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CVSS:4.0/AV:A/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X
Adjacent BLE radio attack with no privileges or interaction; passive sniffing of unencrypted health data yields high confidentiality impact only, no integrity or availability effect.
Primary rating from Vendor (icscert).
CVSS VectorVendor: icscert
Lifecycle Timeline
3DescriptionCVE.org
An attacker within BLE communication range can passively intercept wireless traffic and obtain sensitive health-related information, including glucose measurement values.
AnalysisAI
Cleartext Bluetooth Low Energy transmission in the Apollo Pharmacy Blood Glucose Monitoring System (Model APG-01 BT) allows an attacker within BLE radio range to passively sniff wireless traffic and recover patient glucose readings and related health data. The flaw is a CWE-319 cleartext-transmission issue affecting a consumer medical device, disclosed via CISA ICS-CERT advisory ICSMA-26-169-01. No public exploit identified at time of analysis, and the vulnerability is not listed in CISA KEV.
Technical ContextAI
The affected product is a consumer blood glucose meter that pairs with a companion mobile application over Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) to deliver measurement readings. CWE-319 (Cleartext Transmission of Sensitive Information) indicates the BLE link layer is used without applying pairing/bonding-based encryption (LE Secure Connections or legacy LE encryption) or any application-layer encryption over GATT characteristics, so glucose measurement values are emitted in plaintext on the BLE radio interface. The single affected CPE is cpe:2.3:a:apollo_pharmacy:blood_glucose_monitoring_system_(model_no._apg-01_bt) (all versions), and CISA's referenced 'Understanding Bluetooth Technology' guidance underscores that confidentiality on BLE requires explicit pairing-time encryption, which this product does not enforce.
RemediationAI
No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis; consult CISA ICSMA-26-169-01 (https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/ics-medical-advisories/icsma-26-169-01) and contact Apollo Pharmacy via https://www.apollopharmacy.in/contact-us for firmware status. As compensating controls, users and care providers should operate the meter in environments where casual BLE eavesdroppers are unlikely (e.g., avoid taking readings in public spaces, clinics, or shared housing) accepting the trade-off of reduced convenience, disable BLE on the meter between readings to shrink the exposure window at the cost of having to re-pair, and where clinically acceptable read values directly from the device display rather than syncing to the phone app. Organizations procuring the device for patient programs should review CISA's Bluetooth guidance (https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/understanding-bluetooth-technology) and consider substituting with meters that enforce BLE LE Secure Connections pairing until a fix is published.
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External POC / Exploit Code
Leaving vuln.today
EUVD-2026-37971
GHSA-cmv8-9pgg-5rx4