Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:N/A:N
Default TensorZero deployments run without authentication so PR:N is the realistic worst case; network low-complexity file read plus SSRF pivot gives S:C and C:H with no integrity/availability impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/tensorzero/tensorzero).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/tensorzero/tensorzero
Lifecycle Timeline
3Blast Radius
ecosystem impact- 6 pypi packages depend on tensorzero (4 direct, 2 indirect)
Ecosystem-wide dependent count for version 2026.6.0.
DescriptionCVE.org
Impact
The /internal/object_storage endpoint accepts a caller-supplied JSON storage_path parameter that dynamically overrides the TensorZero [object_storage] configuration.
By abusing the filesystem storage type, a caller can read arbitrary files from the gateway filesystem, including files that may contain sensitive credentials. Similarly, by abusing the s3_compatible storage type, the caller can coerce the gateway into making outbound object storage requests to attacker-chosen internal/cloud-metadata endpoints.
This vulnerability only applies when the gateway can be accessed by untrusted callers. If a developer's TensorZero deployment has authentication enabled, only authenticated callers can exploit this vulnerability. If a developer's deployment has authentication disabled, any caller can exploit this vulnerability.
Remediation
The vulnerability has been patched in version 2026.6.0. See PR #7527.
Workarounds
If developers are unable to upgrade a gateway that is exposed to untrusted callers, please block external access to the /internal/object_storage endpoint.
AnalysisAI
Arbitrary file read and server-side request forgery in TensorZero Gateway (pip package tensorzero, versions < 2026.6.0) let callers of the /internal/object_storage endpoint override the gateway's [object_storage] configuration via a caller-supplied storage_path JSON parameter. Using the filesystem storage type an attacker reads arbitrary files (including credential files) from the gateway host, while the s3_compatible type coerces the gateway into outbound requests to attacker-chosen internal or cloud-metadata endpoints. There is no public exploit identified at time of analysis and the flaw is not in CISA KEV; exploitability hinges on whether the deployment has authentication enabled.
Technical ContextAI
TensorZero is an open-source LLM gateway/observability stack whose Rust gateway persists model artifacts (e.g. images) through a pluggable [object_storage] backend supporting filesystem and s3_compatible (S3-style) storage kinds. The internal /internal/object_storage endpoint was designed to resolve StoragePath objects, but it trusted a client-supplied storage_path that dynamically replaced the operator-configured store rather than binding resolution to the gateway's own configuration. This maps to CWE-552 (Files or Directories Accessible to External Parties): untrusted input selects both the storage backend type and the path/target, so a filesystem override yields path/file disclosure and an s3_compatible override yields SSRF. The patched code (commit 0abbc838, PR #7527) hardens the Client::resolve path so the gateway only fetches from its own configured [object_storage], and adds an object-storage-disabled test configuration; affected package identity is pkg:pip/tensorzero.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade the tensorzero package to version 2026.6.0 or later (fix in commit 0abbc838 / PR #7527), per advisory GHSA-824w-x939-6cmc and release https://github.com/tensorzero/tensorzero/releases/tag/2026.6.0. If immediate upgrade is not possible for a gateway exposed to untrusted callers, block external access to the /internal/object_storage endpoint at a reverse proxy, ingress, or firewall (the vendor's recommended workaround); side effect is that any legitimate internal tooling relying on that endpoint must be sourced from a trusted network segment. Additionally, enable the gateway's authentication so only authenticated callers can reach the endpoint, and constrain the host's outbound network egress and IMDS access (e.g. enforce IMDSv2 / block 169.254.169.254 from the gateway) to blunt the SSRF-to-metadata path, accepting that egress restrictions may break legitimate S3-compatible object storage traffic.
Same technique Information Disclosure
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-64144
GHSA-824w-x939-6cmc