Tilt CVE-2026-55884
CRITICALSeverity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:L/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Unauthenticated network access (AV:N/PR:N/UI:N) but AC:H because it depends on a non-default non-loopback bind; S:C since the token proxy reaches the separate apiserver/cluster, with high confidentiality and integrity and low availability impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/tilt-dev/tilt).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/tilt-dev/tilt
Lifecycle Timeline
6DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
The Tilt HUD HTTP server exposes state-changing and sensitive-read endpoints with no authentication. When the HUD is bound to a non-loopback address, a network attacker can trigger the developer's pre-defined Tiltfile resources, tamper with Tiltfile arguments, read full engine state including the session token, and reach the Tilt apiserver through a token-attaching proxy.
Details
The HUD server registers its handlers on a gorilla/mux router with no authenticating middleware. The cookieWrapper helper emits the Tilt-Token cookie but never validates it, and is attached only to the static-asset prefix.
Impact
An unauthenticated network caller can force any developer-defined resource to run on the host as the tilt user (choosing which and when, not the command text), set arbitrary Tiltfile arguments, disclose the session token and full engine state, and invoke apiserver resources via the loopback-token proxy. Because tilt up runs with the developer's privileges and credentials, the impact reaches the developer's environment and cluster.
Conditions for exploitation
- Affected version in
>= 0.20.8, <= 0.37.3. - HUD bound to a non-loopback address (
tilt up --host 0.0.0.0, orTILT_HOSTset). - Network reachability to the listener (default port
10350).
Not affected
- The default loopback-only bind is not reachable from the network.
Workarounds
Use the default loopback bind (omit --host, unset TILT_HOST) and ensure nothing else proxies to localhost:10350. No complete workaround short of upgrading for non-loopback deployments.
AnalysisAI
Missing authentication in the Tilt HUD HTTP server (Go package github.com/tilt-dev/tilt, versions 0.20.8 through 0.37.3) lets an unauthenticated network attacker trigger developer-defined Tiltfile resources, tamper with Tiltfile arguments, read full engine state including the session token, and proxy authenticated calls into the Tilt apiserver. Exploitation is only possible when Tilt is bound to a non-loopback address (via 'tilt up --host 0.0.0.0' or TILT_HOST), not in the safe default loopback configuration. No public exploit identified at time of analysis and it is not listed in CISA KEV; a vendor patch exists in v0.37.4.
Technical ContextAI
Tilt is a developer workflow tool for Kubernetes microservices that runs a local control plane ('tilt up') and serves a web HUD plus an embedded apiserver. The HUD HTTP server registers its handlers on a gorilla/mux router with no authenticating middleware. A cookieWrapper helper sets a 'Tilt-Token' cookie but never validates it and is attached only to the static-asset prefix, so the state-changing and sensitive-read API endpoints are entirely unprotected. This is a textbook CWE-306 (Missing Authentication for Critical Function): a token mechanism exists but is not enforced where it matters. The vendor fix (PR #6776, commit 47393fba) adds a requireToken wrapper on the apiserver proxy, restricts /debug/pprof to loopback via a loopbackOnly middleware, and makes the Tilt CLI attach the Tilt-Token header to its own requests. Affected component per CPE: pkg:go/github.com_tilt-dev_tilt.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade to Tilt v0.37.4 (https://github.com/tilt-dev/tilt/releases/tag/v0.37.4), which enforces the Tilt-Token on the apiserver proxy and restricts /debug endpoints to loopback (fix in PR https://github.com/tilt-dev/tilt/pull/6776). If you cannot upgrade immediately, revert to the default loopback bind by omitting '--host' and unsetting the TILT_HOST environment variable so the HUD listens only on localhost, and ensure no reverse proxy, port-forward, or container port mapping exposes localhost:10350 to the network; the trade-off is loss of intended remote HUD access, which the vendor notes is the only complete mitigation short of patching for non-loopback deployments. As additional hardening, restrict network access to port 10350 with host firewall rules or bind only to a trusted management interface. Advisory: https://github.com/tilt-dev/tilt/security/advisories/GHSA-c73q-8xxr-rgqm.
Same technique Authentication Bypass
View allVendor StatusVendor
SUSE
Severity: Critical| Product | Status |
|---|---|
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 16.1 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.1 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP5 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP6 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.5 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.6 | Affected |
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-c73q-8xxr-rgqm