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FUXA CVE-2026-47717

HIGH
Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data (CWE-201)
2026-05-27 https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA GHSA-q3w6-q3hc-c5x6
7.5
CVSS 3.1 · GitHub Advisory
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Severity by source

GitHub Advisory PRIMARY
7.5 HIGH
AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N

Primary rating from GitHub Advisory · only source for this CVE.

CVSS VectorGitHub Advisory

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
Attack Vector
Network
Attack Complexity
Low
Privileges Required
None
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
None

Lifecycle Timeline

2
Source Code Evidence Fetched
May 27, 2026 - 23:17 vuln.today
Analysis Generated
May 27, 2026 - 23:17 vuln.today

DescriptionGitHub Advisory

Summary

The GET /api/project endpoint exposes sensitive project configuration data to guest-context requests even when secureEnabled is enabled.

Details

File: server/api/projects/index.js

javascript
prjApp.get("/api/project", secureFnc, function(req, res) {
    const permission = checkGroupsFnc(req);
    runtime.project.getProject(req.userId, permission).then(result => {
        if (result) {
            res.json(result);
        }
    });
});

The endpoint uses the secureFnc middleware, but this middleware calls verifyToken in server/api/jwt-helper.js which auto-generates a valid guest JWT when no token is provided (line 49-51):

javascript
if (!token) {
    token = getGuestToken();
}

The guest token is signed with the server's secret and passes verification. The handler then calls getProject which returns the full project data. The _filterProjectPermission function (line 924 of server/runtime/project/index.js) filters some UI elements for non-admin users, but it does not remove scripts, devices, alarms, or other sensitive configuration data.

PoC

Environment

  • FUXA v1.3.0-2773 (frangoteam/fuxa:latest)
  • secureEnabled: true with a random secretCode

Retrieve full project data without authentication:

bash
curl -s http://192.168.32.129:1881/api/project
json
{
  "scripts": [
    {
      "id": "SCRIPT_ID",
      "name": "calculate"
    },
  ]
}

No authentication token, API key, or cookie was provided. The response includes:

  • Server-side scripts: full source code, IDs, names, execution mode, and permission levels. This reveals internal automation logic and sensitive project structure information that could assist further attacks against the deployed system.
  • Device configurations: and communication endpoint information may also be exposed depending on the deployed project configuration.
  • HMI views: the full SVG content and layout of every operator screen, including variable bindings that map UI elements to device tags.
  • Alarm definitions: alarm thresholds, conditions, and notification settings when configured.

Impact

The endpoint may expose sensitive project configuration data including script metadata, device connection information, HMI configuration, and alarm definitions. In industrial environments this information can assist further targeted attacks against the deployed system.

AnalysisAI

Unauthenticated information disclosure in FUXA 1.3.0 (web-based SCADA/HMI server, npm package fuxa-server) lets remote attackers retrieve full project configuration from the GET /api/project endpoint even when secureEnabled is turned on. The exposed data includes server-side script source code, device connection details, HMI view layouts with tag bindings, and alarm definitions. Publicly available exploit code exists (a single unauthenticated curl request demonstrated in the GitHub advisory), and the CVSS vector confirms unauthenticated network exploitation rated 7.5 (confidentiality-only impact); there is no public exploit identified as actively exploited in CISA KEV.

Technical ContextAI

FUXA is a Node.js-based SCADA/HMI and IIoT platform used to build operator dashboards and connect to industrial devices (Modbus, S7, OPC-UA, etc.). The flaw maps to CWE-201 (Insertion of Sensitive Information Into Sent Data): the /api/project route is wrapped by the secureFnc middleware, but secureFnc delegates to verifyToken in server/api/jwt-helper.js, which on a missing token silently substitutes a guest JWT via getGuestToken() (jwt-helper.js lines 49-51). That guest token is signed with the server's own secret, so it passes signature verification and the handler proceeds as an authenticated guest. The getProject implementation then returns the project, and the _filterProjectPermission routine (server/runtime/project/index.js line 924) only strips selected UI elements for non-admin users - it never removes scripts, devices, alarms, or other sensitive configuration - so guest-context callers receive the complete project. The only affected package per the provided data is pkg:npm/fuxa-server.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patch: upgrade to FUXA v1.3.1, which the release notes confirm addresses this class of issue (including 'Security: remove script property of frontend project', authentication-bypass fixes in request routing #2260, and related authorization fixes); pull the patched image or release from https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA/releases/tag/v1.3.1 and review the advisory at https://github.com/frangoteam/FUXA/security/advisories/GHSA-q3w6-q3hc-c5x6. Until you can upgrade, place FUXA behind a reverse proxy or network ACL that requires real authentication and blocks unauthenticated access to /api/project - the side effect is that any legitimate guest/anonymous dashboard access also breaks. Additionally, restrict the FUXA HTTP port (default 1881) to a trusted OT management segment or VPN rather than exposing it to general networks, accepting that remote operators will then need VPN access; rotating the secretCode does not mitigate this because the guest token is signed with that same secret, so secret rotation alone is not a valid workaround.

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CVE-2026-47717 vulnerability details – vuln.today

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