What is the CVSS score of CVE-2026-47372?

CVE-2026-47372 has a CVSS 3.1 base score of 9.1 (Critical). CVSS vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N. EPSS exploitation probability: 0.0%.

Which versions of Crypt::SaltedHash are affected by CVE-2026-47372?

Crypt::SaltedHash through version 0.09 uses weak password salts that enable efficient offline attacks against stolen credential databases.. A patch is available.

How to fix or mitigate CVE-2026-47372?

24 hours: Identify all systems and applications using Crypt::SaltedHash and document current versions. 7 days: Upgrade Crypt::SaltedHash to version 0.10 on all affected systems and verify functionality. 30 days: Evaluate credential re-hashing feasibility; consider forced password reset for high-value accounts if database breach is confirmed or suspected.

Crypt::SaltedHash CVE-2026-47372

EUVD-2026-31198 CRITICAL

Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) (CWE-338)

2026-05-20 9b29abf9-4ab0-4765-b253-1875cd9b441e

GHSA-h295-pfx3-r298

Information Disclosure Suse

9.1

CVSS 3.1 · NVD

Severity by source

NVD PRIMARY

9.1 CRITICAL

AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

SUSE

CRITICAL

qualitative

Primary rating from NVD.

CVSS VectorNVD

CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N

Attack Vector

Network

Attack Complexity

Low

Privileges Required

None

User Interaction

None

Scope

Unchanged

Confidentiality

High

Integrity

High

Availability

None

Lifecycle Timeline

Source Code Evidence Fetched

May 21, 2026 - 15:22 vuln.today

Analysis Generated

May 21, 2026 - 15:22 vuln.today

CVSS changed

May 21, 2026 - 15:22 NVD

9.1 (CRITICAL)

CVE Published

May 20, 2026 - 22:16 nvd

UNKNOWN (no severity yet)

DescriptionCVE.org

Crypt::SaltedHash versions through 0.09 for Perl generate insecure random values for salts.

These versions use the built-in rand function, which is predictable and unsuitable for cryptography.

AnalysisAI

Predictable salt generation in the Perl module Crypt::SaltedHash through version 0.09 weakens password hash storage by deriving salts from Perl's non-cryptographic rand() function. Attackers who obtain a salted hash database can predict or precompute salts, dramatically reducing the cost of offline brute-force or rainbow-table attacks against stored credentials. No public exploit identified at time of analysis and EPSS exploitation probability is negligible (0.01%), but the upstream maintainer has released a fix in version 0.10 that switches to a system CSPRNG.

Technical ContextAI

Crypt::SaltedHash is a Perl module on CPAN used to generate salted password hashes (SHA, SSHA, etc.) commonly consumed by LDAP-style authentication backends. The root cause maps to CWE-338 (Use of Cryptographically Weak Pseudo-Random Number Generator): the salt was assembled character-by-character from a 16-character hex alphabet using Perl's built-in rand(), which is a deterministic Mersenne-style PRNG seeded from low-entropy sources and is not suitable for security-sensitive output. The upstream patch (commit 9b68437d) replaces the rand()-based loop with Crypt::SysRandom::random_bytes(), drawing from the operating system's CSPRNG (e.g., /dev/urandom or getrandom on Linux) and hex-encoding the result, eliminating the predictability of generated salts.

RemediationAI

Vendor-released patch: Crypt::SaltedHash 0.10 - upgrade from CPAN (cpanm Crypt::SaltedHash) or pin the dependency to >=0.10 in cpanfile/dist.ini; the fix introduces Crypt::SysRandom and POSIX as new dependencies, so ensure these are available in production Perl environments before deploying. The upstream patch is documented at https://github.com/robrwo/perl-Crypt-SaltedHash/commit/9b68437d2cd420b819b3a795474c3870338d38d5 and release notes at https://metacpan.org/release/RRWO/Crypt-SaltedHash-0.10/changes, with discussion on oss-security at http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/05/20/22. If immediate upgrade is not possible, a compensating control is to override or monkey-patch the salt generator to draw from Crypt::URandom or Crypt::SysRandom directly, accepting the maintenance burden of a local patch; additionally, treat any hashes generated under <=0.09 as weakened and force a password reset / rehash on next successful login so that legacy weak-salt records are replaced with new ones generated by the patched code.