remotely reachable from outside the cluster without such a foothold. Reaching full RCE/cluster compromise further depends on chaining additional attacks against the reachable Argo APIs, so the missing NetworkPolicy alone grants network reachability, not automatic code execution. Limiting factors: single-tenant clusters with no untrusted workloads, clusters already enforcing NetworkPolicy at the CNI level, and installations on chart 10.0.0+ are not exposed.

The supplied CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L, base 8.6) frames this as an adjacent-network, low-complexity, low-privilege issue with high confidentiality and integrity impact - consistent with an attacker who already has a foothold as some pod on the cluster (PR:L) rather than a fully unauthenticated internet-facing flaw. It is an exposure/hardening gap, not a memory-corruption bug: exploitation requires combining this open network path with follow-on attacks against the now-reachable Argo APIs, which is why the vendor describes 'combined attacks' to reach RCE. No EPSS score, no SSVC decision, no POC, and no KEV listing were provided, so probability-of-exploitation signals are absent; the realistic risk is elevated in multi-tenant or shared clusters where untrusted workloads run alongside Argo CD, and lower in single-tenant clusters that already enforce network segmentation via a CNI-level policy or service mesh. This is a genuine defense-in-depth priority for shared-cluster operators rather than a wormable, mass-exploitable vulnerability.

An attacker who has compromised or deployed any low-privileged pod on a shared Kubernetes cluster (for example via a vulnerable application workload) discovers that Argo CD's repo-server and internal APIs are reachable because no NetworkPolicy blocks pod-to-pod traffic. From that pod they connect directly to repo-server and the Argo APIs, abuse the exposed functionality to extract repository credentials or manipulate application manifests, and pivot toward broader cluster compromise and remote code execution. No public exploit is identified at time of analysis, so this reflects the vendor-described 'combined attack' path rather than a released PoC.