Severity by source
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/ddnexus/pagy) · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/ddnexus/pagy
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionCVE.org
Summary
Pagy::I18n.locale= did not validate its argument before using it as a path component to load the matching dictionary file (<locale>.yml). An application that assigns untrusted input to the locale - e.g. the common pattern Pagy::I18n.locale = params[:locale] - let that input influence which file Pagy attempted to load.
Details
The setter stored the value as-is, and the loader joined it into a path and read it:
# gem/lib/pagy/modules/i18n/i18n.rb
def locale=(value)
Thread.current[:pagy_locale] = value.to_s
end
# ...later, when translating:
path = pathnames.reverse.map { |p| p.join("#{locale}.yml") }.find(&:exist?)
dictionary = YAML.load_file(path)[locale]Because the locale was used verbatim, a value such as an absolute path or a ../-style string redirected the lookup outside the locales directory. Pagy's subsequent structural check (dictionary['pagy']['p11n']) prevents the file's contents from being returned, so this is not a direct file read.
Fixed in 43.5.6 by constraining the locale to a BCP 47 shape before use:
LOCALE_PATTERN = /\A[a-zA-Z]{2,8}(-[a-zA-Z0-9]{1,8})*\z/
def locale=(value)
Thread.current[:pagy_locale] = value.to_s[LOCALE_PATTERN]
endAny non-matching value (including nil) resolves to the default locale and never reaches the file lookup.
PoC
In an application that sets Pagy::I18n.locale = params[:locale], the loader appends .yml and reads <locale>.yml, so the request param controls the target path. For example, pointing it at the app's config/database.yml:
- Send a request with
?locale=../../../config/database(adjust the
number of ../ to reach the app root from the gem's locales/ directory).
- Pagy calls
YAML.load_fileon the resulting…/config/database.yml. - The outcome differs by whether that
.ymlexists, is readable, parses
as YAML, and has Pagy's expected structure - an existing, readable config/database.yml raises a different error than a non-existent path (which silently falls back to the default locale). This yields a file-existence / readability oracle for .yml paths, and the targeted file is read into the process during the attempt.
Impact
Information disclosure (CWE-22 / CWE-200): a file-existence / readability oracle for .yml paths on the host, plus a server-side read of attacker-chosen files into the process. The file contents are not returned in the response.
Only applications that pass unsanitized end-user input into Pagy::I18n.locale= are affected. Applications that set the locale from trusted values are not affected.
Patched: pagy 43.5.6. Workaround (if you cannot upgrade): validate the locale before assigning it, e.g. Pagy::I18n.locale = params[:locale].to_s[/\A[a-zA-Z]{2,8}(-[a-zA-Z0-9]{1,8})*\z/], or restrict it to your known set of locales.
AnalysisAI
Information disclosure via path traversal in Pagy's I18n locale handler allows an attacker to verify the existence and readability of arbitrary
Same weakness CWE-22 – Path Traversal
View allSame technique Information Disclosure
View allShare
External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-50088
GHSA-2xmw-f8j8-wfxc