Docker CVE-2026-44328

Summary

free5GC's SMF mounts the UPI management route group without inbound OAuth2 middleware (same root cause as the broader UPI auth gap reported in free5gc/free5gc#887). On top of that, the DELETE /upi/v1/upNodesLinks/{upNodeRef} handler unconditionally dereferences upNode.UPF after the type-guarded async release, even though AN-typed nodes are constructed without a UPF object. As a result, a single unauthenticated DELETE /upi/v1/upNodesLinks/gNB1 request crashes the handler with a nil-pointer panic AND mutates the in-memory user-plane topology before panicking (the UpNodeDelete(upNodeRef) line runs first). This is an unauthenticated, state-mutating panic-DoS sink that an off-path network attacker can trigger by name against any AN entry.

Details

Validated against the SMF container in the official Docker compose lab.

• Source repo tag: v4.2.1
• Running Docker image: free5gc/smf:v4.2.1
• Runtime SMF commit: 8385c00a
• Docker validation date: 2026-03-22 local (container log timestamp 2026-03-21T23:43:17Z)
• SMF endpoint: http://10.100.200.6:8000

Control comparison on the same SMF instance:

• GET /nsmf-oam/v1/ (no token) -> 401 Unauthorized
• DELETE /upi/v1/upNodesLinks/gNB1 (no token) -> 500 Internal Server Error (panic)

The sibling nsmf-oam returning 401 proves OAuth middleware IS wired in for other SMF route groups; the UPI group specifically is mounted without it.

Vulnerable handler logic (paths in free5gc/smf):

// NFs/smf/internal/sbi/api_upi.go:94..99
if upNode.Type == smf_context.UPNODE_UPF {
    go s.Processor().ReleaseAllResourcesOfUPF(upNode.UPF)
}
upi.UpNodeDelete(upNodeRef)
upNode.UPF.CancelAssociation()   // <-- panics for AN-typed nodes; nil UPF

The Type == UPNODE_UPF guard only protects the asynchronous ReleaseAllResourcesOfUPF call. After that, UpNodeDelete(upNodeRef) runs unconditionally (so the topology mutation lands first), and then upNode.UPF.CancelAssociation() is called unconditionally on a *UPF that is nil for AN nodes by construction.

Code evidence:

• UPI group mounted WITHOUT auth middleware:
• NFs/smf/internal/sbi/server.go:76
• NFs/smf/internal/sbi/server.go:78
• Protected control comparison (other SMF groups DO use auth):
• NFs/smf/internal/sbi/server.go:99
• NFs/smf/internal/sbi/server.go:105
• Delete handler (panic site):
• NFs/smf/internal/sbi/api_upi.go:94
• NFs/smf/internal/sbi/api_upi.go:99
• AN nodes are constructed without a UPF object (root cause of the nil deref):
• NFs/smf/internal/context/user_plane_information.go:95
• NFs/smf/internal/context/user_plane_information.go:97

PoC

Reproduced end-to-end against the running SMF at http://10.100.200.6:8000.

1. Control: protected sibling OAM route returns 401:

curl -i http://10.100.200.6:8000/nsmf-oam/v1/

HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized

1. Trigger: unauthenticated DELETE on the default AN node gNB1:

curl -i -X DELETE http://10.100.200.6:8000/upi/v1/upNodesLinks/gNB1

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error

1. SMF container logs (docker logs --tail 120 smf) show topology mutation landing BEFORE the panic, and the panic stack pointing at api_upi.go:99:

[INFO][SMF][Init] UPNode [gNB1] found. Deleting it.
[INFO][SMF][Init] Delete UPLink [UPF] <=> [gNB1].
[ERRO][SMF][GIN] panic: runtime error: invalid memory address or nil pointer dereference
github.com/free5gc/smf/internal/sbi.(*Server).DeleteUpNodeLink
    /go/src/free5gc/NFs/smf/internal/sbi/api_upi.go:99 +0x298
[INFO][SMF][GIN] | 500 | DELETE | /upi/v1/upNodesLinks/gNB1

The lab state was manually restored after validation by re-creating the AN entry; that POST is restoration-only and is NOT a mitigation.

Impact

Three compounding defects on the same SMF SBI surface:

1. Missing inbound authentication (CWE-306) and authorization (CWE-862) on the UPI route group, so the trigger is reachable to any off-path network attacker who can reach SMF on the SBI -- no token, no session, no UE state needed. The same-instance nsmf-oam returning 401 proves the middleware is wired in elsewhere and only missing on UPI.
2. NULL pointer dereference (CWE-476) in DeleteUpNodeLink: the Type == UPNODE_UPF guard only covers the async release call, then upNode.UPF.CancelAssociation() runs unconditionally on AN-typed nodes that have a nil UPF field by construction.
3. Order of operations (CWE-755 / CWE-754): UpNodeDelete(upNodeRef) mutates the in-memory user-plane topology BEFORE the dereference panics, so the topology change lands even though the request returns 500. This makes the bug state-mutating, not just a plain panic.

Any party that can reach SMF on the SBI can:

• Delete arbitrary named entries (e.g. gNB1) from SMF's in-memory user-plane topology anonymously via a single DELETE /upi/v1/upNodesLinks/{ref} request, denying SMF's ability to consider that AN/UPF in subsequent UPF selection / PFCP path establishment for legitimate UE sessions.
• Trigger a panic on the SMF goroutine for the deleted-AN case, even though Gin recovers the goroutine, leaving the topology in the mutated state above.
• Repeat the trigger by name against any AN entry, sustaining the topology denial without ever authenticating.

This is a strict superset of the impact in free5gc/free5gc#887 for this specific code path: same auth bypass, plus a concrete request-triggerable nil deref, plus state mutation that survives the panic.

Affected: free5gc v4.2.1.

Upstream issue: https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/issues/905 Upstream fix: https://github.com/free5gc/smf/pull/199