EUVD-2026-36035Severity by source
AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Primary rating from NVD · only source for this CVE.
CVSS VectorNVD
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Lifecycle Timeline
2DescriptionNVD
Roxy-WI is a web interface for managing Haproxy, Nginx, Apache and Keepalived servers. In versions 8.2.6.4 and prior, the install blueprint declares only bp.before_request → @jwt_required() (app/routes/install/routes.py:36-39). The individual endpoints install_exporter, install_waf, install_geoip, check_geoip, get_exporter_version, and get_task_status are not wrapped in page_for_admin and do not call roxywi_common.is_user_has_access_to_its_group(server_ip) or check_is_server_in_group(server_ip). Only the GET index page (install_monitoring) gates on roxywi_auth.page_for_admin(level=2). Because the missing decorators omit both role and group checks, any logged-in user - including the default guest role 4 - can install/reconfigure exporters, WAF, and GeoIP databases on every server in the Roxy-WI database, regardless of tenant ownership. The Ansible playbooks run with the per-server SSH credential stored in Roxy-WI, which the credentials' rightful owner (a different tenant) has provisioned with sudo rights for the management workflow. At time of publication, there are no publicly available patches.
Articles & Coverage 2
AnalysisAI
Privilege escalation and cross-tenant compromise in Roxy-WI versions 8.2.6.4 and prior allows any authenticated user - including the default guest role 4 - to install or reconfigure exporters, WAF, and GeoIP databases on every managed server regardless of tenant ownership. Because the affected installer endpoints lack role and group decorators, low-privilege users can pivot through stored SSH credentials with sudo to achieve root-level command execution on HAProxy/Nginx/Apache hosts belonging to other tenants. …
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Attack ChainAIDerived
Hypothetical attack flow derived from CVE metadata
Vulnerability AssessmentAI
| Exploitation | Exploitation requires (1) network access to the Roxy-WI web interface, (2) any authenticated session on the Roxy-WI application - including the default guest role 4, with no admin role required - and (3) a multi-tenant Roxy-WI deployment where the target server_ip is registered under a different tenant whose stored SSH credential has sudo on the target host (the standard Roxy-WI management configuration). … Additional conditions and limiting factors are described in the full assessment. |
| Risk Assessment | The CVSS 9.9 score (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H) is well aligned with the technical reality: network reachability, low complexity, only a low-privilege account required, no user interaction, and a Scope change because the bug in the web app yields root execution on downstream managed hosts via Ansible. … Full risk analysis with EPSS, KEV, and SSVC signal comparison available after sign-in. |
| Exploit Scenario | An attacker obtains or is issued a low-privilege Roxy-WI account (e.g., the default guest role 4) on a multi-tenant Roxy-WI instance, enumerates server_ip values belonging to another tenant from the UI or API, then issues a POST to the install_exporter, install_waf, or install_geoip endpoint specifying the victim tenant's server_ip. Roxy-WI executes the corresponding Ansible playbook against that host using the victim tenant's stored SSH credential with sudo, giving the attacker root-equivalent command execution on a server they should have no access to. … |
| Remediation | No vendor-released patch identified at time of analysis - the GitHub advisory GHSA-v3f8-g2v8-jq5h (https://github.com/roxy-wi/roxy-wi/security/advisories/GHSA-v3f8-g2v8-jq5h) confirms no public fix is available as of publication, so operators should monitor the advisory and the roxy-wi repository for an updated release above 8.2.6.4. … Detailed patch versions, workarounds, and compensating controls in full report. |
Recommended ActionAI
Within 24 hours: Inventory all Roxy-WI installations and versions; disable default guest role 4 accounts; implement network-level access controls to installer endpoints. …
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