OpenStack Ironic CVE-2026-44917

Exploitation requires the attacker to hold a valid Ironic API credential at the operator privilege level sufficient to create or modify bare metal nodes with custom pxe_template parameters. The pxe_template feature must be in use or accessible in the target deployment - operators who do not allow custom PXE templates via API policy may not be exposed. Exploitation is limited to authenticated access; unauthenticated exploitation has not been confirmed and cannot be asserted given the absence of a CVSS vector. The attack is constrained to the conductor host's filesystem and does not directly affect the hypervisor or compute plane. EOL releases (bobcat, dalmation) remain permanently unpatched by the upstream project.

No CVSS vector has been published for this CVE, which prevents definitive scoring of attack vector, complexity, or privilege requirements. The vulnerability is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog, and no public exploit code has been identified at time of analysis. EPSS data is not available. Risk must be inferred from the advisory context: the Ironic conductor is an operator-facing control plane service, so exploitation likely requires authenticated API access (an Ironic operator-level credential), which limits the exposed attack surface. However, the impact is potentially critical - the conductor stores sensitive infrastructure secrets that could be leveraged to pivot into physical hardware management or adjacent cloud services. The oss-security disclosure and coordinated credit attribution (Red Hat, Ericsson) indicate this was responsibly reported and follows a structured disclosure process, suggesting the issue is genuine. The absence of CVSS and CWE data means key risk signals are MISSING and defenders should not assume this is low severity based on score absence alone.

An authenticated Ironic operator submits a node or template provisioning request containing a crafted pxe_template value that includes a path traversal sequence or template directive referencing a sensitive file on the conductor host, such as /etc/ironic/ironic.conf or SSH private keys in the conductor's home directory. The conductor processes the template and the extracted file contents are returned to the attacker via the API or rendered into accessible provisioning artifacts. No public exploit code has been identified, but the attack primitive - user-controlled template input processed server-side - is well-understood and straightforward to replicate from the advisory description alone.