Severity by source
AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Local cgroup pressure-file write access gives AV:L/PR:L; the timing-sensitive cross-CPU race justifies AC:H; UAF in kernel context yields full C/I/A impact.
Primary rating from Vendor (Linux).
CVSS VectorVendor: Linux
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
5DescriptionCVE.org
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/psi: fix race between file release and pressure write
A potential race condition exists between pressure write and cgroup file release regarding the priv member of struct kernfs_open_file, which triggers the uaf reported in [1].
Consider the following scenario involving execution on two separate CPUs:
CPU0 CPU1 == == vfs_rmdir() kernfs_iop_rmdir() cgroup_rmdir() cgroup_kn_lock_live() cgroup_destroy_locked() cgroup_addrm_files() cgroup_rm_file() kernfs_remove_by_name() kernfs_remove_by_name_ns() vfs_write() __kernfs_remove() new_sync_write() kernfs_drain() kernfs_fop_write_iter() kernfs_drain_open_files() cgroup_file_write() kernfs_release_file() pressure_write() cgroup_file_release() ctx = of->priv; kfree(ctx); of->priv = NULL; cgroup_kn_unlock() cgroup_kn_lock_live() cgroup_get(cgrp) cgroup_kn_unlock() if (ctx->psi.trigger) // here, trigger uaf for ctx, that is of->priv
The cgroup_rmdir() is protected by the cgroup_mutex, it also safeguards the memory deallocation of of->priv performed within cgroup_file_release(). However, the operations involving of->priv executed within pressure_write() are not entirely covered by the protection of cgroup_mutex. Consequently, if the code in pressure_write(), specifically the section handling the ctx variable executes after cgroup_file_release() has completed, a uaf vulnerability involving of->priv is triggered.
Therefore, the issue can be resolved by extending the scope of the cgroup_mutex lock within pressure_write() to encompass all code paths involving of->priv, thereby properly synchronizing the race condition occurring between cgroup_file_release() and pressure_write().
And, if an live kn lock can be successfully acquired while executing the pressure write operation, it indicates that the cgroup deletion process has not yet reached its final stage; consequently, the priv pointer within open_file cannot be NULL. Therefore, the operation to retrieve the ctx value must be moved to a point *after* the live kn lock has been successfully acquired.
In another situation, specifically after entering cgroup_kn_lock_live() but before acquiring cgroup_mutex, there exists a different class of race condition:
CPU0: write memory.pressure CPU1: write cgroup.pressure=0 ===== =======
kernfs_fop_write_iter() kernfs_get_active_of(of) pressure_write() cgroup_kn_lock_live(memory.pressure) cgroup_tryget(cgrp) kernfs_break_active_protection(kn) ... blocks on cgroup_mutex
cgroup_pressure_write() cgroup_kn_lock_live(cgroup.pressure) cgroup_file_show(memory.pressure, false) kernfs_show(false) kernfs_drain_open_files() cgroup_file_release(of) kfree(ctx) of->priv = NULL cgroup_kn_unlock()
... acquires cgroup_mutex ctx = of->priv; // may now be NULL if (ctx->psi.trigger) // NULL dereference
Consequently, there is a possibility that of->priv is NULL, the pressure write needs to check for this.
Now that the scope of the cgroup_mutex has been expanded, the original explicit cgroup_get/put operations are no longer necessary, this is because acquiring/releasing the live kn lock inherently executes a cgroup get/put operation.
[1] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in pressure_write+0xa4/0x210 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4011 Call Trace: pressure_write+0xa4/0x210 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:4011 cgroup_file_write+0x36f/0x790 kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c:43 ---truncated---
AnalysisAI
Local privilege-escalation-capable memory corruption in the Linux kernel's PSI (Pressure Stall Information) subsystem allows a local user with write access to cgroup pressure files to trigger a use-after-free or NULL-pointer dereference. The flaw stems from a race between pressure_write() and cgroup file release/rmdir on the kernfs_open_file->priv pointer, confirmed via a KASAN slab-use-after-free report in pressure_write+0xa4/0x210. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires local access to a system with PSI enabled (CONFIG_PSI) and write permission to a cgroupv2 pressure-stall interface file (e.g. … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | Signals are largely consistent in pointing to a real-but-not-urgent local issue. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | A local attacker (or compromised process) on a shared or containerized host that can write to a cgroup's memory.pressure file races a pressure-trigger write against either a concurrent cgroup directory removal or a write of cgroup.pressure=0 that drains the open file. Winning the race causes pressure_write() to dereference a freed or NULLed of->priv, crashing the kernel (DoS) or, with heap-grooming to reclaim the freed ctx, potentially corrupting kernel memory toward privilege escalation. … |
| Remediation | Vendor-released patch: upgrade to a fixed stable kernel - 6.18.33, 7.0.10, or 7.1 (or your distribution's backported equivalent) - which extends the cgroup_mutex scope across all of->priv accesses and adds the NULL check. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours: Inventory all Linux systems and identify kernel versions; contact major vendors (Red Hat, Canonical, SUSE, Debian, etc.) for specific patch availability and timelines. …
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-38859
GHSA-3v2r-c9x3-5fgr